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This study focuses on the media's role and impact on voter turnout in the 1998 
Legislative Council Election in Hong Kong. From a normative theory of media in 
democracy, it is argued that media should "activate informed participation" in a 
democratic election. Thus, media are expected to play a role in encouraging political 
participation during an election. 
Underthis concern a framework is constructed so that media effects on political 
knowledge, political attitudes, and voter turnout are studied and analyzed. The 
relationships between news media consumption and various consequences are 
explained by incorporating concepts and arguments from political communication 
research, and studies in social psychology. 
A brief yet systematic analysis on media coverage of the election, focusing on 
the notion of strategic coverage, is also conducted so that an empirical basis is 
established for the discussion of the normative implications of the media effects 
found. 
〇n the whole, it is found that media contribute to political knowledge, which in 
turn may affect political attitudes in various ways and contribute to voting. However, 
by covering the election as a strategic game participated by politicians with no 
significance for the large public, news media consumption also has negative impacts 
0门 voter turnout. -
- I ‘ 
The author argues that, as media play an important role in the political process 
in Hong Kong. Journalists should recognize that they are a part of the political 
process and their works would have important consequences on democratization in 
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I. Introduction 
While election studies constitute the bulk of political communication research in 
Western countries, especially the US, similar research in Hong Kong is still at its 
incipient stage. As democracy was only introduced in the 1980s and direct elections 
did not exist in Hong Kong until 1991, researchers still have much work to do in order 
to achieve an understanding of the electoral process of Hong Kong. 
This research aims at studying a particular aspect of the 1998 Legislative 
Council (LegCo) election in Hong Kong - the role and impact of the media in the 
electoral process regarding the problem of voter turnout. This research will focus on 
the geographical constituencies in the 1998 election. While the whole LegCo were 
returned by geographical constituencies, functional constituencies and election 
committee, only the first one has direct elections in which all Hong Kong adult 
permanent residents are eligible voters. Although only 20 seats were returned by the 
method, it is the only procedure among the three that can be said as truly democratic. 
It is also the component of HK LegCo election expected to expand in the future under 
further democratization. Though if the Basic Law of Hong Kong is not amended (and 
it is unlikely that it will be amended), Hong Kong people still have to wait for at least 
10 more years. 
In doing research on Hong Kong elections, two particular principles have to be 
kept in mind. First, as Tao (1995a) argued, communication behavior is not an isolated 
phenomenon, its content, format and functions all have inextricable relations with the 
political environment, institutional rules, professional standards and cultural values of 
t 
a society. The context inside which the election and political communication take 
place should not be neglected. 
On the other hand, it is also important to bring about a dialogue with similar 
studies in other contexts. Through the comparisons we can discover the similarities 
1 • 
and dissimilarities in the electoral and communication processes in different societies. 
Without conducting a comparative study, the large amount of theoretical works and 
empirical research about election and political communication in other countries are 
an important reference point for local researchers in designing their studies and 
explaining their results. In this study, theoretical frameworks and empirical research 
in the West are used as the basis of organization, with discussions about and 
references to the local context intermingled in it. 
The study will be divided into the following parts. This introductory chapter will 
give a discussion on the aim and scope of the research. Chapter 2 will provide a brief 
discussion of the context in which the 1998 LegCo election was held, as well as a 
general discussion about the potential influence of the political media in Hong Kong. 
Chapter 3 will give an overview of some basic theoretical and research approaches 
towards election studies, turnout and media effects. That would make clear the 
approaches used and assumptions made in this research. Chapter 4 will further 
explicate and develop the theoretical framework utilized in this research. Chapter 5 
will inform the readers about the methods used for data collection. Chapter 6 to 8 will 
present the results from analyzing the survey data on media effects in the election. 
Chapter 9 will give a brief analysis of media content to shed light on the results of 
survey analysis, and provide cues about media performance regarding its 
encouraging, or discouraging, participation. Chapter 10will be the conclusion. 
- 产 ‘ 
The research question ‘ : 
The main focus of the research is on media effects on voter turnout in the 1998 
1 
LegCo election. However, the question is not simply an empirical one, that is, 
existence or non-existence of certain effects. Rather, it is related to a normative view 
of media role and performance in elections, or in democratic societies in general. 
That is, the empirical existence of media effects would have normative implications. 
Here, the importance of voter turnout, media effects, and the effect-performance 
2 
relationship will be discussed in turn. Then the aim of the study will be stated. 
Among the large amount of work done on election and voting, the problem of 
voter turnout has received relatively less attention than vote choice. There are at 
least three main reasons behind this relative lack of concern. First, some countries 
require voting by law. For instance, some European governments (e.g, Italy) would 
sanction people who fail to go out to vote. As a result, turnout rates in these countries 
are constantly extremely high and the cause is clear. Second, even in countries 
without such regulations turnout rates may still attain very satisfactory levels. If a 
country has an average turnout rate of around 70 to 80 percent, then the problem of 
voter turnout would also become less important. A 100 percent turnout rate is not 
necessary for the well being of a democracy'. When the turnout rate remains high, 
the problem of "who wins" would become a much more interesting, if not much more 
important, topic. Third, in a long established democracy, fluctuations in voter turnout 
rates between elections are usually small. As Lang and Lang (1968) stated, "in a 
structural view，levels of electoral participation appear to be fairly stable attributes of 
the political system, reflecting the influence of cultural, historical and social factors 
operating independently of the other circumstances surrounding an election" (p.66). 
However, in a society that does not have a high turnout rate, there are important 
reasons for concerns. This explains why US researchers, facing declining turnout 
rates in the past three decades, have started to pay more attention on the turnout 
problem in recent years (Teixeira, 1987, 1992; Weaver, 1994; Joslyn, 1984). Low 
- 产 ‘ 
voter turnout may arouse concems among candidates as increasing the number of -
voters may be beneficial to some parties and disadvantageous to others. In Hong 
I 
Kong, it is often argued that increasing voter turnout would help the democrats. Thus 
it is sometimes assumed that the democrats have a larger stake in increasing the 
1 Some theorists even argue that a certain portion of the public being apathetic is good and 
necessary for a democracy. It is because the apathetic public does not have any particular political 
affiliation, provides the target for competing factions to persuade. They can act like a buffer zone, which 
can alleviate the direct conflicts between competing factions in a society. 
^ 
J 
turnoutl More important, as Teixeira (1992) pointed out, a low turnout rate is 
detrimental for democratic legitimacy. The representative-ness of the elected officials 
runs into question if they receive support only from a restricted portion of the public. 
The agenda they put forward becomes the agenda of a small group of people. The 
result can range from "widespread social and political disorganization to the 
reinforcement of some of the milder social pathologies [the American public] already 
see: gridlock government and a political culture that turns talented people away from 
careers in public service" (p.3). 
In a place like Hong Kong where democracy is only partial and developing, 
increasing turnout is important for continuing democratization. A higher turnout rate 
would make the democrats' call for speedy democratization stronger. More important, 
as Almond and Verba (1963) argured, a democracy is characterized as having a 
democratic political culture, of which political participation is a very important 
component. Voting is only the most basic kind of political participation in a democratic 
society, other kinds of participation may range from participating in campaign 
activities in election times, to participating in community activities and personal 
contacts with officials (Nie and Verba, 1972). Research has shown that the Hong 
Kong public is not very active in political participation but not completely apathetic. 
Lau and Kuan (1995) argue that the Hong Kong public can be characterized as the 
attentive spectators, who do not participate actively in public affairs but pay a 
considerable amount of attention to them through the media. However, as 
‘democracy develops, citizens would be required to act more actively. 了 
1 
2 The reason for this expectation is that the pro-China parties and organizations have a strong and 
more direct relationship with their supporters. Their mobilizing power is greater. While the Democrats 
enjoy wider support in the society as a whole, they do not have very strong mobilizing power and direct 
relationship with their supporters. Thus, if turnout rate is low it would include a larger proportion of 
supporters of pro-China parties. Nevertheless, there is no systematic research on whether this is 
actually the case, and politicians themselves usually deny or neglect this argument in public. 
4 
Media effects 
Questions on media effects have attracted communication researchers' 
attention for more than half a century. Different conceptions of media effects have 
marked different eras of effect research, from the hypodermic needle paradigm, to 
the limited effects model, to the renewed interest in media effects starting from the 
70s. Media effects are surely among the important concerns in modern society even 
if evidence of powerful media effects has not yet been conclusive (Bartels, 1993). 
Existence or absence of media effects has been demonstrated and discussed 
by many researchers in the West. The limited effects model, based upon the 
research findings by Lazarsfeld and his colleagues in the 40s, dominated the 
understanding about media effects for decades. Lang and Lang (1968) stated its 
principle as follow, 
very few of the effects of mass communication are immediate and direct, 
most are cumulative in that they usually involve prior exposure to other 
communications that set a framework within which any specific item of 
information is perceived (p.4). 
However, starting from the 1970s researchers have renewed their interests in 
1 
media effects. In the larger arena of communication research this resurgence was 
” n o t unrelated to the success of a number of new hypotheses, such as agenda-setting, 
knowledge-gap etc. More important perhaps are the re-conceptualizations of effects 
and reformulations of the research questions. While effect research in 1950s and 60s 
has focused mainly on attitudinal change, research into the 70s has incorporated 
广 ‘ 
various cognitive effects into account. Also, while the existence and—non-existence of 
effects were the main question in the past, researchers now are more interested in 
« 
the mechanism of effects;. According to McQuail (1994), media effects research 
3 Re-conceptualizing effects and reformulating the focus of research as the mechanisms rather 
than existence of effects per se are related to the widespread use of cognitive psychology and social 
psychology in the field. These developments have broadened the scope of study and strengthened the 
theoretical basis of effects research. Actually, reviewing the research in recent years, the overall 
conclusion that can be drawn may not be different from that of the earlier era: some people will be 
affected some times under some conditions. But the difference is that researchers nowadays are more 
5 
starting from the 80s is greatly affected by the rise of "social constructivism," leading 
to a new era of effect research that can be named as "audience negotiated 
influence." In sum, the incorporation of theories and hypotheses from other fields 
including sociology and psychology, together with improvements in methodologies, 
have led to the continuation of effect research with a widened landscape. 
For studies of media effects in elections, beginning from the 70s US researchers 
re-evaluated the political and media environment. Patterson (1980) argues that the 
decline of partisanship in America, well documented by Nie et al. (1979), allowed the 
media to exert more influence. The rise of television as a powerful medium also 
deserves attention. Similarly, Holbrook (1996) put forward four arguments for 
campaign effects. They are: 1) a significant number of people make their decisions 
during the campaign, 2) party identification has declined, 3) there are significant 
fluctuations in candidate support during the campaign period, and 4) elections 
become more and more media oriented. 
Review and discussions of relevant studies and findings will be given in the next 
chapter. From the brief discussion above we see that media effects study will be 
meaningful from the theoretical standpoint if new theories and approaches are 
• incorporated. The significance of effect research also depends on the actual social 
context. In the next chapter it will be pointed out that there are reasons supporting us 
paying attention to media effects in Hong Kong, where studies in political 
communication in general are lacking, let alone specific studies about media effects 
^ on voters. There are a few pioneering articles (Cheung, 1995;'Chan, 1995), but the 
conclusions that can be drawn are still very limited. And one of the basic goals of this 
t 
study is to provide a more systematic and rigorous analysis of media effects in Hong 
Kong elections regarding a particular problem 一 the voter turnout. 
able to specific the "somes," and they are more able to explain why effects sometimes exist, and also 
why they do not exist at other times. ’ 
6 
Effects and performance 
Media performance is another area of concerns attracting great attention from 
researchers and the public alike. Media performance is both a normative and an 
empirical question, concerning what media did with reference to what they should do, 
while media effect concerns mainiy what media actually did. However, the two areas 
are not unrelated and studying media performance and effects together would 
provide us a better understanding of media's role and functions in elections. For 
instance, McLeod, McLeod and Kosicki (1994) strongly suggested that, 
The connection between normative democratic standards for the media and 
empirical political communication research……should be restored. In 
democratic societies, normative expectations can serve as useful criteria for 
evaluating the performance of media institutions and the workings of 
political communication more generally......Examinations of performance 
requires going beyond critiques of media content and other institutional 
outputs to study individual cognitive, affective, and behavioral effects of 
these products (p.124). 
While McLeod et al. argued that performance research should move one step 
forward to study effects, we can also argue that effect research needs to pay more 
attention to the normative implications of effects, and the relationship between effects 
‘ and performance. Some scholars describe the move to develop theoretical 
hypotheses that would integrate media institution, content, and effect research as 
"horizontalization" (McLeod, Kosicki and Pan’ 1991; Neuman, 1989). This 
horizontalization is important in several ways. First, normative theories about media 
performance and empirical research on content and media institutions can generate 
hypothesis about effects, as well as specific criteria for interpreting effects. Second, 
t 
specific to effect research, scholars have tried to explain why evidence of media 
effects has been weak or even inconsistent over the years. Some have pointed to the 
problem of measurement (e.g. Bartels, 1993; Zaller, 1996), others have started to 
look at the content and media practices for reasons. Third, the significance and 
implications of media effects need to be better articulated. Combining effect research 
7 
and other types of media research can help researchers to argue for the importance 
and implications of the effects found. Further, while the traditional social scientific 
approach to media effects is to try to find out the generalizable laws or rules, effects 
are not always, or even always not, universal. Most effects of the media are the 
results of media performing in a certain way in a certain context. Linking content and 
performance in specific contexts to the existence or absence of effects can make us 
aware of the desirability of effects and the possibility of change and improvement. 
The aim of the study 
Thus, this study starts from a normative concern that democratization in Hong 
Kong is desirable and the development of a more participatory culture is needed. 
Then what is the role we expect the media to play in the process? In what way the 
media are expected to perform? With what effects? Theoretically, if a study has to 
answer the questions comprehensively, it has to tackle the linkages in the following 
Figure 1.1. 
Figure 1.1 A possible scope of study regarding media effects and 
performance 
Normative standard Expectations about Expectations about 
‘ derived from theory ^ media performance > media effects 
- i i^  ‘ i ； 
Actual standard Actual media - Actual media 
adopted by media ^ performance • effects 
Theoretical linkage > Empirical linkage • 
Normative-practical linkage 
Of course, it is not necessary for a study to cover all the linkages, and it is 
impossible for the present author to tackle all the linkages in this study. Instead, the 
8 
present study will provide a discussion on the normative standard of activating 
informed participation derived from a normative view of democracy, and the 
expectations regarding performance and effects implied by the standard. In the 
empirical study, there are three possible places for discrepancies between the ideal 
and the real 一 that between the normative standard itself and the standard (news 
values, principles etc) adopted by news workers, that between the expected and 
actual performance, and that between the expected and actual effects. In this study 
the main focus will be on the problem of effects. However, the discovery of effects 
naturally call for explanation, and it is unsatisfactory to present evidence on effect 
without some empirical and conceptual analysis on how such effects might be related 
to media content and practices. With the normative concern in mind there is also a 
need for a discussion about the normative implications of the effects. Therefore, 
some systematic analysis of media content will be incorporated to provide empirical 
cues for explanations and normative implications of media effects, and also for a 
preliminary assessment of media performance. Nevertheless, it should be stressed 
that the analysis of content serves only a supplementary role in the whole study. This 
study does not contain the design needed to test any hypothesis on the relation 
‘ between content attributes and effects criteria. The discussion on the media content 
is mostly conceptual. However, the content analysis remains an integral part of this 
study. Without it, the analysis on media effects could not be convincingly situated in 
the overall normative framework. In addition, the content analysis part will also raise 
^ • 
additional questions that would help to point out the direction of future research. 了 
i 
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II. The background of the 1998 election 
As this study is on the 1998 LegCo election in Hong Kong, a brief review of the 
background of the election is warranted. 
As a British colony for more than 150 years, Hong Kong's economy started to 
develop in the 1950s and 1960s when a large number of refugees came to Hong 
Kong from the mainland, providing capital and labor to the society. Until early 80s, 
the Hong Kong society was marked by a lack of local identity, an authoritarian 
colonial government that gave people a considerable degree of freedom, rapid 
economic growth and prosperity, and an overwhelming quest for social stability 
instead of politics. As a refugee society, Hong Kong people at that time had stability 
as their utmost concern and politics was something to avoid. Exceptions might 
include those people who were still very much concerned with politics in China. 
Further, the Hong Kong government succeeded in incorporating the remaining elites 
who might want to enter the local political arena by the process now famously 
phrased as "administrative absorption of politics" (King, 1981). These features led to 
the formation of the "minimally integrated social-political system" (Lau, 1982), in 
‘which people did not have strong political needs and requests (Tse, 1995). 
The situation changed when the British and Chinese governments started to 
negotiate the return of Hong Kong to China. Knowing that the Chinese government 
was insistent on getting Hong Kong back, the British government started to develop 
- i- ‘ 
democracy in Hong Kong. A schedule was set so that by the time of Hong—Kong's 
return to China, a partial democracy would have been established for 
t 
democratization to continue. Certainly, the Chinese government was conservative 
about democratizing Hong Kong. And the British government was also careful in 
designing the schedule ofdemocratization, and at times adjusting the schedule in the 
face of Chinese pressure. 
10 
The Tiananmen Incident in 1989 provided an important thrust for further 
democratization. The incident had important consequences on Hong Kong's political 
development. First, Hong Kong people became more supportive for democracy after 
witnessing how theirfuture government would crack down peaceful protests. Second, 
a group of elite and social activists gained their prominence and credibility as political 
leaders through organizing and leading protests and activities during the period, 
while a group of pro-China politicians lost their political dout. Some of the "new born 
political leaders" later joined hands to form the Hong Kong Democratic Union, 
arguably the first political party in Hong Kong. With the landslide victory of HKDU in 
the 1991 LegCo election (Kwok et al., 1992), citizens and politicians started to 
recognize the development of party politics as the irreversible t r end , 
Moreover, the events in 1989 also changed the dynamics in the Sino-British 
relationship. As Lau (1998) stated, after 1989 "Sino-British relationship turned sour 
as a result of the anti-China united front of the Western powers in which Britain 
played an active part" (p.18). To reduce the fear and anxiety existing in Hong Kong 
society after 1989, the British government introduced various projects including 
large-scale infrastructure development in Hong Kong and giving the right to live in 
Britain for a small sector of the Hong Kong public. The Chinese government reacted 
fiercely and skeptically. Then, in 1992, the British government headed by John Major 
appointed Chris Patten, an experienced politician, to be the "last governor" of Hong 
Kong. It was a break with the British tradition of appointing diplomats from the 
产 ’ 
Foreign Affairs Department to be ihe chief executive of Hong Kong's colonial 
government. Judging by hindsight, the appointment of Patten "presaged the adoption 
of a hard-line stance towards democratic reform of the LegCo, to the extent of 
denying any agreements Britain had signed with China" (Lau, 1998, p.6). 
Patten's political reform announced in his first policy address has led to 
unending controversies and quarrels between China and Britain in the last few years 
of the transition period. Basically, the 1995 LegCo election, following Patten's plan, 
11 
was to be elected by the three different procedures - geographical constituencies, 
functional constituencies, and election committee - that the British and Chinese 
governments have agreed upon. However, to inject more democratic favors into the 
election the voting age was lowered from 21 to 18. More important, the election 
committee in 1995 was composed of councillors of the District Boards, who had been 
directly elected by the public in District Board elections. Thus the election committee 
in 1995 was effectively a body of democratic indirect election. Besides, the functional 
constituencies in 1995 had an electoral base extended to more than 2 millions by 
giving virtually every individual working in a particular sector the right to vote in those 
elections. Patten's reform skillfully avoided literal violation of the Basic Law. But of 
course, the Chinese government was greatly irritated by the reform. Before this 
controversy, there was a "through train" agreement reached by the two countries that 
legislators elected in 1995 could straightly enter the first post-handover LegCo, if 
some basic requirements are met (like pledging allegiance to the Hong Kong SAR 
government). However, with Patten's reform underway the Chinese government 
thought that the 1995 LegCo was composed by a method not according to Sino-
British agreements and the Basic Law. The Chinese government decided to "set up a 
, n e w stove." 
The Provisional Legislature was the product. It was established to fill the void 
between the handover and the first LegCo election. Whether the Provisional 
Legislature is legitimate is a matter out of the scope of discussion here. Suffice it to 
~~ 产 ‘ 
say that the Provisional Legislature was not even partially popularly elected, and the -
democrats in Hong Kong refused to join it*. 
< 
The Provisional Legislature was finally to be replaced by an elected Council in 
1998. Like the past LegCo elections, the seats were to be returned by three separate 
4 The Chinese government did not rule the democrats out of the Provisional Legislature, but there is 
the suspicion that the democrats would have found it hard to get in the Provisional LegCo even if they 
decided to join. 
12 
procedures. Ten seats were to be elected by an election committee, which members 
had been selected by the Chinese government. Thirty seats were to be returned 
through functional constituencies, which had an electoral base of around 140,000 
voters in total only (mostly corporate voters). Twenty seats were to be returned by 
direct elections in geographical constituencies in which about 4 millions Hong Kong 
adult permanent residents were eligible to vote. Registration was required before 
voting. There were about 2.8 millions people registered as voters at the end of the 
government registration campaign conducted in late 1997 and early 1998, in which 
about 250,000 people registered as voters for the first time. 
The election was not without prominent controversies. In general the election 
was viewed as a step backward in democratization. The Chinese government 
insisted to re-adjust the pace of democratization and the progress brought about by 
Patten's political reform was to be dismissed (like narrowing the number of eligible 
voters in the functional constituency elections). Second, the electoral system was 
changed from single-seat-single-vote system to a proportional-representation system. 
The system was first criticized by the democrats as a conspiracy to reduce the power 
of the democrats' clique in the LegCo5. While it is a fact that Hong Kong has never 
. . h a d a stable, often used electoral system, the new system was also heavily criticized 
by politicians and analysts alike as much more complex than the previous one for the 
public to understand (see Appendix C for a discussion). In fact, with these 
controversies media coverage of the election was mainly negative during late 1997 
: and early 1998. - 二 ‘ 
In addition, the Hong Kong society appeared to be not interested in the election. 
From media reports we saw candidate debates cancelled due to the lack of audience, 
opinion polls consistently showing a lack of cognition and interest in the upcoming 
election. The media also did not give an overwhelming amount of coverage about the 
5 The criticism follows from the fact that the proportional-representation system is less conducive 
for the large parties to gain a majority of seats. 
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election. Judging by hindsight, we could attribute these indications to problems other 
than political apathy - there were too many organizations organizing too many 
debates, questions asked in polls were not realistic, some findings from polls were 
over-emphasized while others downplayed, and the media's coverage only reflected 
how the media viewed the election. However, during the campaign period these 
phenomena led media and political analysts to agree on an estimate of a 30-35% 
turnout rate (based on registered voters). 
But on May 24, with heavy rain for most of the day, 53% of registered voters 
went to the voting booth. It broke the record of Hong Kong's history of democracy, 
and also the glasses of the analysts and observers. Given only 70% ofeligible voters 
in Hong Kong were registered, a turnout rate of 53% was not actually very high by 
international standard, but it is not very low either®. This has pointed out another 
significance of the question of voter turnout. In the 1998 election, the high turnout 
rate was a surprise. Researchers are now trying hard to understand the causes, 
implications and significance associated with it. This study focuses on one of the 
possible factors that we can trace back to, that is, the mass media. Of course, it is 
very unlikely that the media will be the most important factor behind the voter turnout, 
, .bu t they should not be ignored. It is because, in theory, media have become the main 
arena of political communication in a modern society. But looking at the specific 
context of Hong Kong, are there any special characteristics in Hong Kong politics 
and democratization making the media an important actor? 
产 ‘ 
The likely-to-be-influential media in Hong Kong 
i 
Before discussing the importance of media in Hong Kong politics, it should be 
noted that Hong Kong is still in the process of democratization. Democracy, like the 
city of Rome, is not something that can be built in one day. The partial character of 
6 That means the turnout rate is about 37% if calculated based on eligible voters. It is not a large 
figure but comparable to the turnout rate of US off-year Congress elections. See Joslyn (1984). 
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Hong Kong's democracy can be seen from three different levels. At the system level, 
the political system is still in many aspects not democratic. Hong Kong's chief 
executive, no matter the colonial Governor in the past or the Chief Executive now, 
has never been directly elected. Government departments are not headed by 
politicians from political parties but by civil servants promoted within the government 
bureaucracy. There is a general lack of political accountability in the system?. The 
governing style of the Hong Kong government has long been known as executive-led. 
This has effectively deprived political parties or other elected representatives the 
chance offormulating and implementing their own policies. This greatly limits the role 
and power of them in the political processes. Politicians in Hong Kong can only enter 
councils at various levels, and entering the LegCo becomes the'highest possible 
achievement of them in the meantime. In effect, all political parties in Hong Kong 
become opposition parties (Lee, 1993)^. 
At the societal level, Hong Kong people are not particularly active in politics. 
Voter turnouts in 1991 and 1995 LegCo elections were low. In a survey conducted in 
1993’ Lau and Kuan (1995b) found that for all kinds of political participation they 
have listed (excluding voting and media use), consistently more than 90% of 
..respondents reported that they never engaged in them, with attending rallies and sit-
ins as the only exception^ Many researchers have pointed out that political apathy 
was partly due to the fact that they recognize the constraints in the system about 
what the people and their elected representatives can do (Chui, 1993; Cheng, 1996). 
广 ‘ 
Other researchers have pointed out that it is part of the culture of the Hong Kong 二 
7 The unaccountability is demonstrated by the fact that no officials have ever resigned since the 
handover despite the economic turmoil in Hong Kong and various chaos like the "bird flu crisis," the new 
airport chaos, etc.. ‘ 
8 To say that all political parties are opposition parties do not mean that they always oppose the 
government. Some parties, actually, are always supportive to the government. The point here is that, as 
political parties do not have the formal institutional role as policy-makers and implementers, their role 
become mainly on checking government power and criticizing government policies. ’ 
9 However, DeGolyer (1998) shows similar findings and argues that the figures are not particularly 
low when compared to other democratic countries. 
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Chinese (Chan, 1993; Lau and Kuan, 1992; Kuan and Lau, 1995). However, the 
Hong Kong public is not totally alienated from the political process, a large portion of 
them pay considerable levels of attention to politics and public affairs through the 
news media, which make them "attentive spectators" (Lau and Kuan, 1995). 
At the institutional level, Hong Kong does not have a strong political party 
system. Political parties have a short history in Hong Kong. They do not have strong 
ties with the public and well-articulated policy platforms. Again part of the problems 
lies in the politicaF system itself (Lee, 1993). Part of the problem is the political culture 
in which many people are reluctant to render support for political parties and in 
general, people do not have a high level oftrust towards the "politicians" (Lau, 1994; 
1998b). The lack of experience of the politicians themselves may also account for 
part o f the problem. In a general sense, the party system now existing in Hong Kong 
still does not carry out the functions of interest aggregation, articulation and political 
mobilization to the extent that their counterparts in developed democracies do. 
From this discussion of the partial characteristics of Hong Kong democracy we 
can already see the reasons why the media are an important actor in the political 
process. In political communication research it is almost a truism that common 
,peop le have very little direct experience with politics while media constitute the most 
important channel of information for them. This is especially true in Hong Kong as the 
spectator role prevails among the public and the fact that other institutions linking the 
public and the government, like parties and interest groups, are relatively weak. For 
0-
|nstance, political parties in Hong Kong generally do not have a strong organization _ . 
and connection with the mass (except a few leftist political groups), they are not very 
strong mobilizing agents and have to rely on the media to a large extent to 
communicate with the public (Cheng, 1996). Media coverage of political parties has 
been a major factor in the increasing legitimacy of political parties in Hong Kong 
(Fung, 1995; 1998). In this case, media become a more important mobilizing agent 
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as others are comparative weaker and even dependent on the media. In Hong Kong 
there is even a lack of political socialization beginning from a person's childhood due 
to the lack of political education in schools (Tse, 1997). In Western countries, while 
the media are regarded as responsible for creating the "pictures in the public's head," 
the socialization process is also important for orienting the citizens to the system 
itself and develop the diffuse support for the system. In other words, socialization is 
responsible for creating a "basic picture of politics in people's heads." However, in 
Hong Kong these basic pictures about the democratic system are lacking. Of course, 
at the theoretical level whether the media can be relied on as the central political 
socializing agent and mediating political institutions can be debated. But it can be 
suggested that the importance of the media in Hong Kong is at least partly stemmed 
from the fact that, while in developed democracies there is usually a large number of 
players in the political process taking up different roles and performing different 
functions, the lack of these players in Hong Kong politics allow the media a larger 
potential influence in the society. 
Another factor making the media likely to be influential in Hong Kong politics is 
that they are one of the most trusted institutions in the political process. Although the 
.‘ credibility of the Hong Kong media is on the decline due to their various "unethical 
conducts" in recent years, they are still rated higher by the public when compared 
with the government, political parties and other institutions on questions relating to 
their roles in the political process. Table 2.1 shows the results of a survey conducted 
in 1995 and reported by Lau ("1998b). The news media consistently achieved the -
best rating in the four questions asked. Among the political actors they are the most 
• 
trusted, and most representative as perceived by the public. In terms of public's 
perceived influence on the actors and perceived motives of the actors, the media 
also have the best scores. It is well known that as an actor's credibility increases its 
influence increases. Thus Table 2.1 provide further suggestions that media are likely 
to be influential among the Hong Kong public. 
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Table 2.1 Public opinions towards various political actors 
(source: Lau Siu-kai (1998b). Democratization, Poverty of 
Political Leaders, and Political lnefficacy in Hong Kong, p.13 一 
14} 
Political Trust(1) Representative- Influence (3) Motives (4) 
Actors ness (2) 
Mistrust Trust Cannot Can Little Large Service Self 
Governor 31.8 15.7 65.4 9.8 61.2 8.4 10.3 22.8 
Patten 
LegCo 19.4 25.0 43.6 26.5 55.4 4.4 12.3 20.3 
PWC (5) 30.7 9.3 55.9 6.6 56.6 5.2 8.8 24.0 
Civil ser- 15.2 27.2 51.5 22.8 59.8 10.3 17.9 21.8 
vants (6) -
DP(7) 25.0 17.6 44.4 22.1 56.4 3.7 14.5 17.2 
LP(8) 30.4 27.2 52.0 12.5 58.8 1.5 9.6 23.5 
DAB (9) 27.3 9.3 48.8 14.0 57.6 2.7 9.1 18.9 
News 10.3 46.1 30.4 41.7 49.8 13.8 33.3 12.5 
media 
Notes: 
(1) Whether respondents trust the actors. Other answering categories included average, no 
answer and don't know. ’ 
(2) Whether the actors can represent the respondent's view. Other answering categories 
included sometimes, no answer and don't know. 
(3) Whether the respondent thinks s/he has influence on the actors. Other answering 
categories included average, no answer and don't know. 
(4) Respondents' judgment of the motive of the actors. The two answers shown are social 
service and self interest, other categories included both, don't know and no answer. 
(5) Preliminary Working Committee, a consultative body set up by the Chinese government 
before the handover. 
(6) For the second and third question, the data are respondents' rating of Hong Kong 
government. 
(7) Democratic Party 
(8) Liberal Party 
(9) Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong 
、Then, what about media's influence in election? For many politicians and • 
researchers, media are too important to be neglected. The late legislator Ng Ming-
yum (1995) said in a conference about election and media after winning in the 1991 
LegCo election, "[The media] affected the result of the election to a very large 
extent......you did not only report the process of election, your presence affected the 
results, you become a part of the election" (p.54).Researchers also spotted the 
ubiquitous character of the media and the importance of media as a platform for 
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election campaign. As Chiu (1993) stated, 
the increasing significance of the mass media in campaign mobilization 
deserve greater attention. In the 1991 [District Board] elections, 56.3% of 
respondents in a survey alleged to have known the candidates through the 
mass media. In the 1991 LegCo election, a remarkable 88.3% was 
recorded......This can be explained by the fact that the television 
broadcasting companies had paid substantial effort to closely follow the 
election, and the newspapers also made special features and columns on 
the territory's unprecedented political event. 
With all these discussions it should be clear that why media are an important 
actor to be reckoned with in the electoral and political process. Of course, these are 
no proof of the existence of media effects, but they provide reasons for us to spend 
efforts to explore them. Their likely impact also points to the importance of them 
acting in a responsible way so that they would bring about positive consequences to 
the society, or at least do not damage the society. What are the possible 
consequences of the media in an election? The next chapter will give a review on the 




111. Approaches to election and media effect studies 
Election studies and research on media effects in elections may involve different 
approaches. In this part I will review the major approaches in studying election in 
general, voter turnout, and media effects. 
Approaches to election 
Election is one of the most salient features of a democracy. For some theorists it 
is even the defining feature. For instance, Schumpeter (1955) defined the democratic 
method as the "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which 
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
people's vote." 
However, there is not only one way to conceptualize what an election is. Joslyn 
(1984) has recognized four perspectives on election. The first is called prospective-
policy-choice approach. In this view, elections provide a mechanism by which the 
public expresses policy preferences and constrain the future policy choices of public 
officials. The second perspective is called retrospective-policy-choice approach, 
which argues that the standard of evaluation used by voters is likely to be a more 
global assessment of satisfaction with past policy performance. The third is the 
selection-of-a-benevolent-leader perspective, which sees election as a process by 
which human societies select leaders to make authoritative decisions. These three 
二 * 
can be further combined together undera larger headline, which I call the "people's 
choice approach." It assumes that the voters have an important and meaningful 
choice to make in an election - important as it will end up affecting the people's 
livelihood and the society at large, and meaningful as who wins does make a 
difference. The emphasis of the people's choice approach is on what decisions 
people make, and why they make such decisions. 
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The fourth and final perspective is election-as-ritual. In its critical version, 
elections are seen as serving the interests of political elite by preserving social 
stability, keeping the citizenry misinformed, and channeling political participation into 
a routine, non-threatening and impotent form. Under the ritual perspective the 
choices involved in a particular election become less important. The government and 
the winning candidates are provided with legitimacy regardless who wins. Elections 
become something like a mass in a Church in which people have a collective 
experience and reconstruct their identities. It results in legitimization of the governing 
institutions and stabilization of the society. It should be pointed out that the ritual view 
does not entail a negative view on election. This perspective can be useful if one 
wants to understand the meanings and significance of, or generated by, some 
particular features of the election or the campaign communication processes (e.g. 
Marvin, 1994). And it is also possible to see the legitimating function of campaigns 
and electoral processes in a positive light (e.g., Just et al., 1996). 
This research follows the people's choice perspective. The author believes that 
elections, and the choices involved, are important and meaningful to the Hong Kong 
society and its people. Although my concern of voter turnout is related to the 
‘ legitimization of political institutions, my focus is not on the process of campaign and 
how the legitimization comes about, the primary focus is still the choice that people 
have to make, namely, whether to go out to vote or not. 
Conceptualizing the voting decision: one step vs. two steps : 一 
Then, what are the decisions that a voter has to make? There are two ways to 
conceptualize the voters' decisions in an election. The first way is to differentiate two 
steps in the decision making process, i.e., deciding whether to go out to vote, and if 
yes, then whom to vote for. By this separation two distinct problems in voting 
research, voter turnout and vote choice, are defined. It is the more conventional and 
dominant way to conduct voting research. 
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The second way is to regard non-voting as one of the alternatives that a voter 
can choose from among others in one single decision. For instance, in an election 
with two candidates competing for a seat, a voter can choose either voting for 
candidate A, voting for candidate B, or abstaining. An example of research is 
Fishbein et al. (1985), who argue that voting participation can be predicted more 
satisfactorily by simultaneously considering all alternatives available to voters and 
knowing the voters' level of intention to perform each of the alternatives'。. 
Thinking about the voting decision as involving only one step may be closer to 
the reality. Voters are not very likely to clearly differentiate the two steps when they 
make their decisions. However, the two-step formulation may still be important, since 
turnout and choice, if not distinct in the people's mind, are distinct in the outcomes of 
the election. The two results also carry different meanings and implications, and have 
different types of impacts on the society. Therefore, as 丨 am focusing on voter turnout 
in this research,丨 will not consider whom the voters vote for. The turnout decision 
remains to be dichotomous. Also, by considering the voters' (and non-voters') 
attitudes towards the candidates, the possibility that people may abstain from voting 
because of the absence of a good choice should already be at least partially taken 
into account in the analysis, though not in a detailed way. 
Approaches to turnout 
Theorists have devised different approaches for the study and explanation of 
voter turnout. Three kinds of analysis are' to be discussed here. They are not only 
used in explaining turnout but also vote choice. They have different levels of 
theoretical importance and empirical relevance, and point to different issues and 
problems in explaining voter turnout. 
1° Fishbein's theory of reasoned action proposed that people's behavior can be explained by 
people's intention to perform that behavior, which in turns depends on people's attitudes towards the 
behavior and their subjective norms regarding the behavior. Although research results showed that his 
theory can predict behavior to a larger extent, the most problematic question is whether the separation 
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The first kind of analysis is the rational choice model of political decision making, 
with Anthony Downs as one of its most famous proponents (Downs, 1957). As an 
economist, Downs assumed that people are rational, i.e., they will choose the best 
means towards a given end, in political decision-making. The turnout decision 
involves a cost-benefit calculation. If the costs of going out to vote exceed the 
benefits, a voter will abstain. The costs of voting includes time and effort spent in 
deciding and going out to vote, and also the costs in gathering and processing 
political information. However, the extrinsic benefits of voting would be negligible. 
Even the election results may have great impacts on people's livelihood, an 
individual has only one vote. The probability that an individual's vote would affect the 
election outcome is close to zero. As a result, the utility that can' be derived from 
one's vote is also close to zero (the benefits are "discounted," to use Downs' own 
word). Moreover, people would have an incentive to free-ride on other people's votes, 
i.e., let other people choose for them. Finally, the rational choice model simply fails 
because its logic would lead to the notion of ‘‘rational abstention.’， 
In addressing the problem, Downs argues that two points may drive rational 
men to arrive at different conclusions about the election situation and make the 
decision to vote. First, rational men in a democracy may be motivated to some extent 
by a sense of social responsibility, and second, responsibility is a part of the return of 
voting. Here, Downs points to the importance of maintaining the democratic system a 
part of the extrinsic benefits of voting, and there is also the intrinsic benefits derived 
from the 'act of voting itself. However, as Aldrich and Simon (1986) pointed out, -
rationally people should not believe that whether they go out to vote would affect the 
final turnout rate. Thus the benefits of maintaining the system is also discounted to 
the extent that they become negligible. For intrinsic benefits, as Grofman (1987) 
argues, it is starting to ask for social and psychological explanations of voter turnout. 
of and relationship between attitude towards the behavior, the intention to perform the behavior and the 
behavior itself are meaningful. 
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It moves away from rational choice theory and turns towards social psychological 
explanations. 
This does not mean that the rational choice model is completely meaningless. 
On the contrary, ideas and concepts of the theory, or their modifications, continue to 
exert great influence on empirical research. However, the explanation and 
understanding of empirical political behavior require more powerful empirical 
analysis. There are many approaches and theories to the empirical study of voting 
behavior. To simplify the matter, two kinds of analysis divided methodologically -
individual-level analysis and aggregate-level analysis - are discussed here. 
The classic in election studies using the social psychological approach with 
individual level analysis in US is undoubtedly Campbell et a/.'s (1960) The American 
Voter. In this study (and others following the same approach), voter turnout and vote 
choice are explained by a set of psychological attributes, mostly political attitudes 
and beliefs. For instance, they found that turnout is related to sense of civic duty, 
political involvement, concern over the election outcome and partisanship. 
The types of variables used in explaining voting behavior differ according to the 
theories a research adopts. But there are also researchers who do not stick to a 
,part icular theoretical approach. Instead, different types of variables may be used 
simultaneously. Behaviors, social environments and experiences may also be taken 
into account when constructing the set of factors affecting the turnout decision. For 
instance, a special stream of research in US has focused on the contextual effects of 
the social environment on mdividuals (Herckfeldt, 1987). Huckfeldt argued that social 
contexts in which individuals are living would have effects on individual's other 
political behavior". 
In Hong Kong, Shum (1996) has included campaign mobilization variables in 
the regression model for explaining voter turnout in the 1995 LegCo election in Hong 
11 What Huckfeldt (1987) had actually found was that individual-based participation, including voting 
turnout, is not affected by one's neighborhood context. Only social-based participation, like donating 
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Kong. He found that two of the campaign mobilization variables, telephone 
canvassing and interpersonal persuasion, are significantly related to turnout. Other 
significant predictors of turnout in Shum's study include political interests, sense of 
duty, sense of efficacy, age and occupation. 
While the rational choice model is not successful in explaining the empirical 
phenomenon of turnout, the individual-level analysis of turnout also enjoys limited 
success. As Aldrich and Simon (1986) pointed out, election studies are more 
successful in predicting vote choice than turnout. In explanation of vote choice using 
regression models, an R square of 0.5 is standard in the US. However, when the 
question comes to turnout, the R square becomes much lower. Researchers have 
tried different methods of measurement and conceptualization searching for 
improvements (like Fishbein et al., 1985, as mentioned earlier). One possible reason 
for the lack of explanatory power that can be tackled more specifically in the present 
study is that past studies usually tried to use a standard set of variables to account 
for all individuals' turnout. However, different groups of people may be driven by 
different factors to go out to vote. In this study, the differences between sophisticated 
and non-sophisticated people, as will be discussed later, will be analyzed. 
To complete the discussion of approaches to turnout study, aggregate-level 
analysis has also to be considered. Applying to the recent election in Hong Kong, the 
question this approach asks is not why some individuals vote but others not, but why 
the election has a turnout rate of 53%. In tackling this question, we may need to refer 
“ to a =set of structural and c'ontextual factors, like the culture, political development, 
political and electoral systems, and recent economic performance, of the Hong Kong 
society. This approach can help us to understand turnout as a macro-level 
phenomenon. This approach is also not restricted to the study of turnout. For 
instance, Holbrook (1996) has demonstrated how a set of societal and contextual 
variables can well explain the level of support an incumbent would enjoy in a US 
money, displaying bumper stickers etc., are affected by neighborhood context. 
25 
presidential election. However, this approach requires relevant information from a 
large number of elections in a society. Obviously the short history of direct elections 
in Hong Kong makes this approach impractical. 
Media effects on attitudes and learning 
Now we can turn to a discussion of research on media effects, especially effects 
in elections. As mentioned earlier, researchers in the 50s and 60s generally believed 
in limited media effects, thus at that time very few researchers have systematically 
studied them in elections. However, media variables are not totally non-existent in 
research in that period. Political scientists usually defined media use as part of 
political participation (e.g., Campbell et al., 1960). Methodologically, media use was 
utilized as indicators to represent some other concepts like political involvement and 
interests (e.g., Campbell etal., 1960; Teixeira, 1992; Shum, 1996). 
When used in this way, media use is usually significantly related to turnout. For 
instance, Teixeira (1992) found that, besides factors like decrease in partisanship, 
concern over outcome, knowledge about parties and social connectedness, the 
decrease in political involvement and efficacy have contributed to more than half of 
, t h e decline. And the decrease in campaign involvement through media can account 
for nearly a quarter of the decline in turnout. In a regression analysis of causes of 
turnout in Hong Kong, Shum (1996) found that exposure to media campaign, as an 
indicator of political interests, is significantly related to turnout. Then, does media use 
have effects of its -own? Also, though it is reasonable to use media use as an 
indicator of political interest, it is also plausible that media use may affect or be 
1 
affected by other political attitudes, such as 6什10307 and sense of duty. 
There are numerous studies focusing on the relationship between media use 
and the set of attitudes that could be grouped as one's civic awareness. Patterson 
(1980) has argued that the relationship between political interest and media 
exposure is a reciprocal one. By means of a panel study, he even argued that media 
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exposure's effects on interests were even stronger than the effects in the opposite 
direction in the 1976 US election. Hagen (1996) shows how citizens' sense of civic 
duty drives them to expose to news, but at the same time, due to the lack of relevant 
background information they are frustrated when they find it difficult to understand 
the news. Cappella and Jamieson (1997), combining media framing analysis with 
information processing theories, show that the strategic frame used by the media in 
shaping news stories would activate people's political cynicism. In their experimental 
studies, subjects exposed to election campaign news and health care reform news 
with strategic framing were more likely to elicit a higher level of general political 
cynicism and cynical learning (what people believe they have learned from the news) 
than those exposed to news with issue framing and those not exposed to news. 
Though no significant effect was found on cynical motive (what people believe about 
the motives behind politician's action), the general conclusion given by Cappella and 
Jamieson (1997) is that media are likely to be a cause behind the rise of cynicism in 
US politics. Hetherington (1998), by analyzing survey data, showed that television 
exposure has contributed to lower levels of political trust in the 1988 survey data, 
though no significant effects exist in the 1996 data. Given this various possible 
‘ r e l a t i onsh ips between media use and political attitudes, to single out media use and 
study its relationship with various attitudes would be meaningful. 
Besides its relationship with political attitudes, media consumption has another 
. e f f e c t on the audience which is not so controversial but equally intricate. It is the 
cognitive effects of the media, especially about the acquistion of information. ‘ 
Research for decades have shown that there are a large number of factors 
contributing to political knowledge. They include demographic variables, media use, 
educational level, political interests, perceived utility of political information etc. (see 
Chaffee and Kanihan, 1997, for a review of past research findings). Short of first-
hand experience with political and public affairs, people rely heavily on different 
media channels to get relevant information. However, behind the simple knowledge 
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effect hypothesis there are various possible research questions. One is the relative 
informative-ness of different media, especially the comparison of the effectiveness of 
television and newspaper. Patterson (1980) argues that television is less effective in 
informing the public. This view is then further supported by later research. Robinson 
and Davis (1990) summarize 13 research in US and point out that TV is a less 
effective informing medium. However, there are also dissenting views and evidence 
(Chaffee etal., 1994; Price and Zaller, 1993; Graber, 1990). 
Another kind of research has focused on the different media content available 
during an election campaign. In an election media would produce different types of 
programs besides normal newscasts, such as talk shows and debates. Candidates in 
the US and other countries may also air advertisements on TV. Chaffee et al. (1994) 
conclude that the informing effects of television advertisements of political 
candidates seem to be negligible in their study, but other kinds of television events, 
including conventions, debates, candidate interviews and talk show appearance are 
associated with higher levels of candidate-issue learning. Zhao and Chaffee (1995) 
find that television advertisements are not consistently effective in informing the 
public, while television news attention is related consistently with higher knowledge. 
In another study about the 1992 US presidential election, Just et al. (1996) show that 
debates and political advertising are both effective means of transmitting messages 
to the public. 
These studies, however, are almost purely empirical and their theoretical values 
产 ‘ 
- ‘ 
are limited. Starting from mid 80s," more and ^ o r e research has ‘ utilized 
psychological theories of information processing to explicate the processes of media 
« 
effects on learning and attitude change. The concept of sophistication and schema 
are especially important. In cognitive psychology, sophisticates or experts are those 
who tend to view a set of information in terms of meaningful patterns in it (Krosnick, 
1990). Lau and Erber (1985) stated that experts by definition "know more than non-
experts ……[and] have had more experience thinking about it, and they presumably 
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have learned the most efficacious ways of grouping, categorizing, or organizing 
information in that domain." (p.38-39) This leads to the notion of schema, which is a 
knowledge structure with concepts as nodes and links between them, organized 
hierarchically or non-hierchically. Schemas aid information reception, interpretation, 
and recall. Thus, political sophistication can be defined as having well organized 
knowledge structures about political matters that make information processing more 
efficient' l 
Following the information processing approach, learning from the media can be 
considered as a process involving a series of steps including exposure, reception, 
intrerpretation and storage. Sophistication, as a measure of people's cognitive ability, 
would lead to and condition learning because it facilitates the various steps. For 
instance, Rhee and Cappella (1997) have shown that political sophistication is 
related to information recall and various measures of quality of people's answers to 
questions (like construct differentiation and elaboration). 
Research has shown that sophistication is a powerful concept in studying the 
public opinion process. This research will also make important use of this concept. 
As democracy is developing in Hong Kong, the public is continually learning to deal 
with political matters. It is believed that those who learn faster and better, i.e., the 
sophisticated, would have observable and important differences from the non-
sophisticated. Detailed discussion about its conceptualization and operationalization 
will be given in Chapter 6. 
In sum, media have intricate relatfonships with both political attitudes and 
political learning. Knowledge, attitudes and sophistication are important intervening 
factors and mechanisms through which media can exert effects on voting behavior. 
12 This definition is different from the notion of ideological sophistication, developed by Converse 
(1964, 1975). However, the two notions are not totally unrelated. See Rhee and Cappella (1997) for a 
discussion. 
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Media effects on voter turnout 
Some early studies in US about media effects on voter turnout have focused on 
the problem of early return. The concern is that, due to the time difference from the 
East to the West coast in America, reports of the estimated results in East coast may 
affect voting behavior of the people living in West coast (Lang and Lang, 1968; 
Epstein and Strom, 1981; Jackson, 1983). The results of the studies are mixed, as 
Delli Carpini (1984) summarized, "these studies, starting from different theoretical 
assumptions and using different methods, have come to quite different conclusions, 
ranging from no effect (Epstein and Strom) to a potential decline of 6 to 12 percent 
(Jackson) [in voter turnout]" (p.867). 
More recent studies have focused on effects of other media contents. In an 
experimental study, Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1994) found that poll results do not 
significantly affect people's intention to vote, although there are suggestive evidence 
showing supporters of the leading candidate may be mobilized while supporters of 
the trailing candidate may be demobilized. In her study, Owen (1991) asked her 
respondents whether they think they would be affected by polls, and there was a 
consistent finding of approximately 5 percent in each sample indicated that they 
‘ w o u l d not turn out to vote in an election if their candidates were trailing in the polls. In 
another study, Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1997) show that, using an experimental 
method again, negative advertising lowers people's intention to vote after controlling 
for demographics and party identification. 
、 These studies are clear in focus by studying particular contents' effects on 
voters, but they are not able to tell us about the overall effects of the media 
I 
environment on voters. We know that in an election media organizations spend a 
great deal of efforts to organize programs and reports for the events. Voters are 
exposed to the media environment as a whole in the campaign period, including 
newscasts, newspapers, magazines, radio talk shows, television public affairs 
programming, televised debates, advertising etc. In fact, one particular problem in 
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searching for media effects is that the news environment contains a large amount of 
diverse information with effects that may cancel out each other. A person 
encouraged to vote by a news report that s/he reads in the morning may feel 
discouraged when s/he hears a poll result on the radio in the afternoon'\ 
In this study the effects of the whole news environment on voters is the concern. 
Of course, it is very difficult to operationalize and measure the news environment. In 
this research, I will focus mainly on the news channels of the three most important 
and conventional mass media 一 TV, radio and newspaper. The newscasts are not 
equal to the whole news environment but they remain to be the most important news 
sources for the Hong Kong public and it is believed that people's consumption of 
these newscasts can most reliably capture the major "media effects" in the election. 
K should be noted that I am focusing on the mass media only. In an election, the 
public can also be said as situated in an information environment (Just et al., 1996). 
Information environment and news environment are two largely related and 
overlapping concepts. The major difference is that information environment contains 
elements other than mass media. People may also have access to information 
through candidate campaign activities, interpersonal communication, and candidates 
campaign communication not involving the media (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995). On 
the other hand, the media environment provides affective elements, like impression 
and image, as well as cognitive elements, like information. 
It is also important to recognize that there are different dimensions in news 
“ - • 
_ consumption. Traditionally exposure is the major variable usecfby researchers, but it 
only measures one dimension in media use. A person may stay in front of a 
* 
television set when s/he watches TV news, but at the same time doing other things. 
People may listen to radio when they are driving or working. Sometimes exposure 
13 Holbrook (1996), for instance, acknowledges the cancelling-out mechanism of media and 
candidate campaign messages. He argued that in the long term there is a tendency to return to an 
equilibrium level determined by structural and contextual parameters in an election. However, if the 
messages are largely one-sided, strong campaign effects are possible. 
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can even be accidental and unintentional. Thus exposure does not entail reception of 
message from the media. Another dimension, people's attention paid to the news 
when exposing should be taken into account. 
This chapter has given a discussion on the relevant literature. In sum, the 
present study will follow the people's choice perspective of election, which sees 
election as involving people making meaningful decisions. It will adopt an individual-
level analysis with media and social psychological factors as the major variables. The 
study aims at studying the effects of news consumption in general, rather than the 
effects of specific media contents. And a number of media's cognitive and attitudinal 
effects will be studied together, rather than on an one-to-one basis. 
- 一 -
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IV. Activating informed participation: A conceptual model for 
empirical evaluation 
The previous chapters have provided an overview of the research question and 
related past research. Here I am going to outline the theoretical framework that 
guides this study. 
As pointed out in Chapter 1, the framework used in this research will be based 
on a normative view of media's role in a democratic election, or in a democratic 
society in general. However, discussions on norms regarding how media should act 
usually have focused on objectivity, equality, and freedom of the press etc (e.g. 
McQuail, 1992). To a large extent, the overwhelming focus on objectivity and 
freedom etc is because of the traditional view of the media as an observer of the 
political process. However, there is a need to review this observer role. As 
Lichtenberg (1990) puts it, 
Traditionally, the press has been conceived as an observer - ideally, a 
neutral observer -o f the political scene. On this view, the press is part of the 
political process but it is also not part; it stands outside. But events of the 
last few decades have demonstrated the inadequacy of this view. The press 
today - the mass media in particular - is one of the primary actors on the 
political scene, capable of making or breaking political careers and issues. 
It is not to argue that the media should abandon the role of neutral observer. 
The norms of objectivity and freedom are certainly important and closely related to 
media's role in a democracy, but they seem not to be the most central ones regarding 
‘ the question of political participation and turnout. Also, the debates surrounding the 
norms of objectivity and neutrality in the past two decades are so complicated that 
t 
there is certainly no simple answer to whether and in what sense objectivity is still 
desired. In general, scholars would agree with Lichtenberg that there is a need to 
rethink about the proper roles and responsibilities of the media^^. Journalists are 
14 Actually, while Lichtenberg argues for a re-consideration of the role of media, she has also 
supported the norm of objectivity in her other writings (see Lichtenberg, 1991). 
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playing roles in the political process and by the works they did they have impacts on 
the political process. In this sense, journalists are political actors and the media can 
be conceptualized as a political institution (Cook, 1998). 
In a more specific discussion about the relationship between media and 
democratic values, Gurevitch and Blumler (1990) have summarized eight democratic 
expectations of media performance. They are: 
1) Surveillance of the sociopolitical environment. Report developments likely to 
impinge on the welfare of citizens. 
2) Identifying key issues, including the forces that have formed and may resolve 
them. 
3) Provision of platforms for advocacy by politicians and spokespersons for causes 
and groups. 
4) Carrying dialogue across a diverse range of views, as well as between power 
holders. 
5) Holding officials accountable for how they have exercised power. 
6) Providing incentives for citizens to learn, choose, and become involved and 
informed citizens rather than merely to follow and kibitz over the political 
process. 
7) Resisting forces outside the media to subvert their independence, integrity and 
ability to serve the audience. 
8) Having a sense of respect for the audience as potentially concerned and able to 
e 
make sense of his or her political environment. 
These eight standards cover a wide area of concerns. They are inter-related 
I 
and all are relevant to media performance in an election. However, it is impossible to 
study them all at once. To attain a clearer focus of the study the standard of providing 
incentives for citizens to learn and become involved and informed is emphasized. 
The central question-of media effects on voter turnout should also be understood as 
stemming from this normative standard, which I just rename as "activating informed 
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participation." Under this concept, media should be an information providing channel 
as well as a participation-provoking channel. 
Of course, people may have a sense of uneasiness in thinking that media have 
to mobilize the people. Here, the standard of activating informed participation must 
be clearly separated from the "mobilizing ideal" as discussed by Miller (1991)，which 
emphasized that "the media should be firmly subordinated to the state and its 
primary function should be to encourage whatever the state defines as good" (p.201). 
The kind of participation that should be activated, according to the standard 
discussed by Gurevitch and Blumler (1990), is not defined solely by the government 
o r the media, instead it should be based on agreed-upon values of the society. 
This in turn raises the problem of how to ascertain what the agreed-upon values 
are and how people can arrive at it. The issue is related to the ideal of public sphere, 
a place where private individuals come together as free and equal citizens to discuss 
public issues rationally (Jurgen Habermas, 1989). And in terms of Gurevitch and 
Blumler's (1990) discussion we can see that this problem is related to the media as 
platform providers. The media, in today's society, would be a very important part of 
the public sphere and they are charged with the responsibility to provide a platform 
for opinion exchanges and discussions about public issues. However, to discuss the 
media as a public sphere here would go too far away from the central issue. Two 
points should be noted here. First, as already pointed out, the standards of media 
performance in a democracy - the eight standards proposed by Gurevitch and 
w » _ 
Blumler and other ideals proposed by other theorists - are not unrelated. Instead, the 
standards should be seen as closely linked with each other. For instance, the 
standards of surveying the environment, identifying key issues, holding politicians to 
account fortheir own conductcan be viewed as the ways by which the media provide 
information and incentives to act. The focus on activating informed participation in 
this research is only due to the focus on media effects on voter turnout. Other 
standards should not be viewed as totally irrelevant. 
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Secondly, we must recognize that there are constraints and conflicts existing at 
various levels that make the media difficult to live to the standards. Gurevitch and 
Blumler (1990) point out four kinds of obstacles hindering the attainment of the 
standards. These include conflicts among the standards themselves, the gap 
between the media elite and the public, competition of different kinds of messages for 
the people's attention, and the constraints from the socio-political and economic 
environment of a society. They also discussed how constraints appear at different 
levels, namely the societal level, the institutional level, the intra-organizational level 
and the audience level. 
Adopting the framework of Gurevitch and Blumler (1990), McLeod et al. (1994) 
summarize the problems of constraints, conventions and effects regarding media 
performance. For the standard of activating informed participation, McLeod et al. 
point out that the ideologies of objectivity and press autonomy are the constraints 
that make the media unable to live up with the standard. Empirical research in the US 
has shown that there is a lack of mobilizing information on the media since they have 
to avoid accusations of bias (Lemert, 1977; 1981). This has led to undesirable effects. 
At the individual level, it leads to increase in political apathy, lower levels of political 
involvement and perceived efficacy. At the system level, it leads to limited, indirect 
and distorted feedback from the public to policy-makers and the concentration of 
decision-making power (McLeod et al., 1994, p.128-129). 
Thus, we have to bear in mind the possible constraints the media are facing, 
— and the possible contradictions in the arguments regarding the role of media. 
Considering the issue of constraints is especially important when the normative 
4 
implications of media effects are discussed. 
Expected media effects under activating informed participation 
The relationship between media use and political attitudes have long been the 
central focus of media effects and political communication research. Though early 
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research suggested that media do not directly affect people's attitudes except 
reinforcing them. Research in recent years shows otherwise. In the previous 
chapters we see that the relationship between media use and attitudes favoring 
participation are not always positive. While media use is usually found to be 
positively related to interests and involvement, it is also found to be negatively 
related to efficacy or political trust in other cases. In this research, we will see 
whether media use in Hong Kong would be related to various political attitudes in 
ways similar or different from past research in Hong Kong or other countries. 
One particular problem of most of the previous studies is that they usually focus 
only on the relationship between media use and one particular attitude. There are 
many extraneous factors not being taken into account. Rather, in this study the 
researcher tries to identify the relationship between media use and a set of political 
attitudes. In doing this, two main sets of attitudes are identified. The first set consists 
of those attitudes towards politics and public affairs in general. Here I will focus on 
the notion of civic awareness. According to Wong and Shum (1996; also Wong, 
1997), civic awareness can be considered as having three interrelated aspects 一 
cognitive, attitudinal and behavioral. However, treating the concept this way will 
make it too broad for this research. So in this research civic awareness is restricted 
to the attitudinal aspect. Five components of civic awareness are identified by the 
researcher and included in the survey (internal and external efficacy, sense of civic 
duty, recognition of political right, and political interests). However, we must not 
- 二 ‘ 
assume that the public also recognizes and differentiates different attitudes as 
researchers do. Thus in the actual analysis we have to examine the respondents' 
4 
answers to determine the reliability and validity of the attitudinal constructs. 
The second set of attitudes consists of the public's evaluations of and attitudes 
towards more particular and concrete political institutions. Since election is the 
subject here, the public's attitudes towards three particular institutions - the 
government, the political parties, the election itself — are included (In Chapter 7’ the 
37 
reasons behind the identification of the attitudes and their operationalization will be 
discussed in more details). 
Past research has provided evidence for the relationship between media use 
and civic awareness and the effects of civic awareness on voting behavior are also 
widely demonstrated. It has been pointed out that media have the potential to 
influence people's attitudes towards political institutions, especially when media 
coverage of a particular institution is largely positive or negative. Thus civic 
awareness and attitudes towards political institutions can be two sets of factors 
intervening the effects of media on turnout. 
However, there is the problem of the casual direction. Does media use lead to 
change in attitudes? Or is media use just a result or an indicator of one's attitudes? 
The right answer seems to be: both ways are possible. A more detailed 
discussion would be given in Chapter 7. Here suffice it to say that, in this study, in 
view of the lack of adequate data and because the relationships between media use 
and many attitudes can be interpreted in both ways, conclusive casual direction 
would not be available. 
Media use leading to increase in knowledge about public affairs is what every 
person would expect. More important and interesting questions are the conditions 
under which people can learn information, and the effects of knowledge on political 
attitudes and voter turnout. Research on the knowledge-gap phenomena have 
shown that people with different socio-economic statuses can learn information from 
» _ 
the media at djfferent rate, producing a gap in the amount of knowledge betw6en 
groups of people (Gaziano and Gaziano, 1996). But instead of using education or 
t 
socio-economic statuses as the basis to differentiate people into groups, this 
research will utilize the concept of political sophistication, defined as the existence of 
a more developed knowledge structure which can help the reception, storage and 
retrieval of information. We can expect that different people with different levels of 
sophistication would learn about information at different rates. 
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The importance of knowledge and sophistication goes beyond simple learning 
as they also lead to or mediate changes in political attitudes and behaviors. On the 
one hand, the knowledge learned may have effects on people's attitudes. If the 
information given in an election campaign about a particular political object is one-
sidedly positive or negative, it is very likely to lead to changes in people's attitudes 
towards the direction suggested by the coverage. Also, sophistication is likely to 
mediate the relationships between a person's political attitudes and other 
characteristics. For instance, Sniderman et al. (1991) has argued that sophisticated 
people are more likely to take the cognitive route in formulating opinions and 
attitudes, a proposition that will be tested in this study also. 
Beside the content of knowledge, the state of knowing something may also 
have effects on one's political attitudes and behavior. The feeling of being 
knowledgeable, which one can gain from learning about news, is likely to make one 
more confident, and become more interested and involved in politics. Thus, it is 
probably that knowledgeable people are more likely to go out to vote. Then, 
knowledge would become another intervening variable mediating media effects on 
voter turnout. 
The normative implications ofeffects 
The notion of activating informed participation leads us to expect media to have 
positive effects on attitudes, knowledge, and ultimately, voter turnout, but what are 
the possible normative implications^of media effects? It has been pointed out that 
there are restrictions of factuality, objectivity and autonomy regarding media's role to 
I 
activate the public. In the specific context of Hong Kong there may also be other 
constraints. Generally speaking, media are not, and should not be, propaganda 
machines for the government. They have to criticize any political institutions if 
something actually go wrong. For instance, in the 1998 LegCo election various 
parties had intra-party cleavages. It is possible that media coverage of the cleavages 
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would have negative impacts on public's sense of efficacy or their evaluations of the 
political parties. However, it is absurd to argue that the media should not report the 
facts because they need to foster positive attitudes among the public. 
It should also be reminded that there were controversies about the legitimacy of 
the 1998 LegCo election itself. Chapter 2 has mentioned several criticisms towards 
the election. In general, the LegCo election as a whole is not completely democratic. 
Thus it may raise the question of whether the media should encourage participation. 
Of course, as the present research is focused" on the direct election of the 
geographical constituencies, the legitimacy question is not large, at least in a relative 
sense. It can also be pointed out that the direct election is participated by virtually all 
major political groups, including the democrats, in Hong Kong, thus the legitimacy of 
the election is widely, if not unreservedly, accepted by the elites. Moreover, the focus 
of the research is on the development of political participation, and even the election 
is not totally just, the development of a participatory culture remains important and 
desirable. Actually, before the election there were also calls for "blank voting," i.e., 
voters should express their support for democratic elections by going out to vote, but 
show their discontent with the undemocratic character of the whole LegCo election 
by a blank vote. 
But if there are people who are still skeptical about the legitimacy of the election, 
then we must ask some questions in interpreting effects. If media have positive 
effects on attitudes and turnout, is it because media reported the election in a 
meaningful and substantial way, or_because media have served as the mouthpiece of 
the government? If media have negative effects, then is it because the media rightly 
pointed out the gloomy side of the election, or because the media covered the 
election in a trivialized way that discouraged participation? 
These questions are the key to tackle the normative implications of empirically 
found effects. And they call for the study of media content. Chapter 1 has pointed out 
that it is not feasible for the author to provide a comprehensive content analysis in 
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this study. Therefore, in providing a brief yet systematic analysis of media coverage 
of the election, a focus is needed so that we can get the most and best cues about 
the answers ofthe above questions. 
There are two principles in choosing the focus of analyzing media content. First, 
the analysis should be able to show something that is continually and largely present 
in media coverage of the whole election campaign. In other words, as argued in 
Chapter 3 media effects are not likely to be the result of particular contents. It is more 
likely to be the result ofthe way media report the election in a general sense. Second, 
as the direct empirical linkage between the content analysis and effects is lacking in 
this study, it will help if past research findings have shown the linkage between the 
content attributes analyzed and effects discovered. 
With these principles in mind, media "strategic coverage" of the election is 
chosen as the focus of the content analysis. It has often been noted that election 
coverage in the US is marked by the focus on the horse-race and the strategy aspect 
of the election (Patterson, 1980; 1994; CappeIla and Jamieson, 1997; Joslyn, 1984; 
Cavanaugh, 1995). Candidates and parties campaign strategies are being focused 
on. And more than that, journalists tend to interpret candidates' and parties' actions 
and issue positions in terms of their strategic concerns. When journalists write 
election stories, they tend to use the language of games, sports, wars, and other 
kinds of contests. When things are put into this perspective, ail actions by candidates, 
parties and other institutions would be explained by only one principle - the pursuit of 
self-interest. As a result, ‘ _ 
strategic coverage may, in other words, invite the attribution of cynical 
motives to political actors in campaigns and public policy debates, not 
because voters are distanced from the process but precisely because they 
are drawn into it and, through a rational analysis of the politicians whose 
motives they have come to know, reject the actors and ultimately the 
process (CappeIla and Jamieson, 1997, p.37). 
Strategic coverage is also related to how media inform the public. No one can 
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deny that the media do provide information to the public. The problem is only whether 
the media have provided enough and important information to the public. The 
difference between reports on strategies and issues are important. Patterson (1980) 
stated that "a large portion of election coverage is devoted to the campaign's 
contestual aspects and says little about which candidate would make the better 
president" (p.6). Over the years, there were researchers echoing Patterson's view 
about media coverage of election (Patterson, 1994; Leovy, 1994). Ramsdei (1996) 
stated that we should establish what the media should cover in elections by asking 
what democracy requires. According to his analysis, elections are instruments to 
communicate popular preferences. Elections, 
produce a mandate where the victorious candidate can claim that his 
positions on the issues have been endorsed by the electorate. To the extent 
that elections do exist to communicate popular preferences or mandate, it is 
difficult to see how such preferences could be based on anything but the 
issues Not only do elections serve to communicate a preference, they 
also exist to renderjudgments on past government performance. Again, the 
presumption is thatjudgments will be based on a government's past policies 
(p.75). 
Ramsdei (1996) did not argue that media should report only issues. Candidates' 
personalities, past performances and backgrounds, and even poll information, are all 
useful for the voters. However, Ramsdei emphasized that the main focus and the 
really substantive part in the election should still be policy issues, followed by past 
records, and then others. 
- ：„ ‘ 
Thus, a further advantage in choosing strategic_coverage as the concern is that 
its normative undesirability is clearer than simply negative coverage. 
Of course, not all theorists would completely agree with Patterson and Ramsdei 
(Carminas and Kuklinski, 1990; Fiorina, 1990)^1 But it should be safe to argue that 
15 Following the Downsian logic, it seems that we should not expect too much from the public. Even 
though the normative theory of democracy may require informed citizens, we also have to take into 
account the fact that citizens have many other things in their more immediate daily lives to consider. 
Thus, Graber argued that other theorists who attack the media as not informative are asking for too 
much. She pointed out that too much issue analysis may only bore the public and turn them away 
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media, in covering the election, should not put too much emphasis on its strategic 
aspects. They should not portray the election only as a game participated by selfish 
actors without significance to the public, thus constructing the role of the public as 
spectators (Edelman, 1988). 
On the whole, there is a normative expectation for media coverage to focus 
more on substantive issue information, though other types of information are also 
needed. And as strategic coverage is one of the most conspicuous aspects of media 
election coverage and one of the most prominent concerns among researchers, 
analyzing the phenomenon will help us interpret the effects found. 
Research questions and hypotheses 
Now, let me summarize the above arguments and state the research questions 
and general hypotheses. The media are expected to exert effects on turnout through 
affecting people's attitudes, including civic awareness and attitudes towards political 
institutions, and knowledge, as represented in Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1 An empirical model of activating informed participation 
^ Political attitudes (Civic awareness, Campaign 
^ ^ y - ^ attitudes towards politicgl institutions) K^^^^^^^^^^^zati^i 
News consumption Turnout 
y f ^ q ^ r^ 
~ 、 . Political knowledge (Knowledge about-the Z 卜 
election and the candidates/parties) / 
/ f ~ ~ ~ ^ " / 
/ Interpersonal communication Interpersonal persuasion 
Demographics L 
(Graber, 1994a). In another article (Graber, 1994b), she gave evidence that the US national survey 
showed a majority feeling that media had already provided enough information for them, and "if average 
voters feel well served by the election information supply, who is to say that they are wrong?" (p.114) 
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Extraneous variable: Political sophistication as moderator of all relationships 
The figure consists of two sets of variables. The diagram shows the major 
variables within the theoretical framework of activating informed participation. 
Media consumption is placed on the left end of the diagram while voter turnout 
is placed on the right hand side. This placement reflects that media consumption is 
the main independent variable focused on in this research, it does not necessarily 
mean that it is theoretically prior to attitudes in the casual chain. 
General hypotheses are represented by the arrows in the diagram. However, 
discussion of specific hypotheses would require more detailed discussions of the 
conceptualization and operationalization ofthe variables, thus they will be stated only 
when the actual analysis part begins. 
The one-way arrows in the diagram represent one-way casual relationship. 
Knowledge is assumed to be affected by news media consumption but not to exert 
influence on news media consumption. It would affect attitudes but attitudes can only 
affect knowledge indirectly. Voter turnout is assumed to be a final decision made by 
the respondents and is affected by the various factors. The arrow linking news media 
consumption and voter turnout represents the effects of media exerted directly on 
voter turnout, as well as indirect effects intervened by factors other than the two in 
the middle of the diagram. The two-way arrow between media and attitudes 
represents that the variables can affect each other. Resolving the relative strength of 
the casual relationships would require the use of sophisticated methods that are not 
_ ^ » 
available in this research. As a7esult, the problem of mutual casual relationship 
would not be solved in this research. This problem will be further discussed in 
Chapter 7. ‘ 
The question of learning from the media, as well as how sophistication mediates 
the learning process will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
Past research usually studied the relationships between news consumption and 
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interest, duty, and efficacy separately. However, there is a lack of research 
concerning the relationship between news consumption and various political 
attitudes at the same time. Moreover, the function of knowledge and sophistication as 
a factor underlying attitude change has aroused more and more concern in recent 
years (Zaller, 1992; Mutz et al., 1996). In Chapter 7, we will see how news 
consumption and knowledge are related to various attitudes, and how these 
relationships differ according to levels of sophistication. 
When we focus on turnout in Chapter 8, the question will be how news 
consumption, knowledge, attitudes and other variables explain turnout. The focus will 
be on the direct and indirect effects of news consumption and knowledge on turnout. 
News consumption is assumed to be leading to turnout through cognitive or affective 
route, while the cognitive route is mediated by knowledge, the affective route is 
mediated to a less extent by the existing variables in the framework and thus a direct 
relationship between turnout and news consumption may result. 
In analyzing media effects, the recent development of cognitive psychological 
approach will play a very important role. The concept of sophistication, and its 
relationships with various phenomena, provide one basic underlying dimension in the 
analysis. Incorporating political sophistication as a variable in the analysis can help 
us to understand better the relationships among the variables in the diagram. It is 
expected that sophisticated and non-sophisticated people differ in political judgment 
_ making and decision making. Thus, different people's attitudes and behavior are 
likely to be explained by different things. In methodological terms, the role of 
sophistication is to add a number of hypotheses about interaction effects into the 
analysis. For instance, there may be interaction ‘ effects of media use and 
sophistication on knowledge and attitudes (see Chapter 6 and 7)^ ®. 
In the diagram there are also some other variables included. Demographic 
16 To visualize how sophistication will be used a number of arrows can be drawn from the variable to 
the arrows linkage the othervariables in the diagram. But it would make the diagram difficult to read and 
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variables are antecedents to media use, attitudes and knowledge etc. As in other 
research, demographic variables are controlled in the data analysis. Campaign 
mobilization will be added in the final voterturnout model. 
Interpersonal communication is certainly important in the political 
communication process. From the two-step flow model (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955), 
through the spiral of silence hypothesis (Noelle-Neuman, 1984), to recent notions 
like impersonal influence (Mutz, 1998) and contextual influence (Huckfeldt and 
Sprague, 1995), researchers have" tried to explicate the complex relationships 
between mass communication, interpersonal communication, and political opinions 
and attitudes, including questions like transmission of social and mass media's 
influence, perception of societal opinions, choice of discussants etc. But it would be 
impossible to study interpersonal communication comprehensively in this research. 
Therefore, interpersonal communication is taken into account in the analysis in two 
ways. A measure of interpersonal communication is used in Chapter 6 in explaining 
political knowledge because it can shed light on the question of learning from the 
media. And a measure in interpersonal persuasion is added in the turnout model. 
Media content will be studied for helping us to understand the reasons behind 
and the implications of media effects. Qualitative analysis will be used, which will 
focus on the strategic coverage of the election by the media. It will tell us about how 
media construct election stories out of the information they have. The analysis of 
newspapers coverage of the election will be given in Chapter 9. 
t 
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thus sophistication is only placed at the bottom. 
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V. Design and methods 
Survey 
Most of the analysis in this research will utilize a survey data set collected in the 
election. The survey aims at understanding the relationships of people's news media 
use and their political attitudes, knowledge and voter turnout. The ultimate goal is to 
find out whether news media have effects on the voters in the 1998 LegCo election. 
The limitation and distribution of available resources make it impossible to have 
the ideal research design with before and after surveys and parallel content analysis. 
As a result, a cross-sectional survey was conducted from March 11 to March 24, two 
months before the election day. The survey was conducted using the Computer 
Assisting Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system with a group of trained 
undergraduate students as interviewers. 
Trained students were employed for carrying out systematic sampling of 
telephone numbers from the updated residential telephone directories of Hong Kong. 
A total of 1993 telephone numbers were selected by the procedure. In order to 
include the telephone numbers that may not be listed in the telephone directories, 
new numbers are generated by adding a constant of 2, 4 and 6 respectively to the 
last digit of every number. So there were finally 7972 phone numbers in the sample. 
These numbers were saved in a database, from which the CATI system randomly 
selects numbers foreach interviewer on any given day during^the interviewing period. 
After the two-week period, the total number of successful interviews were 1226. 
Dividing the number by the total of refusals and successful interviews yields a 
response rate of 43%'^ 
The survey provides the basis for most of the analysis in this research. 
17 A response rate of 43% is not considerably lower than similar research in US, which usually have 
response rates of over 70%. However, due to the nascent development of opinion polls in Hong Kong 
and the public's general reluctance to spend time to answer pollsters questions, especially on sensitive 
topics like politics, in Hong Kong response rate about 50% is the norm. 
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Questions about people's media use, political attitudes, knowledge, intention to vote 
and past voting record, demographics etc. were asked (see Appendix B for the 
questionnaire). 
A second follow-up survey was carried out from June 1 to 10, one week after the 
election. The survey was conducted by another group of trained interviewers using 
the same CATI system. Respondents in the March survey who are registered voters 
were the target respondents in June'^ Of the 904 target respondents, 556 
respondents were classified as truly having completed- both the March and June 
surveys. Thus the panel attrition rate was a little bit less than 40%. As there is a 
period of more than two months separating the two waves and we had only ten days 
to finish the second wave survey, the attrition rate is reasonably good. 
A few remarks should be added. The design here is different from most voting 
studies in the past in Hong Kong which utilized a cross-sectional survey carried out 
after the election, by telephone or home visits. In this research 丨 am using a two-wave 
panel survey so that there are time differences among the answers collected in the 
two study. However, limited resources make repetition of all the questions infeasible 
and thus complete before and after comparison is absent. In addition, when 
questions asked in one single survey fall in the general domain ofthe LegCo election, 
as Zaller (1992) points out, some questions might prime the respondents to answer 
other questions in a certain way. But in this study, questions were asked separately in 
March and June. The measurement items in March survey have to be very well 
—designed, or else random errors will setin, reducing the power ofstatistical tests that 
involve variables measured in two different waves. 
However, these problems, if viewed in another perspective, are also 
advantages. When voter turnout is asked after the election and other variables 
18 In Hong Kong an eligible voter has to register before s/he can actually vote. The Hong Kong 
government has spent_a lot of resources in late 1997 and early 1998 for a registration campaign. 
Though the campaign was only able to attract 250 thousands previously unregistered voters to register, 
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before the election, the relationship between turnout and the predictive variables can 
be free from two challenges. The first is the idea of priming within the questionnaire 
as mentioned. That is, people tend to rationalize their turnout behavior and thus 
giving coherent answers that fit the researcher's expectations. The second is the 
possibility that the act of voting may have effects on people's political attitudes. It is 
especially plausible in Hong Kong as it only has direct elections for less than ten 
years, and voting for most people is not a life-long habit. Thus it is possible that the 
act of voting will enhance people's sense of efficacy and political interests, especially 
if the candidates they vote for win in the election. Note that this argument is relevant 
to the empirical model of media effects set up in the previous chapter. It points to the 
addition of an arrow from voter turnout to attitudes. In other words, an advantage in 
the present design is that the effects of attitudes and media use on voter turnout can 
be established with more confidence due to the absence of the effects of turnout on 
attitudes and media use. 
The author does not intend to argue that the present design is necessarily better 
than a single cross-sectional post-election survey. But the time difference between 
the March survey and June follow-up makes the design being able to provide a 
precious opportunity to look at the relationship between people's turnout decision 
and various attitudinal and behavioral characteristics in a different way. 
Content Analysis 
A content analysis is carried out aiming at supplementing the media effect study. 
The scope of the analysis has to be restricted to a reasonable size that the author 
can handle. Thus content analysis has included analysis of newspaper news. Radio 
news and TV news are excluded because they are usually short in length and thus 
carry relatively far less information than the newspapers. 
the total number of registered voters was added to about 2.8 millions, estimated to be around 70% of all 
the eligible voters in Hong Kong. 
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Also, the research can only include a limited number of newspapers in the 
analysis. Since the media environment surrounding the Hong Kong people and the 
provision of information are the focus, I decided to include only Ming Pao and Apple 
Daily. Other newspapers are excluded since they are not expected to differ widely in 
terms of informative-ness and style of coverage. As this research is not on the 
political stands of newspapers, it would not be necessary to include newspapers with 
different political stands, like leftist newspapers'^ About informative-ness a more 
relevant distinction is mass/elite newspaper. Ming Pao, in this regard, belongs to elite 
newspaper, and Apple Daily belongs to the mass category. In the analysis all news in 
the front section is included. The analysis included the period of the 16 weeks before 
the election (including the election day), that is, from February 2 to May 24. The 
analysis of media coverage wi" be mainly qualitative. The aim is to see how media 
have covered the election, especially regarding the notion of strategic coverage. 
Specific techniques used in the analysis will be discussed in Chapter 9. 
Operationalization of variables 
The operationalization of the key variables involved in the analysis will be 
discussed in various chapters when the variables come into the analysis. A more 
detailed discussion of some operationalization and statistical procedures are given in 
Appendix A. 
- 二 * 
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19 It is not to deny the importance of the leftist papers in Hong Kong. Actually, how the leftist papers 
cover Hong Kong election has often been a special concern for researchers and political actors. There 
is also potential influence of the leftist papers on common people. However, in this study the concern is 
the main channels through which common people know about politics. It is a fact that lefiist papers have 
the smallest readership among all newspapers in Hong Kong. If Hong Kong people ever know what the 
leftist papers say, it is usually because other media cover what the leftist papers say. Thus, in order to 
determine what normal citizens are exposed to during the election period, lefiist papers are left out. 
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VI. News consumption, knowledge, and sophistication 
From this chapter on I will start to analysis the dsrta collected in the surveys. It 
begins with an analysis of the relationship between news consumption, political 
knowledge and political sophistication. By giving information to the public, the media 
can contribute to both the quantity and quality of political participation. People who 
know more are more likely to vote since they are more involved and feel confident in 
dealing with political matters. And the quality of their choice is better if they are 
informed as their vote is likely to be a result of evaluating and counterbalancing i 
r 
different information rather than a random choice. 
( 
Limitation in the research design make it impossible to study the type and 
amount of information that voters have in mind when they formulate their voting 
decisions. Knowledge questions are only asked in March and at that time, which is 
before the most important campaign period, it is difficult to separate different kinds of 
information empirically, as will be shown later. Nevertheless, from the March survey 
we can get an idea of media effects on political knowledge gain in general. And the 
results are believed to apply in the latter stages of the election to a large extent. 
Besides the normative desirability of being informed, empirical theories also 
suggest that knowledge would play an important role in the mechanisms of media 
effects. With the rise of the cognitive information processing approach to the study of 
.pol i t ical communication in recent years (McGraw,、1996), information and 
% -
sophistication have become more and more important. Following this approach, the 
three important components in this chapter - news consumption, information, and 
I 
sophistication, will play important roles in analysis in later chapters. This chapter will 
discuss how the three are conceptualized and measured. And the effects of news 
consumption and sophistication on knowledge will be analyzed and discussed. 
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Conceptualizing and operationalizing news consumption 
As noted in previous discussions, media use will be differentiated into attention 
and exposure. Exposure to media is defined as the amount of time spent consuming 
media content, in this case, newscasts on radio, television and newspapers. 
Attention is defined as the amount of mental effort paid when they are exposed to the 
content (Drew and Weaver, 1990; Chaffee and Schleuder, 1986; McLeod et al., 
1988). Past research has shown that attention and exposure are responsible for 
different effects. In general, exposure is responsible for cognitive effects while 
attention is responsible for cognitive and attitudinal effects (Drew and Weaver, 1990). 
In this study, the aim is not to compare the differences between attention and 
exposure to news media. Both are taken into account so that the amount and scope 
of media effects on knowledge, attitudes, and turnout can be captured more 
completely. 
Three questions are asked in the questionnaire requiring respondents to 
estimate the time they exposed daily to radio news, TV news, and newspaper. If the 
respondents have non-zero exposure to a particular medium, a second question will 
ask them to estimate the amount of attention they paid when during exposure by a 
Likert scale. Table 6.1 shows the results of the factor analysis including the six 
variables testing whether media exposure and attention are distinct dimensions in 
media use. 
Table 6.1 supports the distinction between attention and exposure as two 
dimensions of news medi"a consumptidh. Thus in the following analysis two variables 
are created. News attention is created by taking the mean of the three medium-
attention variables, and news exposure is created by adding the three medium-
exposure variables together (For more details on variable construction here and 
thereafter, please see Appendix A). 
52 
Table 6.1 Factor analysis on differences between attention and exposure 
Pattern matrix of oblique rotation 
Attention Exposure Communality 
TV attention 0.87 0.75 
Newspaper attention 0.85 0.73 
Radio attention 0.88 0.76 
TV exposure 0.74 0.54 
Newspaper exposure 0.67 0.48 
Radio exposure 0.73 0.51 
% of var. accounted 40.4% 22.4% 
Eigenvalue 2.42 1.34 
Factor correlation 
Exposure 0.26 
From Table 6.1 we can also see that the attention variables have larger factor 
loadings and communalities than the exposure variables. In fact, the three attention 
variables have a reliability of 0.84 while the three exposure variables only have a 
reliability of 0.38. This difference is not surprising as exposure to a particular medium 
is dependent upon factors unrelated to one's attitudes about politics, news and 
media. These factors include working routine, habits, and the routines and habits of 
people's family members. Thus, exposure to one medium may not be strongly 
related to exposure to another. However, attention to news should be to a large 
extent related to one's attitudes like the perceived utility of and interest in political 
news. Thus attention to news in one medium should be correlated strongly to 
attention to news in another. 
Methodologically, the results of the factor analysis and the reliability analysis 
i_ imply that, although the constructed news exposure measure has a very high level of 
face validity and has attained construct validity in the factor analysis, it is not a very 
reliable measure. In fact, the problem of the reliability of media exposure and 
attention variables has been pointed out by some researchers. Some even attribute 
the failure of effect research to this unreliability problem (Bartels, 1993; Zaller, 1996). 
Zaller (1996) even argued for abandoning media exposure and attention as 
predictive variables in media effects research. However, the present author believes 
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that media researchers studying media effects on individuals must take Zaller's 
advice with caution, as Miller and Krosnick (1996) noted. When other variables 
(knowledge in Zaller's case) are used to replace media use, reliability is gained only 
by sacrificing face validity. 
By taking into account both exposure and attention the relationship between 
news consumption and other variables can be explored to a fuller extent. 
Nevertheless, the difference in reliability in the attention and exposure measures 
makes comparison between them problematic. The difference between the effects of 
exposure and attention as shown in later analysis would be partially due to the 
difference in the reliability of the two measures. No conclusive results about the 
differences in effects of the two dimensions of media use could be drawn. 
News consumption and knowledge 
When Zaller argued for abandoning media exposure and attention in favor of a 
measure of news reception, which is actually a measure of factual knowledge, he did 
give a more important theoretical reason supporting his claim besides the 
methodological point. The argument is that media effects on attitudes and 
evaluations could exist only after a person's exposing to the media, receiving the 
information, interpreting it and incorporating it into existing knowledge structure. In 
some cases, the retrieval of information is also important in judgment making (Zaller 
and Price, 1990). Thus, the problem of media exposure and attention is that they only 
capture a beginning stage in information processing. And Zaller (1996) argues that 
factual knowledge can be used as a measure of the actual reception of information. 
I agree on the importance of knowledge and the cognitive route of media effects. 
However, as just mentioned,丨 also believe that media variables should not be 
excluded from empirical analysis. They are the actual object of study which 
communication researchers are focusing on. Besides, including media variables 
allow us to look at possible non-cognitive effects. Last but not least, the relationship 
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between news consumption and learning should not be taken for granted. It is true 
that media exposure does not entail reception of information, but this discrepancy 
between exposure and reception is just the intriguing question for communication 
researchers: who can learn what from the media under what kinds of conditions? 
Communication researchers have focused on the notion of knowledge-gap for 
more than two decades (Gaziano and Gaziano, 1996). In its original formulation, 
people with higher levels of socio-economic status, especially those with higher 
levels of education, are more likely to gain knowledge from the media. In the case of 
political knowledge, most researchers agree that most people do not have much 
direct experience of politics, most of the time what they get are second-hand 
information from the mass media (Lau and Erber, 1985). To understand news from 
the media, one's level of sophistication would be important. Broadly defined, political 
sophistication (or political expertise as some political psychologists would call) refers 
to a person's ability to make sense of political matters, processing political 
information and making political judgments. More specifically, political sophistication 
has been conceptualized and operationalized in a number of ways. It may 
conceptually refer to a person's level of abstraction in thinking about politics 
(Converse, 1964; 1975), or a person's level of cognitive complexity (Schroder et al., 
1967; Tetlock, 1983), or the existence of schema - a knowledge structure 一 about 
political information (Lau and Erber, 1985; Hamill and Lodge, 1986). In the literature 
of political psychology, a large number of indicators have been used, including 
w 1 
education, polillcal interest, media use, pure know le^e , or a mixture of them 
(McGraw and Pinney, 1990; Sniderman et al., 1991; Fiske et a/., 1990; McGraw and 
Hubbard, 1996; Funk, 1997; Hsu and Price, 1993; the mfethod of operationalization of 
the concept in this research will be discussed soon). 
The implication of this literature is that while media are important in informing 
the public about the elections and other political matters, more sophisticated people 
are more likely to receive the information from the media than the non-sophisticated 
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people. It is because the sophisticated people have better developed knowledge 
structures and higher levels of ability to draw connections between pieces of 
information with the knowledge they already have. In other words, sophistication can 
facilitate learning from the media. 
We have posited that sophisticated people have a higher ability of learning, but 
learn about what? Can we differentiate different kinds of knowledge? Two particular 
research ideas are relevant here. First, researchers in US usually differentiate 
knowledge in an election into issue knowledge and strategy knowledge, and the two 
kinds of knowledge are different not only empirically but also different in their 
normative desirability. This is what researchers interested in media performance in 
elections usually focus on. Second, researchers familiar with cognitive psychology 
have developed and tested the notion of domain-specific knowledge (Iyengar, 1990; 
Price and Zaller, 1993). That is, common people do not know much about all types of 
knowledge but they focus on different domains, and become knowledgeable about 
particular domains though remaining rather ignorant about other matters-". 
In the survey in March in this study, 24 questions about various domains of 
public affairs are asked. The original design is that the 24 questions can be broken 
down into six groups, four questions are about politician-party matching, four about 
party backgrounds and past performance, four about current campaign strategies, 
four about party issue stands, four about facts about the election, and four about 
general public affairs. However, reliability analysis shows that only party-politician 
一 ‘ 
matching questions attain a reliability coefficient higher than 0.60： Two other groups, 
party background and general public affairs, attain reliability coefficients of higher 
than 0.55. The remaining three groups of questions have reliability coefficients of 
20 Theoretically, the notion of domain-specificity is related to the notion of cognitive heuristics 
(Iyengar, 1990). Following the argument of Downs on rational choice, people will not spend too much 
resource on dealing with political matters. However, it does not mean that citizens are totally irrational, 
rather, they are having bounded rationality. They will use various heuristics, or short-cuts, to minimize 
the costs involved in making a decision. And the fmal decision they make will not be perfectly rational, 
but still being rational to a considerable extent. 
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0.34 to 0.46 only2i. The implication is that there seems to be no clear knowledge 
domains existing at the time the survey was conducted. Thus, in the following 
analysis, a single knowledge measure with the 24 items added together will be used 
(Cronbach's alpha = 0.86). 
Measuring sophistication 
Among the large number of methods used in past research to operationalize 
sophistication as mentioned earlier, pure factual knowledge is becoming the most 
widely used one. However, these indicators, including factual knowledge, though fare 
well in empirical analysis, do not capture a very important aspect of sophistication. 
Sophistication does not refer only to the amount of knowledge acquired, but also the 
way knowledge is processed and structured. Using factual knowledge to represent 
sophistication would present two problems in this study. First, factual knowledge is 
used to represent knowledge per se, and it is also one of the dependent variables to 
be explained, thus some other indicators of sophistication must be found. Second, 
factual knowledge does not capture the conceptual meaning of sophistication 
completely. Thus, when one uses factual knowledge as indicator, the results could 
be interpreted meaningfully even if the concept of sophistication is not used. 
In this study, the author follows the argument made by Tetlock (1983) and 
Schroder et al. (1967) about cognitive complexity. A person is said to be cognitively 
21 The differences in the reliability of the questions are probably the result of three factors. The first is 
the recent-ness of the knowledge involveB. It is probably not a coincident that the two groups of 
knowledge items with the highest level of reliability are about background information, while the items on 
the information and knowledge only recently available attain very low levels of reliability. It points to the 
possibility that learning a particular piece of new information would contain a certain level of random-
ness. However, in the long run, people who are knowledgeable would tend to learn the knowledge and 
information about the same domain as well, and people who are' less knowledgeable may remain 
ignorant about other information in the same domain, or even forget the information learnt. In this case 
the reliability of background information items would become higher. A second factor is the salience of 
the information. Due to the timing of the survey, information about the election, party campaign 
strategies and issue stands remain to be covered sporadically by the media. They are usually put into 
the inner pages of newspapers or as later items in TV and radio news. However, items used in public 
affairs knowledge are more salient. Further, in terms of question design some knowledge items give 
choices for the respondents to choose while others not. For the multiple choice questions, some 
respondents may guess, thus increasing the randomness in being able to answer the questions. These 
are only possible factors, further research would be needed to study the existence and development of 
knowledge domains. 
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complex if s/he demonstrates a high level of differentiation and a high level of 
integration in thinking. Level of differentiation refers to the ability of a person to 
differentiate different stimuli. In other words, in the political realm the level of 
differentiation would be related to the ability of an individual to recognize the 
differences between concepts, groups and issues etc. Level of integration, on the 
other hand, refers to the ability of an individual to combine and connect separate 
objects. In other words, it is the ability of an indivdual to see the connection between 
different political positions, concepts etc. Of course, a complete measure that 
includes one's level of differentiation and integration would be almost impossible in a 
survey. Thus in this study an index is created to represent the respondents' level of 
differentiation mainly, basically referring to how well the respondents can recognize 
political parties' relative positions on two dimensions 一 economic issues and 
democratization. These two dimensions are chosen because they represent the 
major lines of cleavages in Hong Kong politics (Li, 1997). Bivariate correlation 
analysis shows that the measure of level of differentiation is related to knowledge at 
a reasonable level (Pearson r = 0.62). The correlation is strong as the theory of 
sophistication would predict, but it is not overwhelming (otherwise, the analysis of the 
antecedents of knowledge will be meaningless after including level of differentiation). 
Hypotheses and results 
It has already been pointed out that news consumption and sophistication would 
affect knowledge levels in three ways. Three hypotheses can be stated as f o l l o w s : ‘ 
H6.1: News consumption, as the source from which most common people derive 
most of their political knowledge, will lead to higher levels of knowledge. 
H6.2: A person's levels of sophistication, by facilitating various cognitive 
processes of information processing including interpreting and 
comprehending information, as well as storage and retrieval, will lead to 
higher levels of knowledge. 
H6.3: Combining the arguments in the knowledge-gap literature and 
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sophistication theory, it is expected that the interaction between 
sophistication and news consumption will be positively related to higher 
levels of knowledge. 
To get a better understanding about how media inform the public, interpersonal 
communication is also included. Interpersonal communication is also a channel for 
information (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Huckfeldt, 1987). In the survey, 
respondents were asked whether they often, sometimes, rarely or never discuss 
politics and public affairs with friends or relatives. The point of interests here is the 
interaction between sophistication and interpersonal communication. Interpersonal 
communication has several characteristics. First, it is not primarily a channel for 
information acquisition but a channel for opinion expression and exchange. Thus it is 
expected that this kind of communication has less powerful informing effects. 
However, in interpersonal communication, people can specifically ask for the 
particular information they want, thus it is more convenient and cost effective if 
people can find the "experts" around them (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1991). Third, 
interpersonal communication is two-way and the content of communication is more 
flexible than the case in mass communication. It implies that, while lack of the 
necessary background knowledge or schema to understand a particular piece of 
information may hinder information acquisition from the mass media, a person 
engaging in interpersonal communication can ask for the materials and guidance to 
comprehend a particular piece of information. Thus it can be expected that the 
knowledge-gap phenomenon that exist in mass communication would r>ct exist in the 
- •“ » 
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case of interpersonal communication. Two hypotheses can be stated as follows: 
H6.4: People with higher levels of interpersonal discussior^s are more 
knowledgeable about politics and public affairs. However, i； ,e effects of 
interpersonal discussions on knowledge would be lower thar. ie effects of 
mass communic3tion. 
H6.5: Contrary to the situation of mass media consumption, there will not be an 
interaction effect between interpersonal discussions .nd political 
sophistication. 
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To test the hypotheses, a regression analysis is run with the knowledge 
measure as the dependent variable. The independent variables, including 
demographics and political interest as controlling variables, are separated into five 
blocks and entered into the model. 
Table 6.2 Regression analysis on media and sophistication effects on 
knowledge 
Partial model Main effect Final 
only model model 
Demographics (1) 
• A R ' = 1 8 . 7 % * * * 
Political interests 
Political interests 0.13*** 0.05* 0.05* 
AR2 = 4.9%*** 
Communication channels 
News attention 0.20*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 
News exposure 0.10*** 0.07** 0.07** 
Interpersonal discussion 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
AR2 = 8.0%*** 
Sophistication 
Level of sophistication 0.46*** 0.46*** 
A R ' = 16.5%*** 
Interactions 
Level of sophistication X attention 0.07** 
Level of sophistication X exposure 0.05* 
Level of sophistication X int. discussion 0.01 
A R ' = 0.9%*** 
Number of cases 1220 1220 1220 
Percentage of variance accounted for 31.7%*** 48.2%*** 49.0%*** 
Levels of sophistication 
Contingent effects-of (2) Minimum (score = Q) Maximum (score = 12) 
News attention “ 0.14 “ 0.94 
News exposure 0.07 0.61 
Interpersonal discussion 0.08 0.15 
Notes: • 
1. Demographics included family income, personal income, education, age and sex. 
Their regression coefficients are not shown for simplicity. AR^ is obtained at the 
stage of the variables in that bloc were entered and the betas are from the final 
equation in which all the variables in the corresponding model have been entered. 
2. Calculated from the final model by beta of communication variable + the level of 
sophistication score X beta of the interaction variable. 
* p < 0 . 0 5 ; * * p < 0 . 0 1 ; * * * p < 0 . 0 0 1 
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From the results we can see that the hypotheses set out earlier are all 
supported. Before level of sophistication and the interaction variables are added, the 
three communication variables are significantly related to knowledge, with news 
attention having the largest effects. After level of sophistication and the interaction 
variables (See Appendix A for their construction) are added, the beta of all three 
communication variables decreased, but all remained significant. Level of 
sophistication is strongly related to knowledge. Also, the addition of the interaction 
variables did lead to a significant, though not large, increase in the explanatory 
power of the model. As expected, the two interactions between sophistication and 
mass communication attain statistical significance but that between interpersonal 
and mass communication does not. 
The results show that media are an important channel for political information. 
However, the effect sizes differ for people with different levels of sophistication. As 
the sophistication index ranges from 0 to 12, we can calculate the effect sizes for 
different people (shown at the bottom of Table 6.2). For the least sophisticated 
people the effect sizes of communication variables are 0.14 for attention, 0.07 for 
exposure, and 0.08 for interpersonal discussion, but for the most sophisticated the 
effect sizes are 0.94, 0.61 and 0.15 respectively. These findings are illustrated in 
Figure 6.1. The figure indicates that as the sophistication score increases by one unit, 
the effects of news attention increases by 0.07 in terms of standardized regression 
coefficient. The two curved lines indicate the margin of error of the regression 
"coefficient. On the whole, the interaction effects of sophistication with news—attention 
and exposure mean that even people from the least sophisticated group do learn 
some information from the media, it is the most sophisticated people who can learn 
the largest amount of information from the media. 
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Figure 6.1 An illustration for the interaction effects between sophistication 




0.94 7 ^ ^ 
。 匿 
0 12 Sophistication 
Finally, the overall explanatory power of the model is very good indeed. Even 
before sophistication and interaction variables are added, the model can already 
explain more than 30% of the total variance in the dependent variable. The full model 
can explain nearly half of the total variance involved in the knowledge variable. The 
explanatory power is better than many studies on similartopics. For instance, the six 
regression models derived from six different surveys in Zhao and Chaffee's (1995) 
study on campaign advertisments and TV news effects on knowledge have shown R 
square values between 27.1% to 29.5%. Rhee and Cappella's (1997) experimental 
study, analyzing sophistication and media effects on three types of information recall, 
have resulted in R square values between 5% to 20%. The comparatively higKer 
explanatory power in the present study is probably due to the high reliability of the 
knowledge measure. 
Discussion 
What this chapter has accomplished is to conceptualize and explain three very 
important concepts that will continue to operate in later chapters. News consumption 
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is shown to consist of two dimensions 一 attention and exposure. The relationship 
between news consumption, sophistication and political knowledge is also discussed 
and analyzed. On the whole, it is shown that people do learn political information 
from the media, but sophistication is shown to be a contingent condition that would 
facilitate learning from the media. More interestingly, this knowledge-gap 
phenomenon does not exist in the case of learning from interpersonal 
communication. This knowledge-gap phenomenon is partly related to the particular 
ways of media handling and reporting of news. In the case of US, Graber (1994b) 
has argued that media should bear at least part of the blame for the ignorance of the 
American public as shown in opinion polls (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1992) because 
media coverage of political news is often in the episodic frame (Iyengar, 1991) 
without background information. News stories are also usually told with unfamiliar 
words and phrases. In the case of Hong Kong, the media should pay attention to the 
question that whether their coverage is easily comprehensible for the larger public. If 
normal news reporting cannot achieve that, then other kinds of public affairs 
programming may be important. Of course, during the election the media also 
organized different kinds of programs like candidate debates and special 
documentaries. Newspapers also have special editions and pages devoted to 
coverage of election. Whether these actions are enough and helpful are not directly 
assessible here, but future research in the performance of media in Hong Kong 
_ election may focus on the differences between the informative-ness of different 
media programs and genres. ‘ 
Besides the findings, two basic arguments forwarded in this chapter are 
important. First, media can be meaningfully conceptualized as one of the most 
important components of the information environment people reside. Second, it is 
believed that the relationship between various factors can be analyzed more 
meaningfully if the contingent conditions under which these relationships exist are 
taken into account. 
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When using the knowledge, sophistication and media use variables in the 
following analysis, especially in the turnout model in Chapter 8’ certain assumptions 
are made. Level of sophistication is assumed to be a relatively stable attribute of an 
individual. Knowledge level is also assumed to be relatviely stable overtime, as past 
research shown that background knowledge as measured in a previous survey is 
almost always the strongest predictor of knowledge at later times. 
Of course, it becomes more problematic to argue that news consumption is 
stable. Especially in the case of election, the salience of the event may cause 
normally inattentive and unexposed people to pay much more attention and time to 
consume news. However, in the June survey we ask the respondents whether they 
have increased or decreased their exposure and attention to election news in 
particular during the campaign period (i.e., between March and June). The results 
are that 59% of respondents said that they did not change their levels of exposure 
and 40% of respondents reported no change in levels of attention. The proportions of 
respondents reported a little bit increase in exposure and attention are 37% and 54% 
respectively. In other words, the proportions of respondents reported either no 
change or increase a little in their news consumption during the campaign are over 
95% for both the question of exposure and that of attention (see Appendix B). Thus 
the respondents in general did not think they have changed much in the amount of 
news consumption they have during the campaign. Although ideally it is stiil better to 
take into account the changes of news consumption as reported in June, but the 
V 、 
1 
technical problem of how to combine the variables measured in March and June"is 
daunting. Thus in this study the news consumption variables measured in March 
remain to be the most effective and efficient ones for us to analyze the data. 
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VII. Media and political a t t _ e s 
In this chapter the relationship between media and political attitudes will be 
analyzed. The aim is to see whether media use is related to various political attitudes, 
which are in turn potentially related to voter turnout. At the normative level, there can 
be different expectations regarding the relationship between media and different 
attitudes. If it is controversial in arguing that the media should foster positive attitudes 
towards the government, the parties and the elections, it is less controversial in 
saying that the media should lead to a higher sense of civic duty and higher levels of 
political interest. Of course, it does not mean that the relationship between media use 
and attitudes towards political institutions is not related to the normative aspect, it 
only means that whether their relationships are desirable is a more complicated 
question and it must be answered with reference to the media coverage and the 
actual behaviors of the political actors. 
Refer to the diagram in Chapter 4, in the previous chapter the arrow linking 
media and knowledge is tackled with the introducation of sophistication into the 
whole picture. This chapter will study the linkages between media and attitudes, and 
that between knowledge and attitudes. 
Two practical issues in the study ofmedia-attitudes relationship 
The relationship between media consumption and pojitical attitudes has been 
the focus of political communication research since the years of Lazarsfeld and his 
colleagues. Two general problems, which have been briefly discussed in Chapter 4, 
i 
are important. First, what are attitudes? Conceptually an attitude may be defined as 
"a general and relatively enduring evaluation of some person (including oneself), 
group, object, or issue" (Petty et al., 1994, p.70). However, used in a broad way, it is 
often difficult to clearly differentiate attitude with similar concepts like beliefs, values, 
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opinions, evaluations etc. A cursory survey of the political communication and 
political science literature shows that attitude may sometimes be referred to basic 
democratic values like political tolerance (Bobo and Licari, 1989), to certain beliefs 
that is related to the notion of civic awareness like sense of efficacy (Cappella and 
Jamieson, 1997)，to opinions and preferences for policy issues (Converse, 1964; 
Wyckoff, 1984)，or to evaluations of and feelings towards particular objects like 
groups (Zinni et al., 1997). 
For the purpose of the present research 丨 do not intend to give a clear 
conceptual discussion and definition of attitudes. Instead, attitude wni be used as a 
general term including three more specific sets of variables. The first group is civic 
awareness and it includes the general beliefs and predispositions that a democratic 
citizen is supposed to have. It is supposed to include concepts like sense of efficacy 
and sense of duty etc. However, the actual component of civic awareness will be 
determined by analyzing the data, as will be shown later. It should be noted that this 
group of attitudes is more general as they reflect a person's self-concept as a citizen 
and his/her relationship with politics in general. They will be related to a wider range 
of political attitudes and behaviors. The second group is the attitudes towards three 
major political institutions in an election: 1) The government, which is responsible for 
organizing and conducting the election, 2) The political parties, which field 
candidates in the election, and 3) election itself. Of course, attitude towards one 
particular institution can be broken down further conceptually. However, for the sake 
•_ * 
—of simplicity a composite index would represent respondents' attitudes towards one 
institution. These attitudes are more specific than civic awareness as they are 
referring to particular objects rather than politics in general. But they are still general 
in the sense that they are referring to more stable underlying attitudes towards those 
objects, rather than opinions or evaluations of specific aspects or performance of the 
objects on specific issues or in specific events. Thus it is conceptually different from 
the last group of attitudes, which is the performance evaluations of the institutions in 
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the election. They refer to the questions asked in the second-wave survey, which 
specifically asked the respondents to give scores for the three institutions involved 
about their performance in the election. 
The second problem involved in the study of news consumption's relationship 
with political attitudes is the casual direction. Communication researchers are 
certainly more interested in how communication has caused the formation and 
change of attitudes. However, it is also obvious that attitudes can lead to differences 
in communication behavior. The most exemplary case perhaps is the relationship 
between political interests and media consumption. The two are so closely related to 
each other that political scientists not especially interested in media communication 
per se sometimes use media attention and exposure as indicators of political 
interests (Teixeira, 1992; 1987; Shum, 1996). And researchers who are interested in 
media effects often encounter difficulties in arguing for the directions of relationships 
(Norris, 1997; Chan, 1995). Methodologically there are two ways for solving 
problems of casual directions. The first is to utilize more advanced statistical analysis 
like the non-recursive regression model. However, the use of this technique requires 
one to recognize certain variables that are causes of media communication but not 
political interest, and variables that are causes of political interests but not media 
communication. The identification of these antecedent variables is extremely difficult, 
especially in the case of media-use-interest relationship. 
Researchers may also use a panel survey to tackle the problem. By asking the 
_ same set of questions twice, temporal order between variables can be established. 
An example is Thomas Patterson's The Mass Media Election. However, a panel 
survey is costly, and it does not seem to eliminate the problem altogether. 
Facing with this problem, the analysis that follows is mainly aimed at describing 
the relationship between various political attitudes and communication behavior. 
More certain casual claims could be established only in the analysis of the third 
group of attitudes, that is, evaluations of performance after the election. It is because 
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the temporal order between them has been established. In this chapter, after 
discussing how the attitude indices are operationalized, analysis of the pattern of 
relationship between attitudes, media use and knowledge will be conducted. As the 
previous chapter suggests, it will be meaningful to study whether different people 
exhibit different patterns of relationships between news consumption and attitudes. It 
will be shown that whether people with high and low levels of sophistication exhibit 
different patterns of relationships between the variables. 
Civic awareness and attitudes towards political institutions measured 
Both civic awareness and attitudes towards political institutions are measured in 
the March survey by multiple indicators. For civic awareness, respondents have to 
state whether they would agree or disagree with 14 statements by a 5-point scale. 
The statements are designed to include people's sense of duty, perception of political 
rights, sense of internal and external efficacies, and political interest. However, 
whether the respondents' answers fit into the original design is another matter. 
The two statements about political interests are direct and explicit. They are 
stated as "I am interested in Hong Kong politics" and "I am interested in the 
upcoming election." They have a reliability coefficient of 0.59 and an index for 
political interests is derived simply by averaging the two. The other 12statements are 
put into a factor analysis to search for underlying dimensions. Following some initial 
tests, statements with low communalities (< 0.4) and those split evenly across factors 
__ w » 
are removed from the model, resulting in Table 7.1. The results are somewhat 
different from the original design of the statements. The 9 remaining statements can 
be reduced to three factors. The first factor contains 3 statements about people's 
sense of efficacy. The next contains 3 statements about people's sense of duty and 
rights. The last factor also contains 3 statements. One particular commonality of 
those 3 statements is that they all explicitly mention political activities of one kind or 
another. Thus they are thought as representing attitudes towards political 
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participation. As in the case of political interests, the statements representing one 
particular construct are averaged. Therefore 4 variables about civic awareness are 
constructed. (See Appendix A for details). 
Table 7.1 Factor analysis on civic awareness 
Pattern matrix resulted from oblique rotation (only values over 0.30 are shown) 
Sense of Sense of rights Attitudes Comm-
efficacy and duty towards unality 
participation 
The Hong Kong 0.70 0.48 
government failed to 
respond to public 
opinion. 
Common people 0.68 0.48 
cannot grasp Hong 
Kong politics. 
Hong Kong people 0.76 0.58 
have no influence on 
government policies. 
Citizens have rights 0.58 0.30 0.51 
to express their own 
opinions through 
different means. 
Every citizen has the 0.68 0.50 
duty to obey the law. 
Unless it would affect 0.31 0.65 0.50 
my interests, I have 
no need to go out to 
vote. 
Participating in public 0.68 0.53 
affairs is the duty of 
citizens. 
Voting is an effective 0.71 0.56 
mean to express 
opinions to the 
government. 
； A citizen has the right 、0.61 0.44 
to participate in_ “ 
politics. 
% of variance 21.6% 18.1% 11.4% 
accounted for • 
Eigenvalue 1.94 1.63 1.03 
Correlation among 
factors 
Sense of rights and 0.02 
duty 
Attitudes towards 0.17 -0.01 
participation 
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A particular note about the civic awareness variables is that they generally have 
low reliability coefficients (Cronbach's alpha fo「political interest = 0.59, for sense of 
efficacy = 0.54, for sense of duty and rights = 0.36，attitudes towards political 
participation = 0.42). This means that they are actually not very powerful indicators of 
their respective concepts, but they are the best estimate that can be derived. 
For attitudes towards political institutions, respondents were asked to state 
whether they agree with 20 statements or not using a 5-point scale. The statements 
are designed to capture various possible dimensions and aspects of citizen's 
attitudes towards the institutions. In the factor analysis, statements with 
communalities lower than 0.40 and those split across various factors are removed. 
Table 7.2 shows the results. 
Table 7.2 Factor analysis on attitudes towards political institutions 
Pattern matrix resulted from oblique rotation (only values over 0.30 are shown) 
Attitudes towards 
Election Government Parties Communality 
1 0.83 0.67 
2 0.68 0.46 
3 0.61 0.50 
4 0.80 0.63 
5 0.58 0.48 
6 0.65 0.43 
7 0.65 0.47 
8 0.62 0.48 
9 0.64 0.44 
10 0.64 0.49 
11 0.62 0.41 
12 0.63 0.40 
13 - ^ :0.75 0.59 
14 0.75 0.56 
% of variance accounted for 26.5% 12.7% 10.9% 
Eigenvalue 3.77 1.71 1.52 
Correlations among factors ‘ 
Attitudes towards 0.25 
government 
Attitudes towards parties 0.10 0.15 
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1. The LegCo election in May would be very important for the general development 
in HK 
2. Election is closely related to people's lives. 
3. The LegCo election in May is helpful to Hong Kong democratization. 
4. The election in May is very important to the political development in Hong Kong. 
5. The election in May would boast the confidence of Hong Kong people. 
6. The degree of democracy and freedom that the SAR government is giving the HK 
people is satisfactory. 
7. The SAR government in efficient in handling livelihood issues. 
8. Hong Kong people should trust the SAR government. 
9. Hong Kong government fails to effective solve Hong Kong's social problems 
10. The SAR government is a government really ruled by Hong Kong people. 
11. The Hong Kong government is not a democratic government. 
12. Hong Kong's political parties would change their stands in order to gain votes. 
13. Election is a venue for politicians to strive for fame and interests, it is 
meaningless to common people. 
14. Hong Kong's political parties would only respect public opinion at election times. 
Three sets of statements cluster around three underlying factors. The first factor 
consists of 5 statements about citizens' attitude towards the election. The second 
consists of 6 statements about attitude towards the government and the third 
consists of 3 statements about attitude towards the parties and candidates. Different 
from the case of civic awareness, the components of the factors in this case have 
generally higher reliability coefficients (Cronbach's alpha for attitudes towards 
government = 0.72, for attitudes towards the election = 0.78, for attitudes towards the 
parties = 0.55). The indices are constructed by calculating the means of the answers 
to relevant statements (See appendix A for details). 
Attitude structure and constraint 
In studying the relationships between news consumption, knowledge and 
attitudes the question is more than what attitudes the heavy media users are holding 
versus the light consumer. As we can expect the various political attitudes to be 
related to one another, bivariate analysis of relationships between news consumption 
and political attitudes may give rise to a lot of significant, but possibly spurious, 
correlations. Before going to the analysis, some discussions of the basic ideas 
underlying the analysis will be useful. 
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Philip Converse, in his discussion about the American public's political thinking, 
has developed the concept of attitude structure (1964; 1975; Campbell et al., 1960), 
which refers to the pattern of relationships among a set of policy attitudes. The 
attitudes are structured in the sense that when one of the attitudes changes, some of 
the others would also change. In Converse's terminologies, there are constraints 
present in the relationships among the attitudes. Besides, some attitudes would be 
more central than the others, i.e., changing some attitudes would affect the whole 
configuration of the attitude structure to a larger extent than changing others. In 
Converse's formulation, the attitudes are defined by the political elite to be related to 
each other in a particular way. It results in sets of connected issue positions 
representing different ideologies, namely, liberalism and conservatism in the 
American society. 
Borrowing this idea, the objective of the analysis in the following sections is to 
show the "structural constraints" of the political attitudes involved in this study. We 
can expect the various political attitudes and civic awareness components to be 
closely related. However, it is not likely that all attitudes will be directly related to 
each other. Imagine that we are studying the inter-relationships between 5 attitudes. 
There are numerous possible patterns of relationship among them. The following 
diagram shows two of the possibilities. 
Figure 7.1 Two possible patterns of interrelationships between 5 attitudes 
- -
: A _ J B A B' 
K . 彻 
D E D E 
Assuming that the five attitudes are related to each other at the bivariate level, 
after they control for each other, different patterns can emerge. In Pattern 1 there is a 
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variable C at the "center," as it is related directly to the other four variables. The other 
four variables, however, are directly related to C and another one variable only. In 
Pattern 2, all five variables are directly related to each other. To repeat, the idea of 
constraint is that changing one attitude will lead to changes in the others. However, 
how these constraints work and to what extent attitudes are constrainted by others 
would depend on the patterns of relationship. In Pattern 2 above, changing any one 
variable will directly lead to changes in others. In pattern 1, however, only changing 
attitude C will have the same effect, changing another attitude, such as A, would lead 
to change in D and E only through the mediation of C. Besides, the amount of 
constraint also depends on the strength of the relationships among the attitudes, 
which the above diagram does not show. Ifthe relationships among the variables are 
stronger, then the constraint is larger. 
In the above diagram, if a sixth variable, which is media use, is added into the 
analysis, we can see whether the structure among the attitudinal variables would 
change and whether and to what extent media use is related to various attitudinal 
variables. Using this method to analyze the relationship among attitudes and media 
use would simplify the interpretation. By viewing the relationship between attitudes 
and media use as forming a pattern, the important thing is not the individual linkages 
among the variables but the overall pattern. Also, as casual analysis is impossible 
due to the design, how news consumption and knowledge are directly or indirectly 
related to which of the political attitudes would only provide suggestions for the 
一 w » 
possible, if not actual, effects of news consumption and knowledge. 
It is important to note that there are important differences between the analysis 
here and Converse's original idea. While Converse is' concerning with how policy 
issue attitudes come together, this study is focusing on how civic awareness, 
attitudes towards political institutions and news consumption are related. Also, in 
Converse analysis there is a socially defined "correct" relationship between various 
attitudes. Thus, Converse starts with a "standard" attitude structure to examine 
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whether the attitude structure of the public comes close to it. However, in this study 
the author does not presume any correct relationship between various attitudes. Of 
course, there will be relationships that are easier to interpret than others. For 
instance, a significant direct relationship between sense of duty and rights and 
attitudes towards political participation would be more intuitive than a direct 
relationship between sense of duty and rights and attitudes towards political parties. 
But there is no true orfalse, right or wrong in any relationship among the attitudes. 
Questions are results 
Unlike the previous chapter, it is difficult to state very specific hypotheses in this 
section. Instead, the major questions can be stated as follows: 
Q7.1: In what ways and to what extent the various political attitudes and civic 
awareness variables are related to one another? Would some of the 
relationships at the bivariate level disappear at the multivariate level? 
Q7.2: What would be the pattern of relationship after adding media use and 
knowledge? What kinds of relationships exist between media use and 
knowledge variables and the attitudinal variables? What are the differences 
between the bivariate level analysis and multivariate level analysis of 
media-attitudes relationships? 
In Figure 4.1 I have pointed out that media consumption and political attitudes 
can affect each other. The available data do not allow specification of the casual 
direction. Thus, bivariate and partial correlation analyses are conducted. The results 
are shown in Table 7.3 to 7.4. 
一 • 
~ In the tables the upper-right corners show results of bivariate correlations. As 
would be expected, the attitudinal variables are largely correlated with each other in 
zero-order analysis. In Table 7.3 only one of the 21 bivariate correlation coefficients 
are insignificant. Also, all the relationships are positive, showing that the set of 
political attitudes is, on the whole, reinforcing each other. 
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Table 7.3 Correlations among political attitudes 
Interest Duty Participate. Efficacy Att. gov. Att. par. Att. elect. 
Interest —— .18*** .31*** .17*** .16*** .16*** .32*** 
(1170) (1164) (1153) (1132) (1108) (1120) 
Duty . i r * * —— .22*** .10*** .02 .11*** .06* 
(1152) (1173) (1163) (1142) (1117) (1131) 
Participate. .19*** .18*** —— .10*** .08** .11*** .35*** 
(1146) (1155) (1160) (1134) (1112) (1123) 
Efficacy .08** .03 .00 —— .29*** .29** .18*** 
(1135) (1145) (1142) (1125) (1103) (1113) 
Att. gov. .02 .00 -.04 .26*** —— .09** .32*** 
(1114) (1124) (1116) (1107) (1150) (1165) 
Att.par. .08** .04 .00 .23*** -.01 —— .18*** 
(1091) (1100) (1095) (1096) (1133) (1144) 
Att. elect. .19*** -.03 .28*** .05^ .23*** .13*** ------
(1103) (1114) (1106) (1086) (1148) (1127) 
Notes: 
Cell entries are correlation coefficients and sample size. The upper-right half of the table 
shows zero-order results, the lower-left half shows partial correlation results. In partial 
correlation of two variables, all other variables in the table and five demographics 
variables are controlled. 
•** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; A p < 0.10 
Table 7.4 shows that the media and knowledge variables have different 
relationships with political attitudes. News exposure is related to only three of the 
attitudinal variables in the bivariate analyses: it is positively correlated with political 
interests and attitudes towards participation, but negatively correlated with attitudes 
towards parties (but the correlation coefficient is weak). News attention shows a 
more interesting pattern. It is correlated with all the four civic awareness variables but 
only with one of the three attitudes towards political institutions in the bivariate 
analyses. Actually, zero-order resu[ts, especially its strong relationship with political 
interests, explain why media attention is sometimes used as an indicator of political 
involvement or interests: it is connected to a person's civic awareness in general. 
蠢 
Knowledge, in the bivariate analyses, has demonstrated correlations with political 
interest, sense of duty, attitudes towards participation, and attitudes towards the 
government. 
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Table 7.4 Correlations among media use, knowledge and political attitudes 
NE. NA. Know Interest Duty Particip Efficac Att. Att. Att. 
ate. y gov. par. elect. 
NE. ——.31*** .23*** .16*** .03 .10*** -.05^ -.02 -.07* .04 
(1226) (1226) (1173) (1185) (1177) (1166) (1180) (1153) (1167) 
NA. .21*** ——.37*** .36*** .14*** .13*** .07* .03 -.01 .09** 
(1205) (1226) (1173) (1185) (1177) (1166) (1180) (1153) (1167) 
Know .12*** .23*** ——.26*** .22*** .13*** -.00 -.13*** .05 -.02 
(1205) (1205) (1173) (1185) (1177) (1166) (1180) (1153) (1167) 
Interest .03 .24*** .14*** ——.18*** .31*** .17*** .16*** .16*** .32*** 
(1152) (1152) (1152) (1170) (1164) (1153) (1132) (1108) (1120) 
Duty -.03 .04 .12*** .07* ------ .22*** .10*** .02 .11*** .06* 
(1164) (1164) (1164) (1149) (1173) (1163) (1142) (1117) (1131) 
Particip .06* -.02 .04 .17*** .17*** —— .10*** .08** .11*** .35*** 
-ate (1156) (1156) (1156) (1143) (1152) (1160) (1134) (1112) (1123) 
Efficac -.04 . 0 5 八 - . 0 3 .07* .03 .01 ——.29*** .29** .18*** 
y (1145) (1145) (1145) (1132) (1142) (1139) (1125) (1103) (1113) 
Att. -.03 .00 -.12*** .04 .02 -.04 .26*** ——.09** .32*** 
gov. (1159) (1159) (1159) (1111) (1121) (1113) (1104) (1150) (1165) 
Att. -.05A -.06* .04 .09** .03 .00 .23** -.00 ——.18*** 
par. (1133) (1133) (1133) (1088) (1097) (1092) (1083) (1130) (1144) 
Att. -.02 .02 -.02 .18*** -.03 .28*** .05 .22*** .13*** —— 
elect. (1147) (1147) (1147) (1100) (1111) (1103) (1093) (1145) (1124) 
Notes: 
Cell entries are correlation coefficients and sample size. The upper-right half of the table 
shows results of bivariate correlation analysis, which actually contain replication of the 
results shown in Table 7.1.The other half table shows results of partial correlation 
analysis. When analyzing the partial correlation of two variables, all the other variables in 
the table, together with five demographics variables, are controlled. 
: * * • p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; A P <.TD.10 
NA.: News attention NE.: News exposure; 
Know: Knowledge Efficacy: Sense of efficacy 
Interest: Political interest Att. gov.: Attitudes towards the government 
Duty: Sense of duty and rights Att. par.: Attitudes towards the parties 
Participate: Attitudes towards participation Att. elect.: Attitudes towards the election 
The more important part of the analysis is the partial correlations between the 
variables. As suggested earlier, when the variables are controlled for each other, the 
number of significant correlations would decrease substantially. In Table 7.3 the 
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number of insignificant relationships have increased from 1 to 10. In Table 7.4, a 
similar pattern appears. And most important, the number of significant relationships 
between news attention and exposure and other attitudinal variables have decreased 
to a large extent. 
To have a better vision of the partial correlation analysis, results are 
summarized into Figure 7.2 and 7.3, from which we can visualize the "attitude 
structure" of our respondents. Significant relationships among variables are shown 
by linkages among variables and the thickness ofthe lines approximates the strength 
of correlations. 
Figure 7.2 shows that at the multivariate level’ attitudes are not related to each 
other in a pair-wise fashion. Instead, some attitudes appear to be more "central." For 
instance, political interest is significantly related to 5 of the remaining 6 attitudinal 
variables. However, some attitudes are directly related to only a few of other attitudes, 
e.g, attitudes towards the government is only related to sense of efficacy and attitude 
towards the election. 
Figure 7.2 Summary of relationships between political attitudes 
Att. political p^^'^g Att. election 
\ \ Z 
\ Sense of efficacy ^ ^ ^ ^ 
\ \ \ z/ 
： \ \ Att. government Z . 
_ • V - Z ‘ 
\ Political interests 
/ \ 
Sense of duty and rights Att. towards participation 
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Figure 7.3 Summary of relationships between media use, knowledge, and 
political attitudes 
Att. political parties i i ^ _ _ _ _ ^ _ _ _ _ Att. Election 
\ \ / / 
/ \ Sense of efficacy X / 
/ \ \ \ Z / 
Attention ^ \ \ Att. government / 
卜\\：\ / 
K n o w I e d g e ^ ^ ^ ^ \ \ / 
/ ^ \ I 
Exposure ^ Political interests 
s ^ y ^ ^ 
Sense of duty and rights Att. participat. 
For both Figure 7.2 and 7.3: 
Pearson r < 0.10 Pearson r < 0.2CL Pearson r > 0.20 
Broken lines represent negative correlations 
Only relationships significant at .05 levels are entered into the figures 
Another advantage of putting the attitudinal variables into an overall structure is 
that it can help us to ascertain the meanings of the attitudinal variables in a more 
contextualized way. For instance, attitude towards participation is related to interest, 
attitude towards the election, and sense of duty and right only. It suggests that this 
variable is more related to a person's own sense of whether s/he wants to participate 
in public affairs, and it is less related to the political environment. Sense of efficacy is 
related to attitudes towards political parties and government besides its relatioship 
with interest, it suggests that the measure of efficacy is mainly one of external 
efficacy, which is a person's sense of whether one's own opinions and efforts would 
count in the given political environment. 
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What is the situation after the news consumption variables and knowledge are 
added? From the figures we see that the significance of the relationships between 
various attitudes do not change (the correlation coefficients are adjusted, of course). 
All the links that exist in Figure 7.2 also exist in Figure 7.3, and no new relationship is 
added. For how the news consumption and knowledge variables are connected with 
the attitudinal variables, in Figure 7.3 news exposure is only directly related to 
attitudes towards political participation, and news attention is directly related 
positively to political interests and negatively to attitudes towards political parties only. 
In other words, while exposure has three significant correlations with political 
attitudes in bivariate analysis, it is reduced to one in the partial correlation analysis. 
News attention suffers a decrease from five to two. However, the explanatory power 
of knowledge largely survives the control, three out of the four significant bivariate 
relationships between knowledge and attitudes retain, though the correlation 
coefficients have decreased. In sum, it is positively related to political interests and 
sense of rights and duty, and negatively related to attitudes towards parties. 
The results point to a conclusion that is consistent with what scholars in the 
West has argued: media use is not strongly related to a wide set of attitudes but 
knowledge emerges as an important variable in explaining media effects. Figure 7.3 
has shown that news exposure and attention only have very limited relationship with 
attitudes at the multivariate level, but knowledge appears to be more powerful in 
shaping people's attitudes. For instance, comparing the effects of knowledge and 
‘ n e w s attention, it can be argued that though news attention is related to political 
interests more strongly, the casual direction of the relationship is largely unknown. 
However, as the previous chapter suggest, knowledge is likely to be a cause when it 
has direct relationships with attitudinal variables. 
Regarding knowledge effects there are three points to be noted. First, as we 
assume that common people gain most of their political knowledge through the 
media, knowledge effects are to a large extent indirect effects flowing from the media. 
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Second, the knowledge variable used in the analysis refers to amount of knowledge 
only. Thus for the variable to have effects on attitudes, it means either the state of 
knowing something, i.e., the feeling of "I know I am knowledgeable," would have 
attitudinal effects, or the content of coverage induces attitude change. In the above 
analysis, the relationship between civic awareness and knowledge may be explained 
by both mechanisms, while the relationship between knowledge and attitudes 
towards institutions are more likely to be caused by the actual content. For news 
content to have effects on attitudes, like the negative effects on government, it 
requires that the content: 1) has enough elements related to the government, 2) the 
elements are largely negative, or at least capable of eliciting negative responses, to 
the government, and 3) the audience received the negative elements. From these 
arguments we can generate hypothesis about media content, however, as pointed 
out in previous chapters, it will be out of the scope of the present study. 
Sophistication and media effects on attitudes 
In the previous chapter we have tested the knowledge-gap phenomenon. 
Recent research has also shown that people with different levels of sophistication 
have different methods in processing information (Hsu and Price, 1993; Sniderman 
et al., 1991; Rhee and Cappella, 1997; Tewksbury, 1999; Price et al., 1997). There 
are various arguments put forward by scholars. Some argue that sophisticated 
people are more likely to take the cognitive route of judgment formation making 
- rather than the affective route (Sniderman et a/., 1991). Others argue that 
sophisticated people are more likely to counteract media effects as they are more 
capable to re-interpret media messages (McGraw and Hubbard, 1996). 
However, adopting the cognitive route in judgment means only taking 
information as an important basis of judgment. It does not entail relationships 
between amount of information and attitudes, since sophisticated people may have 
their own processes of interpretation and evaluation of information. Actually, whether 
80 
the amount of information and attitudes will be related in the two groups of people 
may differ case by case, considering the nature of the attitudes, the information 
about the attitude object available in the environment, and people's pre-existing 
attitudes etc. However, there is not enough space here to introduce and tackle all the 
complexities. On the whole, a general hypothesis, following the sophisticated people 
as cognitive heuristic users argument (Sniderman et al., 1991), can be stated: 
H7.1: More significant relationships between knowledge and attitudinal variables 
would exist for the sophisticated group rather than the non-sophisticated 
group. 
Then what about the relationship between media consumption and political 
attitudes? When knowledge is controlled, it can be assumed that the relationship 
between news consumption and political attitudes is largely affective. A little 
discussion may be needed for the term "affect." Affect can be defined as "a generic 
term encompassing such things as feelings, moods, and emotions" (Conover and 
Feldman, 1986, p.51). Thus it is different from cognition, which involves the 
processing of knowledge, information and arguments. Affect and cognition are 
closely connected with each other. For instance, a person's interpretation of 
oneselfs emotional states would involve cognitive processes, and a person's affect 
and cognition towards a particular object are correlated (Conover and Feldman, 
1986). However, research also shows that a person's affect towards an object can 
exist without cognition, and affect can be in conflict with cognition (Markus and 
、 MacKuen, 1993; Granberg and Browr>, 1989). In our case, it is possible for a person 
‘ -
to watch a TV story about the election and end up knowing nothing about the election 
and candidates, but only feel that it is annoying or feel confident about the system. 
Generally speaking, research has shown that taking affect into account can help 
explaining people's political attitudes (Markus and MacKuen, 1993; Conover and 
Feldman, 1986). But affect is not widely studied (Graber, 1996), mainly due to the 
fact the cognitive information theories are better developed, and the problems 
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involved in conceptualizing (whether affect can be summarized into like vs. dislike), 
and operationalizing affect. In the present case, the author accepts several 
arguments and assumptions from the social psychology literature. First, affect and 
cognition are distinct and affect can exist without or in conflict with cognition. Second, 
media are capable in producing affective as well as cognitive consequences. Third, 
affect towards objects like the election itself, the parties and candidates etc, would 
likely affect citizens' decision to vote. In the actual analysis in the following, it must be 
conceded that there is no particular variable devised to capture the "affect" of the 
respondents, and the so-called "affective consequences" of the media is largely a 
kind of residual explanation. That is, when the cognitive effects of the media are 
specified by knowledge, the remaining effects of the media variables are more likely 
to be largely affective in nature. 
Back to the analysis, following Sniderman et al. (1991) it may be argued that 
media-attitudes relationships may be stronger in the low sophistication group, since 
they are the people who are more likely to rely on the affective route in judgment 
formation. Thus, a general hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
H7.2: Media use and attitudes are likely to be related more strongly in the low 
sophistication group than the high sophistication group. 
In testing the hypotheses, one complication involved is that sophisticated 
people have higher levels of knowledge than the non-sophisticated people. Thus in 
separating the two groups 一 sophisticated vs. non-sophisticated - a method is 
； a d o p t e d so that the two groups do not differ largely;in knowledge levels (see 
Appendix A), fh i s prevents any conflation of knowledge and sophistication effects. 
Also, it prevents the situation that the amount of variance in the knowledge variable 
would be too small in the non-sophisticated group, which makes the comparison 
between the two groups invalid. 
After dividing the two groups, a correlation analysis is conducted. Here we are 
only interested in the multivariate analysis after the media and knowledge variables 
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are added. The results are summarized in Table 7.5, and also Figure 7.4 and 7.5. 
Table 7.6 Correlations among media use, knowledge and political attitudes 
for the two sophistication groups 
NE. NA Know Interest Duty Particip- Efficacy Att. Att. Att. 
ate gov. par. elect. 
NE —— .24*** .10* .01 -.02 . i r * -.01 -.05 -.05 .02 
(591) (591) (568) (568) (567) (561) (576)(571) (570) 
NA .18*** —— .22*** .24*** .04 -.02 .04 .05 -.08* -.02 
(599) (591) (568) (568) (567) (561) (576) (571) (570) 
Know .14*** .26*** —— .16*** .20*** .00 -.00 -.14**.08^ .00 
(599) (599) (568) (568) (567) (561) * (568) (560) 
• (573) 
Interest .04 .24*** .13** —— .06 .21*** .05 .03 .05 .19** 
(569) (569) (569) (567) (566) (560) (554) (550) (549) 
Duty -.04 .06 .03 .06 ——.17*** .06 .00 -.00 .01 
(581) (581) (581) (567) (566) (560) (554) (550)(550) 
Particip-.01 -.05 .08^ .12*** .18*** .03 .01 .04 .27*** 
ate (574) (574) (574) (562) (571) (560) (553) (549) (548) 
Efficacy -.06 .08^ -.06 .10* -.00 .05 —— .23***.22***.07 
(569) (569) (569) (557) (567) (564) (547) (543) (542) 
Att. gov. -.03 -.05 -.06 .09* .04 -.07^ .29*** .01 .25*** 
(568) (568) (564) (542) (552) (545) (542) (570) (570) 
Att. par. -.06 -.05 .02 .13** . 07八 - . 02 .23*** -.01 ——.10* 
(547) (547) (547) (523) (532) (528) (525) (560) (567) 
Att. .03 -.06 -.07 .17*** -.06 .29*** .02 .19***.16*** —— 
elect. (562) (562) (5362) (536) (546) (540) (536) (545) (542) 
Note: 
Cell entries are correlation coefficients and sample size. The upper-right half of the table 
shows results for the high levels of sophistication group. The other half table shows 
results offor the low levels of sophistication group. When analyzing the partial 
correlation of two variables, ail the other variables in the table, together with five 
demographics variables, are controlled. 
一 产 ‘ 
*** p < 0.001; * *p < 0.01;* p < 0.05; ^ p < 0 . 1 0 • 
NA.: News attention NE.: News exposure; 
Know: Knowledge Efficacy: Sense of efficacy 
Interest: Political interest Att. gov.: Attitudes towards the 
government 
Duty: Sense of duty and rights Att. par.: Attitudes towards the parties 
Participate: Attitudes towards participation Att. elect.: Attitudes towards the 
election | 
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Figure 7.4 Summary of relationships 一 low sophist icat ion group 
Att. political parties Att. Election 
^ V ^ ^ e n ^ o f efficacy / / 
\ \ \ / / 
A t t e n t i o n 、 \ \ Att. government , / 
N ^ A \ / 
Knowledge ^ ^ \ \ / 
/ ^ \ / 
Exposure 、飞 Political interests 
Sense of duty and rights " " " " " ^ ^ " " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ " A ^ p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
Figure 7.5 Summary of relat ionships 一 high sophist icat ion group 
Att. political parties Att. Election 
\ 7/ 
/ Sense of efficacy X / 
\ / / 
Attention ^ Att. government / 
K N < z / 
K n o w l e d g e " ^ ^ ^ ^ / 
/ ^ z 
- E x p o s u r e ^ ^ Political interests 、 ^ ^ ^ 
Sense of duty and rights Att. participation 
Pearson r < 0.10 Pearson r < 0 . 2 0 ^ ^ _ ^ Pearson r > 0.20 
Broken lines represent negative correlations 
Only relationships significant at .05 levels are entered into the figures 
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From Figure 7.4 and 7.5 we can see that H7.1 is supported but H7.2 is not. For 
the low sophistication group, news consumption and knowledge has virtually no 
direct relationship with any attitudinal variables. The remaining relationships include 
the positive one between attention and interest, and that between knowledge and 
interest. If one compares Figure 7.4 with Figure 7.3’ one may argue that the lack of 
direct relationships is due to the smaller sample size in the analysis resulting in 
Figure 7.4. However, even if the confidence level is pushed back to 0.10, only two 
direct relationships between the news consumption and knowledge variables and 
attitudinal variables will be added. They are the positive correlation between news 
attention and sense of efficacy, and that between knowledge and attitudes towards 
participation. In other words, if media have any effects on political attitudes, the 
effects will be mediated through political interests. Thus, it can be argued that media 
effects on political attitudes as shown in Figure 7.4 are very limited. 
Different from the low sophistication group, for the high sophistication group 
news consumption and knowledge are related more closely to the attitudinal 
variables. Actually, all significant relationships between media/knowledge variables 
in Figure 7.3 are retained. Knowledge has retained its positive correlation with 
interests and sense of duty and rights, and its negative relationship with attitudes 
towards government. Actually, knowledge also demonstrates positive effects on 
attitudes towards parties which is significant at 0.10 level. One interesting point to 
note when comparing Figure 7.4 and 7.5 is that in the low sophistication group, 
、 广 • 
political interest has retained its "central" position. It is related directly to five 
attitudinal variables, as well as with news attention and knowledge. However, for the 
sophisticated people interest is less powerful in explaining other attitudes. It can only 
retain direct relationships with two attitudinal variables. Whether we can characterize 
the lowly sophisticated people as interest-driven in their political outlook is a matter 
beyond the scope of the present research. But this question may have important 
implication in understanding Hong Kong people's political attitudes and behavior. 
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How can the failure of hypothesis 7.2 be explained, i.e., why news consumption 
variables demonstrate more and stronger relationships with attitudinal variables in 
the high sophistication group? First of all, it should be noted that the general 
argument about sophistication did not rule out the possibility that sophisticated 
people may utilize the affective route in attitude formation and judgment making, it 
only says that they use the cognitive route relatively more. In other words, Figure 
7.5 — results for the sophistication group - is not directly contradictory to the 
argument. The question is why non-sophisticated people demonstrate no 
relationship between political attidues and their news consumption. What could be 
suggested is that in the analysis the attitudes are more stable and general ones, 
rather than specific evaluations (like those that will be analyzed later). Non-
sophisticated people may find it difficult to formulate these stable and general 
attitudes, no matter by the cognitive or the affective route. Further, the measures are 
taken in March, which is before the major campaign period. And before March media 
coverage did not pay an overwhelming attention to politics and elections. Thus, a 
possible reason behind the lack of media-consumption-attitude relationship for the 
non-sophisticated people is that they not only acquired very few cognitive elements 
but also very few affective elements about politics and political institutions from news 
coverage before the major campaign period. 
Though the relationships in Figure 7.4 and 7.5 have no specified casual 
directions, but we can at least argue that if media have any effects on general 
attitudes of individuals, the effects are likely to be stronger in the case of high 
sophistication group. Then, does it mean that sophisticated people in Hong Kong are 
more passive and likely to subject to media influence? The answer is no. The 
argument here is that sophisticated people in Hong Kong are better user of 
information and media messages, so that when they do not feel the need to re-
interpret political messages and information, they will use them to formulate their 
attitudes. In other words, the relationships between media/knowledge and various 
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attitudes can be called effects in the sense that attitude formation and change are 
partly originated from the media (of course, this is subject to the condition that we 
can ascertain the casual direction, which we cannot do here). But sophisticated 
people are not totally passive, the relationships are probably results of "audience 
negotiated influece" (McQuail, 1994). It is likely that only when the media messages 
are consistent with the pre-existing attitudes of the individuals, knowledge would 
have effects on people's evaluations of performance of political institutions. 
Performance evaluations ofpolitical institutions 
In the above sections the attitudes discussed are expected to be more general, 
the last group of attitudes, performance evaluations of political institutions in the 
election, is much more specific. In the conceptual sense these evaluations can only 
be formed during or after the election. Methodologically, the questions are asked in 
June, thus analysis about media and knowledge effects on performance evaluations 
can be ascertained with a higher degree of confidence. 
Specifically, the respondents in June were asked to rate the performance of the 
government, four particular political parties, political parties and candidates in 
general, and the election by giving marks ranging from 0 to 10, with 10 representing 
excellent performance. Three performance evaluation variables, about government, 
parties and candidate, and election, are constructed (See Appendix A). 
Two questions are important in the analysis. First, how are people's general 
'attitudes, as measured in March, related to their performance evaluations in June? 
On the surface, it seems that people's general attitudes and performance evaluations 
should be related. But actually this is not necessarily .the case. If people use a top-
down route in judgment formation, that is, using generalized ideas and categories 
about the political institutions to formulate specific evaluations (Fiske et al., 1991), 
then general attitudes and specific evaluations will be related with each other to a 
larger extent. However, people can also recognize the specificity of the context of 
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election and formulate performance evaluations of the institutions in the election 
anew by a bottom-up process, that is, they start with specific information and 
impressions collected within the election period and use that as the basis of 
judgment making. The present research, it should be conceded, cannot fully 
differentiate the two judgment-making processes, but following the discussion we 
can suppose that the kind of relationships between general attitudes (measured in 
March) and specific evaluations (measured in June) is related to the judgment 
making process undertaken. 
In the case of the 1998 LegCo election, it seems that bottom-up processes of 
performance evaluations formation is more likely. It is because, without a long history 
of democratic government and election before, Hong Kong people are less likely than 
their Western counterparts to form deep rooted general beliefs about government 
and parties performance in democracy and election. Moreover, the 1998 election 
was a historically special event as it was the first post-handover election. This special 
character of the election made people more likely to see the election as a special 
context and formulate their specific evaluations by a bottom-up process^^. 
Thus, strong relationships between general attitudes and the evaluations are 
not expected. The only exceptional case is performance evaluations about the 
government. The government was primarily responsible for conducting the election 
and most of the controversies and works involved the government as the central 
actor happened before the major election campaign period. Right after the handover 
I 
the government was invofVed in making the electoral rules and systems, and inJate 
1997 and early 1998 the government was actively promoting voter registration. Thus 
at the time of the first survey in March people would have received much information 
22 Fiske (1986) summarizes that situations that are likely to give rise to bottom-up, or piecemeal, 
processing. In general, 
piecemeal processing is favored when: (a) thejudged object is category inconsistent; (b) the 
judged object is a collection of information that does not cue a category; (c) concrete, 
instance-oriented judgments are required; (d) the required judgment is novel; (e) the 
judgment is made at a leisurely pace; (f) the respondent's outcomes depend on the 
judgment; or (g) the respondent has a complex view of the judged object (p.51). 
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and impressions about government performance "in the election." Then, running into 
the campaign period media would turn their spotlights to the candidates and parties, 
thus what people received between March and June 1998 were information and 
impressions about the parties, candidates and the election itself mainly. Therefore, 
we can expect that people's attitudes towards government in March and their 
evaluations of government performance in June would be directly related, while 
people's attitudes towards parties and elections in March and their respective 
performance evaluations in June would be weakly, or even not, related. 
Another question to be looked at here is the media and knowledge effects on 
performance evaluations. Following Zaller (1992), the author regards the knowledge 
variable as one showing indirect effects of media use. Two assumptions are made 
here. First, the knowledge level measured in March would be a valid indicator of 
people knowledge levels during the campaign period. Second, media remain the 
most important source of political knowledge for the citizens, thus if political 
knowledge has any effect on evaluations, a large part of the effect can be considered 
as the indirect effect of the media. Of course, whether relations would exist depends 
on factors like people's underlying attitudes and the configuration of the information 
environment. As within the campaign period the media are more likely to focus on the 
activities of the parties and candidates, knowledge is more likely to show effects on 
people's evaluation of parties than on the other two evaluations. 
“ Hypotheses and resvlts 
The above discussions lead to hypotheses which can be restated as follow: 
H7.3: Among the three political institutions, general attitudes towards the 
government is most likely to be related to evaluation of its performance 
afterthe election. 
H7.4: Knowledge is more likely to have effects on people's evaluations of 
political parties and candidates rather than their evaluations of the other 
two political institutions. 
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To test the hypotheses regression models are constructed. When one 
evaluation variable is used as the dependent variable, the other two are controlled 
due to their likely correlations. These correlations would come from two factors. First, 
people who evaluate one major actor of the election positively are more likely to 
evaluate the election more positively. On the other hand, since the evaluation 
questions using an 11-point scale, different people may have different understanding 
of the scale and give answers clustering around different values. 
When one evaluation variable is used, its corresponding attitude variable 
measured in March is included. Demographics and civic awareness are controlled. 
News attention, exposure and knowledge are included to test the hypotheses. 
Table 7.6 shows the results of the analysis and we can see that the hypotheses 
are largely supported. Knowledge has a negative impact on parties performance 
evaluation. It is consistent with the argument that media coverage inside the 
campaign period was largely focusing on the parties and candidatesand it suggests 
that media coverage about the parties and candidates during the period were largely 
negative. However, news consumptions are not significantly related to any of the 
performance evaluations. Following the line of arguments throughout the chapter, a 
possible explanation of the results is that performance evaluations are mainly 
cognitive, thus media effects on evaluations would be intervened by knowledge. 
Another interesting result is that in Figure 7.3 above we see that knowledge is 
positively related to attitude towards parties, but in Table 7.6 the relationship is 
一 ^ 
negative. Of course, the objects are slightly 'different. In ^/^a^ch the respondents were 
asked for their attitudes towards parties/politicians, in June they were asked for their 
evaluations of parties/candidates. But this difference is not likely to account for the 
difference in results. This difference in results suggests that before the campaign 
period, the media were covering the political parties in positive light, or at least a 
neutral fashion. A neutral coverage of political parties may still lead to more positive 
attitude towards parties since focusing on parties in political coverage can lead to 
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legitimization effects (Fung, 1995; 1998). Also, the attitudes measured in March are 
more general in the sense that they would involve evaluation of parties performance 
not only in the election but also other areas. But going into the major campaign 
period, media coverage would begin to focus on party performance in election, and 
the result in Table 7.6 suggests that the media covered them in a negative light. 
Table 7.6 Media and knowledge effects on political evaluations 
Dependent variable 
Evaluation of gov. Evaluation of political Evaluation of 
performance parties performance election 
Demographics (1) R^ = 0.8% R^ = 2.2%** R2=1.8%* 
Civic awareness (1) AR^ = 2.3%** AR^ = 2.1%** AR^ = 3.0%*** 
News consumption AR^ = 0.3% AR^ = 1.9%** AR^ = 0.2% 
and knowledge (1) 
News attention -0.01 0.03 0.03 
News exposure -0.03 0.01 0.03 
Knowledge 0.05 -0.14*** 0.01 
Performance AR^ = 30.9%*** AR^ = 24.7% *** AR^ = 24.7%*** 
evaluations (2) 
Evaluation of gov. —— 0.34*** 0.33*** 
Evaluation of parties 0.36*** —— 0.26*** 
Evaluation of election 0.29*** 0.25*** —— 
Attitudes towards pol. AR^ = 4.6%*** AR^ = 0.2% AR^ = 0.0% 
Institutions (1) 
Att. towards gov. 0.24*** —— —— 
Att. towards parties ---- 0.05 -—-
Att. towards election —— —— 0.00 
Number of cases 536 524 520 
% of variance 38.9%*** 31.1%*** 29.8%*** 
accounted for 
- i - ‘ 
*p<0.10;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 一 
(1) Variables are measured in March; (2) Variables are measured in June 
As expected, the three performance evaluation variables are closely related to 
each other, but the performance evaluations are not related to attitudes towards the 
institutions measured in March, except in the case of the government. It shows that 
the formation of performance evaluations about the government in the election, 
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unlike the other two, takes place before the actual campaign period. 
-Variability in evaluations 
As shown in Table 7.6, people's evaluations towards the three institutions are 
significantly related to each other. There are several reasons why people would give 
largely similar evaluation scores to the objects. First, as discussed earlier it can be 
the result of people giving a response set when answering the questions. That is, 
they are not seriously answering questions but just give more or less the same 
answer to the set of questions asked. Second, it may be due to the fact that different 
people have different ways to utilize the answering scale. Third, people may actually 
see the three institutions as closely related to each other. This last reason has 
theoretical implications. Sniderman et al. (1991) have shown that a major difference 
between the educated and non-educated people in the US is that the former would 
rate the two major parties oppositely, while the latter would rate the two similarly. 
They concluded that the non-educated people simply fail to recognize that if they 
think one party is good, they should think its rival is bad. In the present study, the 7 
evaluation questions have included various objects like the government and a 
number of parties which are rivals to each other. Though it is impossible to ascertain 
how different the 7 objects are, it is safe to assume that the 7 objects should have 
some differences. 
Thus the variations among the evaluations is a matter related to both the ^ ‘ 
respondents' use of the scale and the extent they differentfate the objects. We 
cannot differentiate the three reasons given above, but it is important to note that the 
three reasons are related to each other. A person has the ability to differentiate the 
objects also is less likely to give response sets. Then, what are the factors behind 
people giving similar or varying evaluations to different political objects? 
It is very possible that news consumption would bring about more varying 
evaluations among the institutions. When a citizen is exposed to news, s/he gets the 
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information and impressions about different institutions and s/he is more capable to 
formulate different evaluations for different institutions. Besides, sophistication, as 
may also be related to amount of variation in performance evaluation since 
sophisticated people are more capable to differentiate the different political 
institutions. Thus the hypotheses can be stated as follows: 
H7.5: Knowledge is related positively to the variability of evaluations. 
H7.6: Media consumption is related positively to the variability of evaluations. 
H7.7: Sophistication is related positively to the variability of evaluations. 
Variability of evaluations is operationalized as the standard deviation of the 7 
evaluations the respondents gave. Civic awareness, attitudes towards political 
institutions, demographics are controlled. We are particularly interested in the effects 
of news consumption, knowledge, and sophistication. The relationship between the 
amount of variation and the three particular evaluations are also of concern here. 
Table 7.7 Determinants of variability of evaluations 
Variability of evaluations 
Demographics (1) R^ = 2.7%*** 
Civic a wareness (1) AR^ = 2.0%** 
Attitudes towards political institutions (1) AR^ = 0.1 % 
News consumption and knowledge (1) AR^ = 3.1 %*** 
News attention 0.09** 
News exposure -0.01 
Knowledge 0.12** 
Sophistication 0.01 
- S - ‘ 
Performance evaluations (2) AR^ = 6.5%*** -
Evaluation of gov. -0.08* 
Evaluation of parties -0.24*** 
Evaluation of election 0.26*!* 
Number of cases 557 
% of variance accounted for 15.3%*** 
*p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *•* p<0.01 
(1) Variables are measured in March; (2) Variables are measured in June 
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Table 7.7 shows that people with higher level of news attention and knowledge 
are both holding more varying evaluations of the different institutions. However, news 
exposure has no effect. Also the hypothesis about sophistication is not supported. 
Why people with higher levels of sophistication turn out not to be especially 
likely to give more varying evaluations? At least part of the issue would be the high 
level of correlation among the knowledge variable and the sophistication measure. 
When two highly correlated variables are included into the same regression model, 
the problem of multicollinearity will be likely to make at least one variable to become 
insignificant. Besides, the insignificant result may also be due to the reason that 
people having higher levels of sophistication does not necessarily utilize their ability 
to differentiate objects at any time in a straight forward way. In fact, as people are 
more sophisticated and complicated in their political thinking, they would be more 
likely to take into account a larger number of factors in forming evaluations 
(Sniderman et al., 1991)，they are less likely to hold extreme attitudes and more likely 
to be moderates (Tetlock, 1983). After all, there is no reason to suppose that the 
most sophisticated people would differentiate the objects to an extent of 
exaggeration. In Tetlock,s (1983) scheme about cognitive complexity, the most 
complex people are those who are not only able differentiate objects but also to 
integrate them together. Thus the most sophisticated people are likely to see 
similarities among the objects as well as differences. Actually, a result not shown in 
-Table 7.7 is that education is negatively related to variability. This suggests that pure 
cognitive complexity has a negative effect on the extent of differentiation made. ‘ 
A further interesting point in Table 7.7 is that variations among evaluations are 
positively related to evaluation of the election, but negatively to evaluation of parties 
and government. It shows that in the survey when people make varying judgments, 
people tend to give higher marks to the election as a whole but lower marks to the 
government, and even lower marks to the political parties. 
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Sophistication and evaluations ofpolitical institutions 
Although we found no relationship between sophistication and variability of 
evaluations, it does not mean that sophistication is irrelevant. We have already seen 
that among the sophisticated people news consumption and knowledge are related 
to political attitudes more closely, while in the case of non-sophisticated people news 
consumption and knowledge seem to be unrelated to political attitudes except 
interests. Can we find similar patterns here? 
Knowledge is only significantly related to evaluations of parties in the earlier 
analysis. Following the arguments so far, it is expected that the relationship between 
knowledge and party evaluations would be stronger among the sophisticated people. 
H7.8: Knowledge is related to parties performance evaluations in the 
sophisticated group to a larger extent. 
Regression analysis is carried out for the two groups on each of the three 
evaluations and the results are shown in Table 7.8. 
Table 7.8 Media and knowledge effects on evaluations of political institutions 
Evaluations of election 
Low sophistication High sophistication 
Demographics 八 R^= 1.5% R^=2.4% 
Civic awareness 八八 AR^ = 2.1% AR^ = 5.0%*** 
News consumption and AR^ 二 0.5% AR^ = 0.9% 
Knowledge 
News attention 0.03 -0.00 
News exposure 0.10 -0.02 
Knowledge -0.04 0.00 
Performance evaluations AR^ = 24.2%*** AR^ = 34.8%*** 
Evaluation of gov. 二 0.45*** ‘ 0.24*** 
Evaluation of parties 0.08 a.47*** 
Variability of evaluations 0.14** 0.23*** 
Attitudes towards political AR^ = 0.0% AR^ = 0.0% 
institutions 
I 
Att. Towards election 0.02 0.00 
Number of cases 238 282 
% of variance accounted for 28.3%*** 43.1%*** 
*p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<Q.01 
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Table 7.8 Continued 
Evaluations of government performance 
Low sophistication High sophistication 
Demographics R '= 1.1% R '= 1.6% 
Civic awareness A R ' = 2.9% A R ' = 7.7%*** 
News consumption and AR^ = 0.5% AR^ = 1.1% 
knowledge 
News attention -0.02 -0.00 
News exposure -0.08 -0.01 
Knowledge 0.06 0.04 
Performance evaluations AR^ = 29.2% *** AR^ = 33.3%*** 
Evaluation of parties 0.32*** 0.38*** 
Evaluation of election 0.37*** 0.24*** 
Variability of evaluations 0.10* -0.19*** 
Attitudes towards political A R ' = 6.5%*** A R ' = 2.0%*** 
institutions 
Att. Towards gov. 0.28*** 0.16*** 
Number of cases 248 288 
% of variance accounted for 40.2%*** 45.6%*** 
Evaluations of political parties performance 
Demographics R^ = 0.1 % R^ = 3.8%* 
Civic awareness AR^ = 2.1% AR^ = 4.1%** 
News consumption and AR^ = 0.6% AR^ = 3.8%*** 
knowledge 
News attention 0.02 0.07 
News exposure 0.01 0.01 
Knowledge -0.04 -0.15*** 
Performance evaluations AR^ = 18.7%*** AR^ = 37.2%*** 
Evaluation of gov. 0.32*** 0.31*** 
Evaluation of election 0.08 0.43*** 
Variability of evaluations -0.27*** -0.12** 
Attitudes towards political AR^ = 0.7% AR^ = 0.0% 
institutions 
Att. Towards parties 0.09 0.00 
Number of cases , .244 284 
% of variance accounted for 22.2%*** 48.9%*** ‘ 
From the table, we can see that knowledge is related negatively and 
significantly to evaluations of party and candidate performance only in the high 
sophistication group. The relationship does not exist in the other group. Knowledge 
also does not have any effects on the other evaluations after the division. Nor does 
news consumption has any visible effects. Thus the hypothesis is supported. 
For the relationship between news consumption and evaluations, we see that 
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none of the relationship is significant. However, one thing should be noted is that, 
while in the previous section we see that news consumption is related to attitudes 
only in the high sophistication group, the results in Table 7.8 suggests otherwise. The 
regression coefficients of news attention and exposure for the low sophistication 
group are larger in magnitude than the corresponding coefficients in the high 
sophistication group in 4 out of 6 times. The coefficent is larger in the high 
sophistication group in only 1 out of 6 times (news attention and evaluations of party 
performance). Actually, news exposure's positive relationship with evaluation of 
election and it's negative relationship with evaluation of government are not too far 
from significant (beta coefficients are 0.10 and -0.08 respectively, which may have 
been significant if sample size is larger) in the low sophistication group. These results, 
taken together, seem to suggest that news consumption has slightly stronger direct 
relationship with evaluations in the low sophistication group. 
As previously explained, the insignificant relationship between news 
consumption and attitudes in the low sophistication group is largely due to the not-
so-salient media political coverage before the major campaign. When the major 
campaign period began, the media shifted the focus to the election and the 
previously uninterested and uninvolved citizens, who tend to be the unsophisticated, 
would start to receive messages from the media. It seems that, going into the major 
campaign period, the difference between the two groups of people starts to appear 
as a cognitive decision making vs. affective decision making difference again. 
Another interesting comparison between the two groups is that the relationships ‘ 
between the three performance evaluations. For the less sophisticated people, 
evaluation of election is not related to evaluation of political parties performance. 
Only the relationship between evaluations of government and parties, and that 
between government and the election, are significant. For the high sophistication 
group, however, the three are closely related. Actually, for the sophisticated people 
their evaluations of the election as a whole is related to evaluation of parties and 
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candidates to a larger extent. It seems to suggest that the two groups have a 
somewhat different understanding of what the election is about. For the high 
sophistication group, the election is one that is organized by the government, and 
more importantly, participated by the parties and candidates who are going to be the 
representatives of the public. For the low sophistication group, however, election 
seems to be primarily an event held by the government. 
Another contrast is the relationship between evaluations and variability of 
evaluations. For the sophisticated variability is positively related to evaluation of 
election but negatively to that of the government and parties/candidates, a pattern 
similar to that for the whole sample. However, for the non-sophisticated variability is 
positively related to evaluations of government and election and negatively to 
parties/candidates evaluation. It shows that, the non-sophisticated, beside viewing 
the election as an event held by the government, also gives comparatively better 
evaluations of government performance than candidates' performance when 
differentiation is made. But for the sophisticated, although they gave relatively 
negative evaluations of parties/candidate and also government performance than 
that of the election when the institutions' performance are differentiated. 
Discussion 
In this chapter the various relationships between political attitudes/ evaluations 
and news consumption/knowledge are analyzed. On the whole, news consumption is 
not particularly strongly related to politicai"attitudes ancf evaluations. However, the 
lack of strong and direct relationships between news consumption and 
attitudes/evaluations may just be reflecting the argument made by Zaller (1992) that 
news consumption variables are not reliable. The present author includes the media 
variables in the analysis due to the belief these variables should not be totally 
ignored, but it is undeniable that they are not powerful predictors of media effects in 
the methodological sense. The measure proposed by Zaller, factual knowledge, is 
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shown to be more powerful. But researchers should be careful in interpreting 
knowledge effects on attitudes and evaluations. Zaller (1996; and Hunt 1994, 1995) 
seems to suggest that knowledge effects are media effects. Although we do not, and 
in fact cannot, deny that people derive political knowledge largely from the media, we 
also have to keep in mind that there are other channels of information for individuals, 
like interpersonal communication and social interactions (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 
1995; 1991; Huckfeldt, 1987). Also, from the analysis in chapter 6 we see that some 
. p e o p l e are more likely to learn news from the media than others. Moreover, when 
people receive information they may have interpreted or re-interpreted the message 
and information themselves (Kuklinski and Hurley, 1996; Gamson, 1992). Therefore, 
at most we can conclude that a large part, but not all, knowledge effects can be 
considered as indirect media effects. 
Nevertheless, thinking about knowledge effects as indirect media effects lead us 
to consider media effects on individuals as dependent not only on exposure or 
attention but also reception. Moreover, what kinds of effects media would have on 
individual is largely dependent on how the media cover news and thus constructing 
the information environment in which individuals reside. Therefore, media do not 
always have the same kind and same amount of effects on individuals, what the 
media are actually reporting is a very important factor. 
Studying media or knowledge effects on individuals also has to take into 
account individual characteristics. A particular important one is level of political 
- 一 ‘ 
sophistication. The results in this chapter are consistent with the general theoretical 
arguments about sophistication in the West. In general, sophisticated people are not 
only more likely to learn information from the media, they are also more likely to 
I 
relate these information and messages to their political attitudes. Lastly, the analysis 
shows that people with different levels of sophistication have different configurations 
in their political evaluations. They may even have a different understanding of the 
election. It can be an interesting path that later research can pursue. 
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VIII. Voterturnout 
The previous chapters have shown how media lead to learning, and how media 
and knowledge are related to, or lead to, the formation of civic awareness, political 
attitudes and evaluations. This chapter will tackle voter turnout in the 1998 LegCo 
election. What are the underlying factors driving people to vote? Do different people 
go out to vote based 0门 different reasons7 
Answering the questions will give the final empirical evidence of media effects 
regarding its ability to activate informed participation. Again, the analysis will be 
conducted with the consideration of knowledge as the cognitive route, and 
sophistication as the contingent condition, of media effects. Political attitudes, which 
are affected by media and knowledge to a certain extent, will also be included. The 
model developed in the chapter may not be the most comprehensive or powerful one 
for explaining voter turnout, but it is a model which allows us to derive the most 
important information about direct and indirect media effects on voter turnout. 
The voter turnout model 
Media and knowledge variables are the major focus. As argued in previous 
chapters, knowledge effects can be, to a large extent, traced back to media use since 
media constitute the main part of the information environment in an election. If the 
amount of knowledge will lead to turnout, then we can say that media have indirectly 
led to turnout. Knowledge effects can be broken down into two aspects, the first is 
the content of knowledge, the second is the fact of knowing itself. For the former, 
knowledge has effects on individuals because the individual knows about something 
that may be negative or positive towards particular topics or objects. For the latter, 
knowledge has effects on individual because the feeling and cognition of oneself 
being knowledgeable can breed one's involvement in public affairs and confidence 
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about making decisions. Knowing something more may also make the object more 
salient in one's mind and thus increasing the probability for one to take any kind of 
action towards that object. 
Of course, it is impossible to separate the two kinds of effects in this study. In 
the last chapter, when knowledge effect on political attitudes is the focus, it may be 
suggested that the two kinds of knowledge may have contributed to different effects. 
For instance, the positive effects of knowledge on political interests and attitude 
towards participation are likely to be effects of knowing, and that is why the effects 
found are positive. But knowledge effect on attitudes towards political institutions are 
likely to be content effects, as suggested by the varying signs of relationship between 
knowledge and attitudes towards and evaluations of different objects at different 
times. The involvement, salience, and confidence gained by knowing may be 
relevant to some aspects of the attitudes towards political institutions, such as 
attitude certainty and extremity (Krosnick, 1995), but not likely to lead to a change of 
the direction ofthe attitudes. In the following analysis, when voter turnout is the focus, 
it is believed that knowledge is likely to have positive effects on turnout due to the 
"knowing" mechanism, while the content of knowledge may also be relevant and 
affect the final extent of knowledge effect found. 
In the previous chapter it is pointed out that media may have cognitive as well 
as affective consequences on individuals. Knowledge is a variable used to specify 
the cognitive route of media effects. Thus, the remaining direct media effects are 
- 产 ‘ 
Jikely to be affective, i.e., media induce feelings and emotions into"people and lead to 
certain attitudes or behaviors. 
Sophistication, which is related to a person's ability to make sense of politics, is 
t 
also a potential factor. However, the high correlation between sophistication and 
knowledge make it unsuitable to add both of them to the model. Sophistication, 
therefore, will be treated as a mediating factor in subsequent analysis. 
Attitudes and civic awareness constitute another group of factors. Theoretically, 
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media can affect turnout by altering people's attitudes. Of course, due to the inability 
to show the casual relationship between media and attitudes, we cannot conclude 
the relationship between media and attitudes' effects on turnout. 
In constructing the regression model for voter turnout, there is in fact a large 
number of variables to consider. Partisanship was found to be a factor driving people 
to vote (Campbell et al., 1960). However, in Hong Kong the notion of partisanship or 
party identification is actually problematic since political parties in Hong Kong do not 
have a long history and people did not form affective ties with or loyalty to parties 
(Louie, 1996). Although parties are developing in Hong Kong, their function and 
power are still far away from that enjoyed by their Western counterparts. Thus for the 
sake of parsimony it is not included in the model. 
Civic awareness is included into the regression model. Attitudes towards 
political institutions, as measured in the March survey, would not be included since 
their role in the explanatory model will largely overlap with that of performance 
evaluations. Although they are not measuring the same thing (as shown in Chapter 
7), both of them will answer the question whether attitudes towards political 
institutions count in the decision of turnout. Therefore, for simplicity performance 
evaluations are chosen to be included due to the fact that they are referring to 
evaluations formed specifically related to the election. 
As with most analysis in this area, demographics are included. Interpersonal 
persuasion, and party/candidate canvassing through telephone or home visit, are 
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also included. “ ‘ 
The analysis and results 
Besides specifying the variables in the model, another issue of concern is 
response bias. Nearly every post-election survey, no matter conducted in which 
country, records voter turnout that is higher than the official figure. In this study, while 
the official figure is 53%, the survey has recorded a turnout rate of 82% instead. This 
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discrepancy is due to three factors. First, government voter registration records 
inevitably contain "dead records," such as those who had emigrated to other 
countries, or died. This would make the official turnout rate lower than the real one. 
Of course, this problem is not likely to account for a large portion, let alone all, of the 
discrepancy. More important issues are sample bias and response bias. Sample bias 
refers to the bias resulting from some people agreeing to cooperate and be 
interviewed while others did not. The resulting sample is likely to be biased towards 
those who are more interested in politics and more willing to express their opinions. 
And these people are also more likely to vote. 
Response bias is another problem involved. Opinion expression through opinion 
surveys is sometimes conceptualized as "private" expression by some scholars 
(Herbst, 1993). However, expression through opinion polls in fact also has the 
"public" character. Research in the past has shown that people would adjust their 
answers to polls on some issues due to gender or race of the interviewer or other 
factors. Sometimes, respondents would feel the need to report answers that are 
socially desirable. It is not known to what extent this problem would exist in Hong 
Kong in the case of voter turnout. On one hand, it can be argued that voting is not a 
fully developed and strong social norm. Thus the problem may not be serious. On the 
other hand, the unexpectedly high turnout rate in May 1998 may drive people to 
recognize voting as socially desirable, thus to adjust their answers. 
In facing these problems, what a research can do is to weigh the sample. Ideally， 
( 
a research should a_ssign heavier weights for people who are likely to have told the 二 
truth and lighter weights for those who probably have told lies. We can assume that 
those people who reported non-voting are likely to have told truth since there is little 
• 
reason for one to mis-report their behavior in a way against the social norm. We 
expect that some of the people reported voting were hiding their actual behavior. But 
there is no uncontroversial procedure or method for the present author to 
differentiate specifically who among the reported voters are more likely to have 
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biased their response. 
Moreover, the author contends that sample bias accounts for the largest portion 
of the discrepancy between the government official turnout rate and the 82% 
recorded in the survey of this study. It is because response rates of survey research 
in Hong Kong are generally low (43% for the March survey in the present study). And 
the present study involves a panel design, thus further contributing to the sample 
bias problem due to panel attrition. 
Thus, a simple weighting procedure is designed to make the data analysis more 
meaningful. All self-reported non-voters are given the same weight which is heavier 
than that of all the self-reported voters. The goal is to make the turnout rate of the 
weighted sample equal to 53%, the government official figure. The result of the 
weighting procedure is that all non-voters are given a weight of 2.455 and all voters 
are given a weight of 0.656. See Appendix A for the calculation involved in and some 
discussions about the weighting procedure. 
We can now go on to the analysis of voter turnout model. The logistic regression 
models will be presented with more details. The independent variables are 
standardized before entering the model so that the beta coefficients can be 
compared with each other (see Appendix A). The variables are entered into the 
model in 6 blocks in the following order: demographics, news consumption, civic 
awareness, performance evaluations, knowledge, and campaign mobilization. It is a 
general model to test media effects on turnout, thus there is no specific hypothesis to 
specify (or the general hypothesis is that the model can explain turnout). Both 
weighted and non-weighted models are analyzed. The results are summarized in 
Table 8.1 and 8.2. 
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Table 8.1 Non-weighted model of voter turnout 
Dependent variable: voter turnout 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Full 
model 
Demographics 
Family income -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.10 -0.14 
Personal income -0.17 -0.18 -0.17 -0.19 -0.20 -0.18 
Age 0.42*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.49*** 0.47*** 0.37** 
Education 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.43*** 0.48*** 0.36** 0.38** 
Sex -0.12 -0.14 -0.15 -0.19 -0.13 -0.14 
News consumption 
News exposure -0.17 -0.17 -0.18 -0.22* -0.22* 
News attention 0.09 -0.04 -0.05 -0.20 -0.19 
Civic awareness 
Attitudes towards 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Participation 
Sense of efficacy 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.12 
Sense of duty and 0.26** 0.28** 0.22* 0 24* 
Rights 
Political interests 0.26* 0.22 0.21 0.22 
Performance evalua 
Government -0.18 -0.20 -0.19 
Parties & candidates -0.01 0.06 0.04 
Election 0.35*** 0.35*** 0:33** 
Knowledge 0.49*** 0.46*** 
Campaign 
mobilization 
Canvassing 0 01 
Interpersonal 0 3 7 * * * 
persuasion 
Number of cases 557 557 557 557 5 5 7 5 5 7 
Incremental Chi- 14.4** 2.3 13.3*** 7.6* 12.0*** 11.1*** 
Square 
% of cases correctly classified in full model = 80.97% 
:_Total Chi-Square = 60.78*** : 
-2-log likelihood = - 495.4 _ 
Psuedo-R-square = .10.93% 
* P < 0 . 1 0 ; ** p < 0.05： * * * p < 0 . 0 1 
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Table 8.2 Weighted model of voter turnout 
Dependent variable: voter turnout 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Full 
model 
Demographics 
Family income -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.12 
Personal income -0.18 -0.20 -0.18 -0.15 -0.15 -0.11 
Age 0.43*** 0.46*** 0.48*** 0.50*** 0.46*** 0.36*** 
Education 0.48*** 0.47*** 0.41*** 0.44*** 0.30** 0.32** 
Sex -0.13 -0.14 -0.14 -0.17* -0.09 -0.10 
News consumption 
News exposure -0.17* -0.17* -0.18* -0.21** -0.19* 
News attention 0.06 -0.08 -0.09 -0.25* -0.23* 
Civic awareness 
Attitudes towards -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
Participation 
Sense of efficacy 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.12 
Sense of duty and 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.23** 0.26** 
Rights 
Political interests 0.29*** 0.27** 0.28** 0.29** 
Performance evalu. 
Government -0.18 -0.21* -0.20* 
Parties & -0.02 0.09 0.09 
candidates 
Election 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.26** 






Number of cases 557 557 557 557 557 557 
Incremental Chi- 23.9*** 3.2 21.3*** 9.3** 19.2*** 13.9*** 
Square 
% of cases correctly classified in full mbdel = 67.70% : 
- T o t a l Chi-Square = 90.79*** ‘ 
“ - 2 - l o g likelihood = 680.469 
Psuedo-R-square = 11.77% 
* p < 0 . 1 0 ; * *p<0 .05 ; * * * p < 0 . 0 1 
Notes (for both tables): ‘ 
1. Entries are standardized beta coefficients 
2. All variables, except voter turnout, campaign mobilization and performance 
evaluations, are measured in March. 
3. The number of cases is 557 since the June survey is involved. In the June survey 
559 respondents were successfully contacted. 
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In both tables, before later variables are included news attention's beta 
coefficient is positive is insignificant. Although news exposure's coefficient is already 
marginally significant when it is added, considerthe fact that news consumption as a 
block is the only non-significant block of factors among the 6, the direct media effects 
on turnout are actually negligible before other variables are added. However, in the 
full model, when variables like knowledge and civic awareness are added, the 
negative coefficients of attention and significant relationship between exposure and 
turnout are both significant at 0.10 level. This suggests that news consumptron, by 
providing information and promoting civic awareness, has indirect positive effects on 
turnout. However, these positive effects are accompanied by negative effects of 
news consumption23. 
The finding of negative media effects is different from many earlier research in 
both US and Hong Kong, which usually find a positive effect of media use on turnout. 
However, it should be noted that in past research on media effects on turnout the 
control variables usually do not include knowledge and some of the attitudinal 
variables included in the present case. Actually, the arguments for media positive 
effects on turnout usually rest the effects of media use on interests or involvement, 
knowledge etc. But in this case these factors mediating media use's positive impact 
are mostly controlled. Then, what is left over? As mentioned news consumption 
would have affective consequences besides cognitive consequences. Since media 
coverage during election campaign usually focuses on the horse-race, mudslinging 
— “ 1 
and conflicts (as —will be discussed in the next chapter), negative affective 
consequences of news consumption are in fact probable. Thus, a probable 
explanation of the negative effects is the negative affect, like feeling of annoyance, 
I 
disgust, meaninglessness etc, produced as a result of media use, which is caused by 
“ A way to check whether the interpretation is valid, as well as the validity of media effects. The 
logistic regression is run again with news consumption added as the last block of factors. The result is 
that, different from what Table 8.1 and 8.2 show, news consumption as a block is significant at 0.06 in 
the unweighted model and significant at 0.02 in the weighted model. This result supports the 
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the way media cover the election. 
Besides news consumption, knowledge is another concern. The tables show 
that knowledge is significantly and positively related to turnout. The addition of 
knowledge has given rise to significant increase in the explanatory power of the 
model, even though knowledge is the fifth block to be added into the model. It has the 
largest regression coefficients among all independent variables. It supports the 
expectation that people having higher levels of knowledge are more likely to vote. 
Here, one possible confusion is that if media have negative impacts on voter turnout 
and if the negative impacts are to be explained by media's negative coverage of the 
election, then why knowledge, as derived mostly from the media, could have positive 
effects on turnout? The answer to this question is that, as pointed out earlier, that 
knowledge is expected to have positive effects on turnout not-only because of the 
content of knowledge, but the self-perceived state of being knowledgeable. Also, it is 
pointed out in Chapter 7 that affect and cognition about the same object are not 
necessarily consistent. 
Perhaps there is a need to further articulate the first argument. We can assume 
that, at least usually, knowledge would lead to greater confidence, self-efficacy etc, 
that are advantageous to participation. But what if the knowledge themselves are 
negative? Here, we have to go back to how knowledge is defined and used in this 
research. In the survey, and throughout the study, knowledge is referring to factual 
knowledge. Assume that media coverage has focused on the horse race and 
mudslinging, news consumers may acquire the messages that politicians are selfish" 
and attacking each other meaninglessly. However, these messages are not factual 
knowledge. A politician has utilized a certain strategy is a fact, but a politician has 
utilized a certain strategy completely due to selfish 'concern is not. Thus media 
messages are combinations of factual information, as well as affective and evaluative 
elements. Sometimes neutral information can be singled out from largely positive or 
explanation given. 
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negative media messages. 
Moreover, the absorption of factual information entails information processing 
and the processes of information processing have complexities that this study would 
not be able to deal with. On the whole, it can be suggested that while media 
messages may be largely negative so that media consumption has negative effects 
0门 turnout, the factual information within the messages may not be negative to the 
same extent. And although we may still expect the content of knowledge may have 
detrimental effects on turnout, the positive effects of knowing and being confident 
and self-efficacious have off-set the negative effects of content. As a result, 
knowledge has an overall positive effect on turnout. 
Some of the findings in the models are echoing similar past research in Hong 
Kong and US past elections. People who are older, who have higher sense of duty 
and rights, higher levels of political interests (in the weighted model only)’ higher 
education, and who have received interpersonal persuasion are shown to be more 
likely to have voted. These findings were similar to the case in 1995 LegCo election 
(Shum, 1996). However, efficacy, and party canvassing which were found to be 
significant in past research in Hong Kong or US have no effects on turnout in this 
case. For efficacy, the difference between the result here and that reported by Shum 
on the 1995 election would at least be partly due to methodological differences. Note 
that the civic awareness variables are measured in March and they are having low 
reliability generally. Also, the way of operationalization is different. For party 
canvassing, Shum's findings in 1995 Were that only telephone canvassing was 
effective in 1995 but not home visit. In this study, however, party canvassing by home 
visits and telephone are combined into one question. Of course, the results may also 
reflect the different contexts of the two elections. But a discussion on this aspect 
would go too far away from the central focus in this study. Thus the puzzle will leave 
to those concerned to solve. 
Voter turnout is related positively to people's evaluation of the election. Actually, 
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as a variable asked in the second-wave survey it is difficult to say that whether 
evaluation of election has caused people to go out to vote or people's voting behavior 
has led them to evaluate the election more positively. Both ways are possible. An 
interesting point is that turnout is negatively related to evaluation of government 
performance. Though the evidence is far from conclusive (significant at 0.10 level 
only), it echoes the common view that the exceptionally high voter turnout was partly 
due to the discontent of the people towards government after the handover. 
Voter turnout and sophistication 
Following the analysis in the previous chapters, it would be important to know 
whether different people's voting behavior is related to different sets of factors. The 
differences in the voting behaviors of the sophisticated and non-sophisticated people 
have been studied by a number of researchers in the West (Funk, 1997; MacDonald 
et al., 1995; Sniderman et al., 1991). It is also expected that, in this study, people with 
different levels of sophistication would be affected by different factors in their turnout 
decision. More specifically, in previous analysis we see that knowledge and media 
are related to attitudes and evaluations to a larger extent in the high sophistication 
group, showing a larger extent of cognitive processes at work in the mind of the 
sophisticated people. Does the same pattern repeat in the case of voter turnout? The 
results o f the logistic regression analysis for the two groups are summarized in Table 
8.3. For sjmplicity, .only the weighted complete models for the two groups are shown. 
The overall explanatory power of the model, in terms of percenfof cases correctly ‘ 
classified, is slightly stronger in the low sophistication group. Similarly, the model 
Chi-Square value is larger in the case of the low sophistication group, and the -2-log 
I 
likelihood value is lower (indicating less error) for the group. Besides, out of the 17 
variables in the explanatory model 12 of them are significant at 0.10 level in the low 
sophistication group. Eight are significant at the 0.05 leveL 
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Table 8.3 Voter turnout for the two sophistication group 
Dependent variable: voter turnout 
Low sophistication High sophistication 
Demographics A Chi-Square = 15.8*** A Chi-Square = 15.0** 
Family income 0.18 -0.49** 
Personal income -0.67*** 0.23 
Age 0.57*** 0.26 
Education 0.40* 0.34 
Sex -0.50*** 0.10 
News consumption A Chi-Square = 5.1* A Chi-Square = 6.1** 
News exposure -0.41** -0.20 
News attention -0.64*** 0.07 
Civic awareness A Chi-Square = 8.9* A Chi-Square = 16.8*** 
Attitudes towards participation 0.17 0.05 
Sense of efficacy 0.30* -0.01 
Sense of duty and rights 0.04 0.43** 
Political interests 0.37* 0.33* 
Performance evaluations A Chi-Square = 21.1*** AChi-Square = 3.1 
Government -0.14 -0.28 
Parties & candidates 0.31 0.15 
Election 0.78*** 0.07 
Knowledge A Chi-Square = 16.9*** A Chi-Square = 6.3** 
Total knowledge level 0.79*** o.48** 
Campaign mobilization A Chi-Square = 12.5*** A Chi-Square = 6.6** 
Canvassing 0.25* -0.02 
Interpersonal persuasion 0.45*** o.42*** 
Number of cases 260 297 
Chi-Square 80.3*** 53.9*** 
% of cases correctly classified 69.12% 64.7% 
-2-log likelihood 279.9 357.2 
Psuedo-R-square 22.29% 1311% 
* p < 0 . 1 0 ; ** p < 0.05; * * * p < 0 . 0 1 
Entries are standardized beta coefficients. 
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However, in the high sophistication group the number of variables explaining -
turnout is only 5 if 0.10 significant level is used and 4 if 0.05 level is used. This is 
somewhat surprising at first sight. This shows that the yahables in general are better 
predictors of voter turnout of the non-sophisticated people, despite the fact that the 
low sophistication group has a somewhat smaller sample size. 
1 1 1 
In addition, different from our earlier findings in the previous chapters that 
knowledge is related more strongly to attitudes and evaluations in the high 
sophistication group, this time the beta coefficient of knowledge is larger in the low 
sophistication group. Also, news exposure and attention are significantly related to 
turnout only in the low sophistication group. 
However, a closer look at the findings and the theoretical arguments made 
earlier may make the findings understandable. There are actually three blocks of 
factors that explain the turnout of less sophisticated people better - performance 
evaluations, knowledge, and campaign mobilization (the difference in the Chi-Square 
value for demographics in the two groups is negligible). Among the three the most 
important one is performance evaluations. The incremental Chi-Square due to 
evaluation variables in the two models differ by 18, which is two-thirds of the 
discrepancy in the model Chi-Square values of the models in the two groups. More 
specifically, the strong relationship between evaluation of the election and turnout 
only exists in the low sophistication group. 
As mentioned in the last section, we actually cannot be certain about whether 
people first formulate a good evaluation about the election and then go out to vote or 
formulate evaluation according to whether they have gone out to vote. Researchers 
familiar with psychological theories would easily recognize the possibility of the 
reduction of cognitive dissonance, or impression management, at work (Bem, 1967). 
If impression management or reducing cognitive dissonance is really the reason 
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behind the phenomenon then the fact that this phenomenon only exists in the low 
sophistication group is actually reasonable. Since cognitively sophisticated 
individuals would be less likely to rely on this evaluation formation heuristic. Of 
course, this explanation is not what the data can show. But we also see the problem 
in explanation if one-wave post-election survey is used. As democracy is developing 
in Hong Kong and people are not experienced in voting, the act of voting or non-
voting itself probably will lead to changes in attitudes and evaluations. 
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About media and knowledge effects on turnout, it should be noted that in the low 
sophistication group the negative effects of news consumption did not appear until 
knowledge and civic awareness are included in the model. News consumption, when 
added as the second block of factors, is only significant at 0.10 level in the low 
sophistication group. But after civic awareness and knowledge are controlled the 
effects become quite remarkable (0.41 and 0.64). Besides, news consumption as a 
block of factors contribute significantly (p < 0.05) to the explanatory power of the 
model when it is added as the second block of factor in the high sophistication group. 
However, in the full model the neither attention nor exposure is significant. In other 
words, in the high sophistication group, attention and exposure are related to turnout 
only when control variables are not added. As previously argued, direct media effects 
after controlling for civic awareness and knowledge are likely tb be largely affective in 
nature. Thus the findings in Table 8.3 is actually consistent with the argument that 
less sophisticated people are more likely to take the affective routes in judgment and 
decision making. Also, in the previous chapter we see that for the high sophistication 
group, media use and knowledge are related to political attitudes to a larger extent. 
Thus another explanation for the weaker relationship between media and turnout 
shown in Table 8.3 is that the effects of media on turnout is mediated by attitudinal 
variables to a larger extent for the high sophistication group, therefore the remaining 
direct relationship between media and turnout is weaker or even non-existent. 
The discrepancy of the explanatory power of knowledge in the two groups can 
be explained in a similar way. In the previous chapter, when studying tRe relationship 
between knowledge and attitudes and evaluations we are mainly focusing on the 
cognitive consequences of knowledge, that is, the content of the knowledge and 
I 
information lead one to make a certain judgment. However, the fact of knowing 
something itself may have consequences on an individual regardless of the actual 
content of the knowledge. As aruged earlier, in the case of turnout the content of 
information is less likely to be relevant. Thus the slightly stronger relationship 
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between knowledge and voter turnout in the low sophistication group also does not 
defy the general argument followed so far. 
Lastly, the fact that campaign mobilizing is more important for the low 
sophistication group is not surprising at all. As following the literature and theoretical 
arguments we can expect that non-sophisticated people are more likely to be 
affected by direct persuasion of various kinds. 
Contrary to the above factors, civic awareness explains the turnout of 
sophisticated group better. In general terms, this is also consistent with the argument 
that sophisticated people are more likely to base their judgments and decisions to 
some general and underlying attitudes. More specifically, the most important civic 
awareness factor at work for the high sophistication group is sense of duty and rights, 
while sense of efficacy is more important in the low sophistication group. Political 
interest is almost equally important in the two groups. 
Lastly, researchers interested in the social structural analysis of voting behavior 
may find the demographics variables in the two groups interesting. While the Chi-
Square contributed by the demographics block in the two groups are almost identical, 
the factors at work in the two groups are completely different. For the low 
sophistication group, voters are likely to be older man having lower personal income 
but higher levels of education. Among the high sophistication group the only factor 
that is significant is the only factor not significant in the other group 一 people with 
lower family income are more likely to vote?*. 
Discussion 
This chapter has presented the last analysis of media effects in the election. 
I 
24 Some readers may find the differences in the explanatory power of the demographic variables 
strange, especially the difference between personal income and family income. One possible criticism is 
that the simdtaneous inclusion of personal and family income would lead to multicollinearity problem. 
The author creates a new income variable by averaging personal income and family income, then re-
runs the analysis of Table 8.3 by substituting personal and family income with the new variable. The 
overall pattern remains very similar. And the arguments put forward about regarding civic awareness, 
performance evaluations, media use, knowledge etc, can be retained. ‘ 
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Voter turnout is explained by a model. The regression results do echo findings in 
earlier elections in Hong Kong and some similar analysis in the US. Of course, it 
should be noted that, like the case in US, the explanatory power of the model as a 
whole does not match the power of theoretical models used in explaining other 
political phenomenon. A measure of psuedo-R-Square, which is analogous to R-
Square value in multiple regression (Menard, 1995), is calculated for each analysis^^ 
It is 11.77% in the weighted model for the whole sample. For the low and high 
sophistication group, the value is 22.29% and 13.11% respectively. In other words, 
by separating the whole sample into two groups, the explanatory power of the model 
increases, especially in the case of the low sophistication group. 
The direct effects of news exposure, and the indirect effects of media through 
knowledge, show that media are, as argued at the beginning of the whole study, an 
important component in the electoral process in Hong Kong. The results suggest that 
news consumption and knowledge are two factors that can be meaningfully studied 
in research about the political processes in Hong Kong. 
The differentiation between people with high and low sophistication provides us 
with previously unacknowledged, empirically interesting and theoretically important 
results. It shows that researchers should not assume that the same factors would 
work for everyone in a society. The identification of a few key characteristics that 
would differentiate people into categories will be important. Political sophistication, 
which refers to people's cognitive ability to process political information and making - - • 
political judgments, is one of such characteristics which help explaining the political “ 
behavior and attitudes of citizens. Future research can try to focus on other 
characteristics to explain how different people make their voting decisions differently. 
The author has to acknowledge that some of' the explanations given earlier 
regarding how different factors explain turnout in the two groups of people are largely 
25 It is calculated by: 
Chi-Square value / (Chi-Square value + -2-log likelihood) 
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ad hoc. But I have tried to give a coherent account that could explain the findings as 
a whole, instead of one argument for one finding. 
Here, the major hypotheses and findings can be summarized together to give 
an overall picture of the results thus far. 
Table 8.4 Summary of data analysis on media effects from Chapter 6 to 8 
Number Hypothesis or question Results or observations 
H6.1 News consumption, as the source from Hypothesis supported in a multiple 
which most common people derive regression analysis, 
their political knowledge, will lead to 
higher levels of knowledge. 
H6.2 A person's level of political Hypothesis supported in a multiple 
sophistication, by facilitating various regression analysis, 
cognitive process, will lead to higher 
levels of knowledge. 
H6.3 Sophistication will have an interaction Hypothesis supported in a multiple 
effect with news consumption because regression analysis, 
sophistication is a pre-condition of 
learning from the mass media. 
H6.4 Interpersonal communication is also a Hypothesis supported in a multiple 
channel for information and so will be regression analysis, 
related with knowledge, but to a lesser 
extent than mass communication. 
H6.5 Sophistication is not a condition of Hypothesis supported in a multiple 
learning in interpersonal regression analysis, 
communication, thus there will be no 
interaction effect between 
sophistication and interpersonal 
communic3tioA. 
Q7.1 What kinds of relationship would exist Attitudes are inter-connected but not 
between attitudes at the bivariate and in a pair-wise fashion. At the 
multivariate levels7 multivariate level an "attitude 
structure" can be drawn. 
Q7.2 What kinds of relationship would exist Media and knowledge are related to 
between media, knowledge and different attitudes at the bivariate 
、 attitudes at the bivariate and level but the relationship decreased 
‘ multivariate levels? at multivariate level. Knowledge 
: emerges as a more important 
correlates of attitudes. 
H7.1 More relationships between knowledge Hypothesis supported by correlation 
and attitudes will exist for the analysis for the two groups 
sophisticated group. separately. 
H7.2 More relationships between media Hypothesis not supported. 
consumption and attitudes will exist for Suggested explanation is that the 
the low sophistication group. not-so-salient coverage of politics 
before the major campaign period 
makes media use not useful for 
forming general political attitudes for 
the non-sophisticated. 
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Table 8.4 Continued 
Number Hypothesis or question Results or observations 
H7.3 Attitudes towards political institutions Hypothesis supported by multiple 
measured in March would most likely regression analysis, 
be related to specific evaluations 
measured after the election in the case 
of the government. 
H7.4 Knowledge is more likely to have Hypothesis supported in multiple 
effects on people's evaluations of regression analysis, 
political parties and candidates rather 
than their evaluations of the other two 
political institutions. 
H7.5 Knowledge is related positively to the Hypothesis supported in multiple 
variability of evaluations. regression analysis. 
H7.6 Media consumption is related positively Only news attention is related 
to the variability of evaluations. positively to variability, news 
exposure is not. 
H7.7 Sophistication is related positively to Hypothesis not supported in multiple 
the variability of evaluations. regression analysis. 
H7.8 Knowledge will be related to Hypothesis supported in multiple 
evaluations of political parties to a regression analysis, 
larger extent in the sophisticated group. 
Q8.1 A model of voter turnout is specified to Knowledge is related positively and 
test media and knowledge effects on strongly with turnout. Media 
turnout. consumption is only slightly related 
to turnout before controlling for other 
variables. After controlling, media 
consumption is negatively related to 
turnout significantly. It shows that 
media consumption has both 
positive and negative consequences 
on turnout. The positive 
consequences are mediated by 
knowledge and civic awareness, but 
the negative consequences, likely to 
be affective in nature, are not 
mediated by any variables exist in 
the model. 
Q8.2 The voter turnout model is tested for Knowledge and media are related 
the:high sophistication and low with turnout in the low sophistication 
sophistication groups separately to see group to a larger extent. For the 
the difference between the two groups, sophisticated people media 
consumption is not related to 
turnout. There are also numerous 
differences on other variables 
between the results for the two 
groups. 
If some last words should be added as a conclusion for the analysis of media 
effects, we can note the following points. First, media do have the potential to bring 
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about effects on people's cognition, attitudes, and behavior. The effects can be direct, 
but more important they are mediated by other factors, such as knowledge and 
sophistication. Second, social scientific studies trying to find out the causes behind 
people's attitudes and behavior should keep in mind that the causes can be very 
different for different people. Thus concepts which can help us to categorize the 
public into groups would help the search of causes. 
Of course, the media effects should be understood in the context. There are 
particular characteristics of the Hong Kong society and politics that favor the 
existence of media effects. First, not only the public relies heavily on the media to 
learn about politics, but also the political parties and candidates are heavily reliant on 
the media, due to the genera! lack of strong ties between the parties and the public 
(this is especially problematic for the democrats). Thus we can expect the media to 
be a more important mobilizing agent in Hong Kong than their counterparts in other 
societies. Second, democracy is under development in recent years. People did not 
turn political participation or behavior into habits. This is a condition allowing various 
agents, including the media, to have more power in influencing the public. Obviously, 
if going out to vote (or abstention) has become a habit, no agent is likely to have 
strong influence on it. Also related to the short history of democracy in Hong Kong is 
the less stable and established political attitudes, values and beliefs, which also allow 
various agents to enjoy greater influence. Lastly, the 1998 election is the first one 
after the handover. The historical specificity of the election makes all the remaining 
~一 fixed attitudes and beliefs less applicable. People are more likely to "start from 
scratch," searching for information and formulating evaluations and making 
behavioral decisions anew. 
After all the analysis, now the question is: How the effects discovered can be 
understood? Can we find the causes behind the effects from content? Also, what are 
the normative implications of the effects found? We see that media have direct 
negative effects on some attitudes and turnout, but have positive effects on 
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knowledge, which in turn helps the turnout rate. Up to this time, what can be argued 
is that media have both desirable and undesirable effects regarding its role of 
activating informed participation. 
However, the implications are not at all clear. Media do have positive effects on 
knowledge, but it can also be argued that media effects on knowledge are not really 
meaningful in the sense that all kinds of communication probably lead to knowledge 
increase. It does not tell us whether media have given enough and important 
information to the public because of the failure to establish knowledge domains in the 
survey in March. Without a basis of comparison we also do not know whether media 
have realized their full potential in informing the public. Moreover, the knowledge gap 
phenomenon demonstrated in Chapter 6 calls for concern about to what extent the 
less sophisticated people can really learn from the media. 
On the other hand, media negative effects on voter turnout call for concern. But 
if the cause behind the negative effects is not ascertained, it would be very difficult to 
discuss the implications of the effects. 
Faced with the uncertainties of the causes and implications of the effects found, 
the next chapter will give a brief but systematic analysis of media content, focusing 
on the notion of strategic coverage, to provide empirical cues and basis for the 




IX. The pitfalls of strategic coverage: How media fall short 
from activating informed participation 
Previous chapters have analyzed the media effects on knowledge, attitudes, 
and turnout in the 1998 election. But how can we connect the effects and media's 
role of activating informed participation together? To answer this question and to 
provide some further context for the effect study, analyzing media content will be 
useful. It can give an empirical basis for the discussion of the reasons behind and the 
implications of the effects. 
Ming Pao and Apple Daily are chosen for analysis. The focus on newspapers is 
due to the fact that they carry the largest amount of election information during the 
campaign. And the two newspapers are chosen to represent the elite and mass 
newspapers respectively. As explained in Chapter 4, the analysis will not be a 
comprehensive one. It will be a systematic analysis on a specific theme 一 strategic 
coverage by the media. Strategic coverage is one of the most prominent themes 
established in past studies on media's election coverage. It refers to the tendency of 
the media to focus on candidates' campaign strategies, their mutual attack and 
conflicts, and their chances of winning in an election (Patterson, 1980; Joslyn, 1984; 
Cavanaugh, 1995; Cappella and Jamieson, 1997). I just use the term "strategic 
coverage" to denote the phenomenon. This kind of coverage assumes that politicians 
are selfish actors with winning as their only aim. This interpretation is not an explicit 
- o n e written -down or a conclusioti drawn from neutral observations or in-depth “ 
analysis, but it underlies journalists' construction of news stories (Cappella and 
Jamieson, 1997). Strategic coverage also characterizes media coverage of other 
political issues (Jamieson and Cappella, 1998). Generally speaking, we can identify 
two aspects of strategic coverage: 1) in terms of information, it focuses on campaign 
information rather than issue information, 2) in terms of narrative, news stories are 
written in a way that is similar to reports of sports, wars, or other kinds of games and 
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contests, and interpretations about candidates' actions and intentions are suggested 
implicitly or even explicitly. 
It should be reminded that the present study does not have the design to 
demonstrate the empirical linkage between content and effects, but arguments about 
the linkage are helped by past research in related areas. The connection between 
strategic coverage and media effects in the present study will be discussed after 
analyzing the content. Here suffice it to say that strategic coverage is one of the most 
likely causes behind some "effects found in the data analysis, especially the negative 
effects of media consumption on turnout. 
Prominence of strategic coverage in Hong Kong 
Let us start with the most basic question: Is strategic coverage of election 
prominent in the 1998 LegCo election? As there is no comprehensive content 
analysis carried out, the precise extent of strategic coverage cannot be established. 
But we can have a rough assessment of it. Starting from February 2, Ming Pao 
established weekly special page (later turned more frequently) for the coverage of 
the upcoming election. During February to April, the special page was included 
mainly on Monday only. On other days during the week news about the upcoming 
election was put into the political news page. In this period, the special election page 
usually focused on a certain theme. From the selection of the themes we can get a 
view of what the focus of coverage was. _ 
‘ _ 
Frora February 2 to April 29 there were altogether 20 special pages^e. tab le 9.1 
summarizes the themes^^. The table shows the nature of the coverage on the page. 
The nature is strategic if the theme is campaign strategies, inter- and intra-party 
conflicts, or poll results showing candidates' support, l t is issue coverage if the theme 
23 A special page is recognized as one which has a heading of “changing situation of the election 
war" at the top of the page. 
27 The table stops at 29/4 because starting from 30/4 Ming Pao has the special election page 
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is about candidates issue stands, past records of the parties on working on public 
affairs, or polls about substantive concerns like the people's issue agenda. There is a 
third category named "strategic-issue" representing the coverage in which a large 
volume of substantive information included but are put into a strategic narrative 
(which is to be discussed later). 
Table 9.1 Themes of special page coverage of Ming Pao: Feb 2 to April 29 
“ Strategy Issue Strategy-
issue 
2/2: lntra-party conflicts 丫 
9/2: Party leaders' chances of winning 丫 
16/2: Participation of members of the Executive Council Y 
23/2: Xinhua News Agency Undefined 
2/3: Poll results for the newest standings in the race Y 
9/3: Parties' and candidates' financial resources Y 
16/3: Liberal Party in functional constituencies elections Y 
23/3: Kowloon West constituency Y 
29/3: Poll results about the current standings Y . 
30/3: Democratic Party's strategy to attack opponents on Y 
participating in Provisional Legislature 
6/4: New Territories East constituency 丫 
10/4: Application as candidates 一 event report Y 
13/4: Hong Kong Island constituency 丫 
14/4: Kowloon East constituency 丫 
20/4: New Territories West race 丫 
25/4: Kowloon West constituency 丫 
25/4: Functional constituencies Y 
26/4: Withdrawal of candidates due to nationality problem Y 
29/4: Poll results about the current standings Y 
Two things can be noted. First, strategic topics are focused more than 
substantive topics (13:1, and 13:5 even including strategic-issue into issue category). 
It may be argued that in February and March candidates did not have much 
substantive information to offer7However, this is not a perfect reason, as journalists 
could have tried to investigate and raise substantive issues themselves. Also, 
substantive information was not always non-existent but only not treated as the most 
important aspect in coverage. For instance on March'2 Ming Pao reported the results 
of a poll conducted by CUHK. The poll asked questions including the criteria the 
respondents will use to choose among candidates and the issues that the 
everyday and the coverage on the page was no longer organized by an overall theme. 
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respondents think are more imminent to Hong Kong. These questions can be 
considered as more important as they are related to the society's understanding of a 
good leader and the public's agenda. However, they are put only at the bottom of the 
page and journalists did not try to follow the result and question various candidates 
and parties about their views upon the society's understanding of a good politician 
and the public's agenda. 
Second, into late March and early April Ming Pao covered the race in the five 
geographical constituencies separately. But the coverage was, again, largely 
focused on campaign strategies or using a strategic framework to compare 
candidates' issue stands. Candidates' issue stands were dubbed as "selling points." 
Focus was on how candidates tried to win the election by adopting strategies. Thus, 
issue stands, background and past performances were equated with campaign 
strategies. 
Starting from April 30 Ming Pao's special election page became organized by 
individual stories. A simple way to look at the general picture of coverage in this later 
period is to look at the headline story on every special page. Coverage on May 19, 20 
and 23 are not available, and there are totally 22 special page headline stories in the 
whole period. Eight of them are about functional constituency election. Four are 
controversies in other aspects of the election^®. One story is about the election 
committee. There are four stories about candidate debates. However, among them 
one is actually about how a debate was cancelled due to lack of audience. Another 
k 
has virtually no issue content, while the remaining two are written in the way that, 二 
again, issue and substantive information are put into a strategic narrative. 
Two stories are about conflicts among candidates. One is about a candidate's 
suspected lying on hereducational background. 0n6 is a poll report. The one on May 
28 They are the British embassy contacted candidates in the election and aroused the Chinese 
government's criticism, controversy about the electoral arrangements, area for campaigning on election 
day, and arrangements of voting stations. 
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18 is the only piece that can be said as substantive. It is an article about Kowloon 
East candidates' various issue stands and the article is free from strategic 
implications. Thus, we can see that even into May Ming Pao did not give emphasis 
on more substantive issues. 
What about Apple Daily? We can construct a similar analysis on its election 
coverage. But unlike Ming Pao, Apple Daily did not publish special page regularly 
until April. Summarizing the headline stories ofthe special page starting from April 12, 
there are altogether 43 stories^^ The stories are then classified into issue stories, 
strategy stories, strategy-issue, functional constituencies/election committee, and 
others. The first three categories are defined as discussed above, the fourth category 
includes all news coverage about functional constituency or election committee 
elections no matter how the news is covered, the fifth is a residual category including 
topics like government actions etc. 
The result is that among the 43 stories, 17 can be classified as strategic 
coverage. These articles included topics like using the Internet for campaign 
promotion, mutual attacks on violating election rules regarding campaigning, polls 
reports etc. Only one is classified as issue coverage, which was on May 16. The 
topic is the public's most concerned issues. Four are classified as strategy-issue 
coverage, which, as explained above, has covered candidates' issue stands but the 
coverage was put into a strategic framework so that the issue stands become 
strategies themselves. There are 10 stories about the functional constituencies and 一 ‘ 
election committee and the remaining 11 were un'"classified as they are 'about other 
aspects of the election. 
From the sketch we can argue that strategic coverage is largely present on the 
two newspapers in the 1998 LegCo election. Fdllowing past research, we can 
suspect that strategic coverage is at least part of the reason for some media effects 
29 Some days have more than one headline story since election news was covered in more than one 
page, and May 3, 17, 22 and 23 are missing from the analysis since the newspapers on those days are 
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found in previous chapters, like its negative effects on turnout and some of the 
attitudinal variables. 
However, to further support the claim that strategic coverage has led to 
undesirable impacts, we can have a closer look at the textual features of the 
coverage. The question is: Which aspects or characteristics of strategic coverage 
would likely have caused problems to informed participation? 
Before going on, a note should be added about another possible reason behind 
the negative media effects on turnout. It has been pointed out in Chapter 4 that some 
people may think the election is undemocratic and illegitimate. An implication is that 
media may have negative effects on turnout because of their portrayal of the election 
as undemocratic, or because of their coverage of the controversies surrounding the 
legitimacy question. This counter-argument is very important since if it is true, the 
apparently undesirable negative media effects on turnout suddenly become not so 
undesirable, and for people who believe the election as illegitimate, the negative 
effects may even become desirable. 
However, from the analysis of media content, the author does not see much 
discussion and criticisms towards the undemocratic character of the election by the 
media. It does not mean criticisms were absent. But the amount of criticisms did not 
attain the level of conspicuity that makes it as probable as strategic coverage to be a 
reason behind the negative effects. Actually, from what has been mentioned, the two 
newspapers gave considerable coverage of the functional constituencies election 
- : 
and election committee during the campaign period. And the overall tone of the 
coverage was not specifically critical. Thus, it seems that media's criticisms of the 
legitimacy of the election are not likely to be the main cause of effects. 
Also, if media's criticisms of the legitimacy o f t he election is the main reason 
behind, the media coverage and knowledge should have negative effects not only on 
turnout but also election performance. However, what have been shown in previous 
unavailable to the researcher. 
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chapters are media coverage's negative effects on turnout as well as knowledge's 
negative effects on parties performance evaluation. Strategic coverage is surely in a 
better position to account for this particular combination of effects. 
As noted above strategic coverage has two main characteristics. One is related 
to the amount of information and the other to the way information is presented in a 
narrative. In the following, textual analysis will be employed to demonstrate more 
closely the problems involved in the coverage. They include how strategic coverage 
denatures candidates' actions, how strategic narrative drives out substantive 
information, and how the narrative devalues substantive information. 
The author reads all the newspaper articles about the direct election from Feb 2 
to May 24 on the two newspapers and come up with the themes presented below. 
The examples given are often the more illustrative cases that are representative of 
the themes. They cannot tell the precise extent to which the three themes are 
present in a quantitative sense, but it can be argued that the themes are present to a 
considerable extent that deserves our attention. 
Denaturing actions and events 
By denaturing candidates' actions I mean the media cover candidates' actions 
in a way that the original intentions or meanings are replaced by strategic 
interpretations. Of course, it is difficult to know the original intentions and meanings 
of candidates' actions. However, journalists cannot assume they know them either. 
产 ‘ 
“ While some scho[ars argue that journalists making interpretations are-not desirable . ‘ 
(Patterson, 1994), others think that interpretations are inevitable (Page, 1996). 
Nevertheless, we can at least argue that whenever interpretations are suggested 
they must be well-reasoned and substantiated in a way that no obvious information is 
lacking and no other obvious alternative interpretation is neglected. 
Coverage of intra-party conflicts and the resulting change of different politicians' 
election strategies have dominated the election coverage in February and early 
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March. This domination per se is not the whole problem. There were really a lot of 
intra-party conflicts in February resulting in disturbances within various parties. In 
covering these stories, strategic interpretations are usually the easiest way to explain 
politicians' actions. Of course, in most of the cases the strategic concerns of the 
parties and politicians were actually conceded by the politicians themselves. 
Nevertheless, there were still cases in which strategic interpretations were imposed 
on politicians. 
The most obvious case was Ming Pao's coverage of the withdrawal of Chow • 
Kit-bing from the Liberal Party (LP). She held a press conference to announce her 
withdrawal decision due to Wong Ying-kei's return and LP's arrangement. She 
refused LP's offer for her to enter the LegCo through election committee and decided 
to enter the direct election as an independent. On February 27, Ming Pao, besides 
covering the press conference, had another article titled "pushing forward by 
stepping backward, gaining an excellent image," in which Chow's "strategy" was 
explained, 
Chow Kit-bing decided to withdraw from the LP, losing the brandname of 
the party, but gaining the media's spotlight, and also establishing an image 
of insisting on principles and ideals. For "sister Bing," she has all the 
reasons to "gamble." 
Now "sister Bing" announced withdrawal, but she became the focus of 
media. She showed the posture of insisting on principle but not accepted by 
her party. It may help her to win the "sympathetic votes" from some people. 
On February 28 there was another article on fhe same issue written in a largely 
similar way. A simple question: does Chow have "all the reasons to gamble"? If every 
politicians' goal is only to win the election, then the best way for Chow perhaps is to 
accept the offer to enter through the election committee, as polls results showed that 
she had an extremely slim chance to win in the geographical constituencies. 
If we still insist on strategic interpretation, can we argue that Chow's decision 
was driven by a long-term strategic concern? It is possible. But this possibility only 
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demonstrates one particular trouble (or advantage for news writers) of strategic 
coverage 一 one can always find strategic interpretations of politicians' actions. 
Furthermore, even if Chow was really posturing as insisting on principles, Chow's 
action was still consistent with what is expected to be in the public interest. That is, a 
politician should respect direct election rather than trying to gain seats through 
undemocratic means, and should be responsible for the citizens in his/her own 
constituency. In other words, no matter what is the intention behind, Chow has done 
the "right" thing. As a result of strategic interpretation, Ming Pao failed to differentiate 
actions that are consistent with the public interest and those that are not. 
It should be admitted that this kind of explicit strategic interpretations of 
candidates' actions is rare. After all, journalists uphold norms of objectivity and 
neutrality. They do not often get into explicit analysis and interpretations. But by 
selecting focus and information to report, and by using a certain narrative, 
C3Ddidates' actions can also be denatured. 
We can turn to media coverage of candidate debates. In an ideal election, what 
candidates will do is to propound their policy platforms and then rationally discuss 
and debate about them. Candidate debates become a site for this kind of meaningful 
confrontation. In reality, however, candidates may spend time on attacking others, 
and in their attack they may resort to emotional and polemical strategies. Actually, 
the line between emotional attack and rational debate is difficult to draw. However, 
journalists, by their strategic coverage, may exaggerate the attack character. We can 
“ 广 • 
look at two cases of headline coverage of debates. - “ 
On May 1, debates in the Hong Kong Island constituency was covered on Ming 
Pao titled "Martin Lee was absent, Yeung Sum became the target." The article paid 
emphasis on the strategic aspect and used the language of a competition. 
……The leading candidate on Democratic Party (DP) Hong Kong Island's 
candidate list, party leader Martin Lee, was absent in yesterday's election 
forum, but his past comments became the focus of opponents' criticisms. 
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Yeung Sum [vice-chairman of DP], who participated the forum, had to "avoid 
the serious," not to argue with opponents about Lee's past comments. 
Right from the beginning of the forum, which was staged at the Charter 
Garden in Central, DP's Yeung Sum first attacked DAB on issues of 
democracy, freedom, human rights and rule of law. Christine Loh also 
grasped the opportunity to enter the fray, she pointed out that the LegCo in 
the colonial era failed to pass the bill on forbidding age discrimination. At 
that time LP did not support this bill, she requested ex-LP's member Chow 
Kit-bing to explain…… 
On Apple Daily we can see a similar phenomenon. When a New Territories East 
election forum was reported on April 30 as the top story, the title was "Scramble in 
New Territories forum produced sparks." And the leading paragraph was written as, 
Although there is still some days before the LegCo election, New Territories 
East forum is filled with the smell of explosives. After DP and DAB's "firing" 
last time, yesterday NT East candidates "scramble" again on the forum. 
There was even the scene in which democrats "bomb" each other. 
These articles may not have failed in including substantive information, 
although, as will be argued later, the strategic narrative restricted the amount and 
depth of information conveyed. More important here is that they are written in a way 
like a report of a war or a game, with descriptions of candidates' attack and defense, 
with words like attack, fray, bomb, firing, explosives etc., organizing the flow of the 
narrative. Strategies used in debate are pointed out. Candidate actions are 
interpreted within the overall framework. 
It should be pointed out that debates are covered as a battlefield not only when 
一 they were the headline, but their chances to become headline stories largely 
increase when they allowed journalists to identify and amplify the conflictual aspects 
of the debate. In general, newspapers tended to characterize debates and forums as 
battlefields rather than a stage for communication and discussion. And some 
a 
debates, due to the presence of elements which particularly fit such a 
characterization, gained more prominence. The conflictual aspect often becomes the 
organizing theme or even the sole matter in coverage. In reporting the debates, the 
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media may have even "created" the conflicts. It is not to argue that candidate 
debates by themselves are fully rational, but it can still be argued that the media had 
distorted the meaning of, that is, denatured, debates. 
Narrative construction: how strategic coverage force out substantive information 
Previous studies have pointed out that in strategic coverage substantive 
information is lacking. Here we can look more closely at how strategic information is 
being omitted. The first way by which strategic coverage undermines the amount of 
substantive information is simply the selection of news topics. Earlier analysis has 
already pointed to this. 
The second way to exclude substantive information is related to narrative 
construction. News articles are stories. In telling stories journalists use the 
information at hand to make a coherent account of events and issues. Thus the 
choices of information to include are not random, but affected by the "narrative 
relevance" of the information. There are two kinds of choices to be made in 
constructing a narrative: paradigmatic and syntagmatic choices. Paradigmatic 
choices refer to the choosing of semantic units from a number of potential units that 
can be used in the same position. Thus a debate can be characterized as a 
discussion, debate, forum, battlefield, competition, etc. Also, paradigmatic choices 
do not refer to separate decisions in the choice of word, it is a decision to choose a 
"paradigm" of words and elements. Thus, if the word battlefield is chosen in the 
<~ ‘ 
above example it usually implies choosing words like fire, bomb, explosives in 
subsequent decisions. Syntagmatic choices refer to the decisions about how to 
combine and connect different elements and units in a text. These two concepts can 
help us to analyze media texts and in this seotion it will be shown that the 
syntagmatic characteristics of a strategic narrative will undermine the amount and 
depth of substantive information and analysis. 
Into March and April, political parties and candidates started to finalize and 
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announce their election platforms. Covering these announcements offered media a 
chance to report some substantive information. However, journalists, with their eyes 
on the strategic aspects, often fail to provide both width and depth of substantive 
information. The following is an example on Apple Daily on April 17’ 
Frontier announces election platform, first time announcing livelihood issue 
stands 
Frontier announced their 98 election platform yesterday. The content 
includes old-age pension scheme which was once opposed by leader Emily 
Lau. Lee Cheuk-yan, also general secretary of CTU, emphasized that the 
platform was decided by a general meeting, there was no "face-off' 
situations during the discussion process. 
The platform is the first time that Frontier discloses its stands on livelihood 
and economic issues, like using "old-age money" system as the primary and 
"compulsory retirement saving scheme" the secondary methods for 
retirement protection, against labor importation, and support increase in 
fees on public services should be checked by LegCo. 
However, Emily Lau once supported government to set compulsory 
retirement saving scheme in LegCo, and opposed to Lee Cheuk Yan's "old-
age money" system (continue to focus on how Emily Lau's has voted 
against other democrats' proposals in the past) 
(fourth paragraph on possible contradiction and problem of 
implementation) 
The platform of Frontier still has "China's democratization" as its large 
premise. They request re-evaluation ofJune Fourth. Regarding constitution, 
[they] request full participation by the public and re-enacting the Basic Law. 
Executive committee member Ho Sau-lan said that the platform only "says 
what it says," there is no intention to pressurize other democrats. ‘ 
: 一 二 * 
(sixth paragraph on who participation in which district's election)...... 
The article is cited at length because it can allow us to see how the six 
paragraphs are organized. The writer has chosen two things to include in the lead 
paragraph - Emily Lau's apparent change in issue.stand and the question of internal 
conflicts. It sets the tone of the whole article. The second paragraph introduces 
Frontier's issue stands on some livelihood issues. After this paragraph, the article 
can go two ways. One is to go deeper into the livelihood issue stands. However, the 
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third paragraph follows the lead paragraph's direction instead, talking about Emily 
Lau's voting record, especially the conflicts between her and some of the democrats. 
This turn has not totally forbidden the further analysis of issue information. As the 
conflicts can also be seen as meaningful since voters can see from the record how 
Emily Lau has acted in the past. But with the focus on strategy, the reason why Lau 
has seemingly changed her stands and why she was in conflict with some other 
democrats were not discussed. At the end, the public only knows a few issue stands 
on a very superficial level. Actually people without relevant background knowledge 
may simply cannot make sense of "old age money," "compulsory retirement saving 
scheme" etc. Then, the fifth paragraph talks about the political stands of Frontier. 
Again, what follows the simple introduction of issue stands is a question on whether 
Frontier is giving pressure to other democrats. 
On the whole, the article was organized with the strategic focus always behind. 
In-depth analysis and wide coverage of substantive information are lacking as the 
syntax of the coverage is "issue stands, strategic implication of issue stands" rather 
than "issue stands, elaboration/analysis of issue stands." 
With a few exceptions, the commonality about the articles on candidates' 
platforms is that the strategic focus can be seen by looking at the "syntax" of the 
article, that is, the flow from the title to the lead paragraph and to others. Issue 
information is contained in these reports in varying degrees, but always subject to the 
restrictions imposed by the strategic focus working through the syntagmatic choices 
、 产 • 
made. “ - 一 . 
Another example showing how important information is omitted in a strategic 
narrative is about candidates’ mutual attack. Throughout the election, this kind of 
mutual attacks on issue stands and past records-often appeared. And due to the 
conflictual character of these events they often got media's attention. 
An illustrative case is that DP's chairman Martin Lee was accused as having 
made the statement years ago that "even one cent should not be left to the future 
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SAR government." Martin Lee had denied he had ever made such a statement. On 
May 10 Ming Pao reported that DAB's vice-chairman Cheng Kai-nam pointed out the 
statement was reported on April 8, 1991 and he has already found the news report 
on that day. However, the reporter did not try to prove whether the news report 
mentioned by Gheng can really be found. 
The obvious possible way to settle down this kind of controversies is to check 
the record, to see whether the criticisms are consistent with facts, and then give the 
involved politicians chances to explain. However, the situation of the two reports is 
that journalists failed to do the job of confirmation and verification. For the readers, 
after all the mutual attacks by the politicians, they still did not know whether Martin 
Lee has really made certain statements in what kind of contexts. At the end, the 
readers only know the candidates are attacking each other but without any idea of 
the validity of the attacks. Put into the context of strategic narrative construction, the 
syntax is "attack, defense, counter-attack," rather than "attack, defense, and 
verification." 
Devaluing substantive information in strategic coverage 
In strategic coverage, substantive information may not be totally absent. 
However, their values have been changed, because they become strategies. They 
are posited in the election campaign in a way not different from other strategies used 
by the candidates. 
一 ‘ 
Issue stands may be treated as strategies explicitly or implicitly. As t iave been “ 
noted, explicit interpretation of issue stands as strategies is rare, but it is not absent. 
For example, in early March a prominent Chinese politician attacked RTHK as 
antagonistic to the Hong Kong SAR government despite its public broadcasting 
nature. The comments immediately aroused heated debate about issues ranging 
from editorial autonomy of RTHK to freedom of expression in Hong Kong. On March 
27, Ming Pao reported that various parties have prepared their platforms on the issue 
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for the debate in the coming week's meeting in the Provisional Legislature. Titled 
"parties commenting on RTHK, preparing dibs for the election," the lead paragraph of 
the article was written as: 
The Provisional Legislature will debate about editorial autonomy of RTHK 
next Wednesday. It becomes the arena for political parties to prepare 
"bullets" for the election in May. The four biggest parties [in the Provisional 
Legislature] will give their own proposals with unique wordings in order to 
avoid supporting their "enemies" on this sensitive issue. 
The coverage did conyey issue information to the public. However, by using 
strategic interpretations the importance of the issue information was undermined. 
The interpretations would distract readers' attention to the substance of the debate 
towards the strategic aspect. K also conveyed the impression that political parties' 
issue stands do not deserve our serious attention because they are only "bips" and 
"bullets" forwinning in an election. 
The same situation exists even the media did not explicitly interpret candidate 
issue stands as strategies. It is because any information wni derive its meaning from 
the narrative within which it is embedded. Take the following example from Apple 
Daily on April 17. 
DAB'S New Territories East candidate Lau Kong-wah frequently started 
attack in a election forum yesterday, trying to arouse the enmity between 
Frontier and DP. Later DP's Cheng Kar-foo retributed, teased Lau Kong-
wah's move from the Hong Kong Democratic Union to DAB as changing 
political stand. 
； The election forum was held in CUHK's so-called "fire-stand" yesterday 
afternoon, the candidates of the six lists directly face-off for the first time. 
Fire is everywhere, reflecting the intense battle in NT East constituency. 
Later Cheng Kar-foo pointed the gun at Lau Kong-wah, teased him as a 
"waving man, entering a waving party." Lau Kong-wah accused Cheng Kar-
foo destroying the rule of law though being a lawyer and always vowing for 
the rule of law. For righteousness Citizens Party's candidate Liu Yat-ming 
pointed out that Cheng only challenged unreasonable phenomenon, and he 
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was 门6乂6「convicted. 
As pointed out earlier, strategic coverage does not exclude all substantive 
information. First, there is Lau's past record as a member of HKDU (which later 
became DP) but later became the leader of the Civil Force, and then joined DAB. 
Second, there is also Cheng's record as an activist in civil protests and has been 
arrested by the police but was never convicted. Although there is the information, but 
the meaning is different when they are put into the context of the news article from 
when they are laid out just as they are. The article has the narrative feature that turns 
the factual information into strategies used by candidates. In terms of paradigmatic 
choice, words like "face-off," "retribute," etc., are used instead of "come together," 
"response," etc. It has already been pointed that this paradigmatic choice is a choice 
of a paradigm of words and we can describe the paradigm chosen by the above 
example as the "war paradigm." Then, other items in the narrative, even though they 
may not be elements of a war when taken separately, acquire this meaning when in 
such a narrative. In this way the information becomes "bullets" even when they are 
not explicitly interpreted as such. 
In terms of syntagmatic choice, the above example is organized as "attack, 
counter-attack" instead of "attack, response, elaboration/fact." Factual information 
does not have a chance to leave the attack-counter-attack framework and stands on 
its own. Thus, in the above example, the fact is not "Lau has changed his party 
membership in the past" but "Cheng accused Lau for changing his party 
一 
membership." Therefore, embedded in strategic narrative, substantive information 
loses its use value to the voters, because information is not differentiated from 
strategies, or even becomes strategies. 
< 
Some overall comments on strategic coverage 
Generally speaking, past studies have already pointed out that strategic 
coverage is characterized by the lack of substantive information and an a priori 
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cynical interpretation of candidates actions and campaign events in terms of 
strategies. What the above analysis achieved is to show in a more detailed way how 
strategic coverage "succeeds" in limiting the amount of useful information given to 
the public and changing the meaning of candidates actions, campaign events and 
turning substantive information into strategies^". 
Patterson (1980; 1994) suggests that the strategic perspective is the result of 
the fact that campaign issues are colorful, unexpected and unique, which make them 
conform to news values. Campaign issues also create suspense and expectation as 
they unfold, and they provide the media the power to control the agenda. Gitlin (1991) 
points to the norm of objectivity, arguing that journalists' fear of being accused as 
being not objective drive them to cover the most uncontroversial and "objective" 
aspect of politics 一 politicians' strategies^'. Zaller (1998) .suggests the "product 
substitution hypothesis" on journalists, coverage of election campaign news. He 
argues that journalists do not like to be manipulated by candidates and thus if they 
perceive the candidates as trying to manipulate them, they will response in giving 
negative coverage of the candidates. Thus the harder the candidates try to sell 
his/her image, the more negative the media are. 
We cannot determine the extent to which the various explanations apply in 
Hong Kong. Probably an explanation of the causes behind strategic coverage in 
Hong Kong have to take into account the news value of Hong Kong journalists and 
the journalistic work routines in Hong Kong. Suffice it to say that the a further step in 
the "horizontalization" of media researchHs to link media content analysis with the 
30 It can be argued that the result of strategic coverage is not only the undermining of the availability 
and importance of substantive information but also the importance of strategies. As argued above 
election is a competition and strategies are an indispensable part of it. Having strategic concerns and 
aiming at winning the election are not anti-democratic, only those strategies that violate the rule of 
competition in an election campaign, and those strategies which are against the public interest, are 
undesirable and should be condemned. However, in the strategic coverage demonstrated above, all 
strategies are treated alike. In this way the media fail to differentiate different strategies and their 
different legitimacies. 
31 This argument is similar to Lemert's (1977, 1981) discussion on mobilizing information. Lemert 
argued that the media fail to carry mobilizing information, which is essential for political participation, 
due to the norm of objectivity. ’ 
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sociological analysis of journalistic work, and a particular question in adopting a 
normative framework in analyzing media is to see the difference between the 
normative values and the practical news values. 
From the content analysis we can see the possible explanation for some media 
effects that are found in previous chapters. Most important, media consumption's 
negative effects on voter turnout can be explained as the demobilization effects of 
media's strategic coverage. Voters refrain from voting due to the recognition that 
politicians are selfish and are not intended to help. Further, we may suspect whether 
strategic coverage has undermined the potential positive effects of knowledge on 
voter turnout. As discussed in Chapter 8’ the content of knowledge, if having a large 
proportion of strategic information, may have led to a negative effect on turnout, 
undermining the positive effects of knowing. 
The overwhelming presence of candidates' mutual attack and conflicts could 
also explain knowledge negative effects on parties' performance evaluation. 
However, remember that the relationship between knowledge and attitudes towards 
parties is positive in March. This is probably because at March media did not give 
salient coverage for the election while parties continued to feature in other political 
news coverage, which has a legitimization effect (Fung, 1995; 1998). Thus election 
coverage in February, though negative and strategic in nature, did not lead to effects 
of knowledge on party attitudes. The situation is different in June. Also, the June 
survey asked respondents to specifically rate performance in election, which is 
- d i f f e r e n t from the.g6neral attitudes measured in March. 
Audience perception of media performance 
Before concluding on strategic coverage, two complications have to be taken 
into account. It is argued that media have focused on strategies and unimportant 
aspects of the election, and there was a lack of substantive information. But do the 
readers’ judgment of media performance consistent with the judgment put forward so 
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far in this chapter. 
In the June survey respondents were asked to evaluate media performance in 
providing information. They were asked whether they think the media have given 
enough issue information, strategy information, polling information, candidate 
background information, and information about the electoral system. A question 
about the usefulness of the information given by the media was also included. Table 
9.2 gives the summary of results. 
Table 9.2 Respondents' evaluations of media performance in providing 
information to the public 
Issue Strategic Background Polling Info, of Usefulness of 
info. info. info. info. electoral information(1) 
system 
Seriously 1.2% 0.6% (3) 0.6% (3) 0.9% 3.2% Verynot 2.0%(11) 
not enough (6) (4) (16) useful 
Not enough 17.7% 30.1% 30.3%(143)21.0% 31.8% Not 14.1%(77) 
(88) (151) (90) (158) useful 
Just right 73.1% 66.9% 66.3%(313) 72.7% 61.8% So-so 33.8%(185) 
(364) (335) (312) (307) 
Too much 8.0% 2.4% 2.8%(13) 5.4% 3.2% Useful 44.1%(241) 
(40) (12) (23) (16) 
Very 6.0% (33) 
useful 
Entries are valid percentage and number of cases 
The answers to these questions, as shown in the table, are inconsistent with 
what the analysis of media content suggested. Respondents were generally satisfied 
with media performance regarding information provision. And the provision of issue 
一 ‘ « 
information even becomes the most satisfactory aspect among the five. Only 88 
respondents thought there was not enough issue information and 6 thought that 
there was a serious lack of it. 
This inconsistency between researcher's and the public's judgment is not 
• 
particular to the present case. A similar situation is also largely present in the US. For 
instance, while some scholars continually argue for the lack of substance in election 
coverage in the US (Patterson, 1980; 1994; Leovy, 1994), there are others argue that 
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the public themselves are not so dis-satisfied. Therefore, the media should be 
considered as having already done a decentjob (Graber, 1994b). 
The problem here is to what extent we should rely on the public's own judgment 
on media performance. The problem is very complicated and has very important 
implications to how we view the public opinion process in a democratic society. It 
could be argued that the public may not be a good judge, and especially in a society 
like Hong Kong where a civic culture is still under development, the public may not be 
sophisticated enough in making reasonable and sound judgment. Certainly, this 
argument is likely to be criticized as too elitist, and we have no way to prove whether 
this elistist view is right. 
But from the data we have, we can pursue two further points. First, the public 
may not be able to differentiate the different kinds of information as the researcher 
has separated. This problem is similar to the discussion of knowledge domain in 
Chapter 6. If the public cannot differentiate the different kinds of information, then 
what Table 9.2 has shown is only a general satisfaction on media's performance. The 
difference between satisfactions with issue and strategy information is not very 
meaningful. This view is supported by reliability analysis and factor analysis. The 
reliability among the five media evaluation variables is 0.61, and the factor analysis 
ends with only one single factor. These figures show that the respondents did not 
display significant differences in their answers towards these five questions. 
Also, it may be argued that while many respondents are satisfied with the 
coverage, those who are more attentive, interested, and knowledgeable would find 
substantive information lacking. From Table 9.3 we can see that people dis-satistified 
with the amount of issue and background information are likely to be more attentive 
to news and more knowledgeable, though they maynot be more interested in politics. 
However, people satisfied with and dis-satisfied with strategy and poiling information 
do not differ. These point to the argument that a lack of issue and background 
information is the opinion of those who really concern and are more informed. 
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Table 9.3 T-tests on the differences of people satisfied and dis-satisfied 
with media 
News attention Political interests Knowledge 
Issue Not enough 3.40 3.14 9.67 
,info. Enough 3.26 3.14 8.27 
Difference 0.14* 0.00 1.40** 
Strategy Not enough 3.33 3.14 8.98 
info. Enough 3.26 3.12 8.15 
Difference 0.07 0.02 0.83* 
Back. Not enough 3.37 3.21 9.47 
info. Enough 3.23 3.08 7.94 
Difference 0.14* 0.13* 1 . 5 3 * * * 
Polling Not enough 3.38 3.05 8.43 
info. Enough 3.29 3.17 8.65 
Difference 0.10 -0.12 -0.22 
Info. Of Notenough 3.28 3.10 8.91 
electoral Enough 3.30 3.11 8.46 
system Difference -0.02 -0.01 0.45* 
Notes: 
Entries are scores on the original scales of the variables. 
The "not enough" group includes answers "not enough" and "seriously not enough." 
Respondents answered "too much" are excluded for simplicity. 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; *p<Q.10 
In sum, while the public's judgment may be different from researchers' analysis, 
the public's judgment should be taken with caution. It is a question to what extent the 
public's judgment should be relied on. Also, the public may not possess the '' 
categories that researchers used in their analysis, and the answers should be 
analyzed in more details to see how people come up their evaluations^^ The above 
discussion certainly did not totally solve the problem of public's judgment. But for the 
«-
present purpose, they support the argument that the general pubric's satisfaction with 
media performance regarding information provision is not enough to defy the 
conclusion of the earlier content analysis. 
I t 
32 Communication research has shown that people's judgment of media performance is subject to 
the influence of one's underlying attitudes and values. A well-known example is the hostile media 
phenomenon (Vallone et al., 1985) - people supporting one side of an issue think that the media are 
biased towards the other side, and people supporting the other side also think that the media are biased 
against them. Therefore, public'sjudgment of media performance is something to be studied rather than 
taken for granted (Kressel, 1993). 
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Candidates' performance 
Another argument relevant to media performance is that media may have failed 
to cover the election substantively just because there is no substance to cover. 
Actually, for some observers of the 1998 election the election itself is devoid of 
important issues. Then, strategic coverage would become not the fault of the media, 
but politicians and/orthe whole political environment. 
However, a brief analysis of TV candidate debates suggests otherwise. TV 
debates are a part of media content. But different from news reports, journalists do 
not have as large an extent of content control. Debates, together with phone-in talk 
shows and political advertising etc, can be classified as "candidate-controlled 
communication" (Just et al., 1996). These channels are characterized by lower levels 
of "mediation," which can be defined as a process in which the original message is 
reshaped and its meanings altered as a result (Zaller and Hunt, 1994). In this sense, 
TV debates are a place where candidates can get their message across in a more 
direct way. As candidates are more autonomous on these "platforms," we can have a 
rough assessment of candidates' performance in the election, and this assessment 
can serve as a reference point in discussing about media's strategic coverage. 
Both RTHK, ATV, and Cable TV organized debates during the 1998 election. ‘ 
Only RTHK's debates will be analyzed". RTHK has organized altogether 15 TV 
debates for the direct elections, which totally amounted to 10 hours of programming. 
Every geographical constituency has one one-hour debate and two half-an-hour 
question and answer"sessions. Orfthe whole, the formats of RTHK's TV debates fit 
33 The five forums organized by ATV have fewer audiences when compared with RTHK's debate 
since they were shown in the afternoon and after mid-night on Sundays. Cable TV has organized totally 
450 minutes of debates for the geographical and the function constituencies. These debates are also 
excluded since the penetration of Cable TV is still limited in Hong Kong, as only about 360,000 
households in Hong Kong have subscribed it. On the other hand, RTHK's 11.5 hours of televised 
debates were broadcast on TVB's Jade, the most popular television channel, in evening time slots on 
Saturdays and Sundays. They have attracted an audience of 15 to 18 points, amounted to about 1 
million viewers, which is only half the audience size for TVB's primetime soap operas. The comparison 
between soap operas and debates should not lead us to conclude that debates are meaningless. As 
pointed out earlier debates organized according to constituencies may restrict the amount of audience 
since every debate is relevant to audiences only in certain districts. 
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into the general category of "candidate-controlled communication" due to the small 
amount of intervention by the media^^. 
Whether debates can convey meaningful information depends first on the topics 
discussed. Newspaper coverage was shown to have focused on the strategic 
aspects of the elections, but TV debates are different. There were more topics on 
policy issues ranging from current issues like the fall of the property market to long 
standing controversies like the pace of democratization. We can also hear a 
considerable number of policy issues that are seldom seriously discussed in Hong 
Kong, like anti-trust law, minimum wage regulation etc. These issues may fail to 
become the focus of discussion in the debates, but the debates did provide a 
platform for different candidates to speak out before the public. 
Of course, whether the discussions are meaningful is a question more about the 
way the candidates discussed. Candidates were less prone to resort to strategic 
narrative. However, due to their interests in presenting themselves in good light, they 
will certainly adopt debating strategies. Together with the other restraints, there are 
severe limitations restricting what debates can achieve and communicate to the 
34 At the beginning of the one-hour debate, the supporters of each candidate list had around 10 to 15 i 
seconds for promotion. Then, the host would raise questions for discussions. Candidates answered ‘ 
questions and discussed as they like. The host was responsible for the basic "order" of the discussion. 
Usually, candidates signaled the hosts and the host would announce which one to speak. However, the 
host did not control the "order" very strictly. Therefore, candidates' interrupting each other was not 
uncommon. The host was also responsible for leading the discussion by raising follow-up questions at 
times. 
At the beginning of the third quarter of the one-hour program, the candidates would have time to 
present themselves by referring to a tool that they selected before the debate. The "tools" were 
p/epared by the programmer and included things ranging from a skeleton to telephone etc.. Together 
with the supporters' promotion at the beginning of the^debate, we can see the entertainment elements 
injected into the debates. However, the amount of these elements was not overwhelming. Also, even in -
the "self-presentation with tools" section, candidates may still present serious things regardless the tools 
in their hands. Debates on various issues continued until the end of the fourth quarter. Time was 
reserved for conclusions by the candidates. 
It can be noted that the host's intervention into the debate process was not very large in the one-
hour debate format except the crucial role of"agenda-setting." The host was required to control the flow 
of the program so that a basic order would be maintained, and several programming necessities were 
met. Also, the government requested the "equal-time rule" to be observed on the debates, that is, every 
candidate list should have equal time for speaking. Thus the' host had to stop candidates if they have 
used up the time. 
The Q&A sessions further minimized the host's role by letting candidates to raise questions for 
their opponents. Every candidate list had an equal time period to be questioned, but the "equal-time 
rule" was not enforced on the questioning side. The host raised questions only if no candidate asked 
questions. For Kowloon East and West, which had only a few candidate lists, only one Q&A session was 
organized in the above way. The second had two "public affairs commentators" as guest questioners. 
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public. 
It should be acknowledged that candidates did give some "concrete proposals" 
on issues. However, as candidates are vying for the seats of LegCo only, the 
candidates can never promise that the policy can be implemented. They also need to 
gain their opponents' cooperation if they want to have a chance to force the 
government in doing something. All candidates, then, have the interest in presenting 
themselves as willing to cooperate with their opponents. This further blurred the 
distinctions between the candidates. 
If future policy issues were not discussed extensively, voters can count on past 
records of the candidates to distinguish which one is better. Candidates themselves 
also recognized the importance of past records and they constantly raised questions 
to other candidates' past. These discussions constituted the bulk of interactions 
between the candidates on the TV debates. We can consider the following example: 
Lau (DP) : ……For instance, do you believe the Provisional Legislature have 
protected the interests of workers? Do you believe the business 
people would consider? 
Wan (DAB): Mr. Lau. You always say you work for the workers, but in some 
recent issues we did not notice your presence, including closing of 
Yaoham's, employees of Wing On Department Store being laid 
down, and closing of Maria's Bakery. We only see Chan Yuen-han 
[from the DAB] working for the workers. So are you thinking that 
you already won the election and do not have to consider labor's 
rights and their "rice bowls"? 
t a u (DP) ': Thank you Mr Wan. I am now working on other issues. Those 
- 二 » 
issues [you raised] have other people working on them, thus I 
work on others. There are many things to do for the labors. The 
problem is not only a few companies' problems. 1 appreciate your 
efforts on them, but 
Wan (DAB): In 1996，in the previous LegCo, you proposed to forbid the "hand-
dug caisson," that really broke the "rice bowls" of more than 5,000 
workers, and make their more than 20,000 family members to 
"have no rice to eat" 
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Lau (DP): But we cannot ignore the safety issues besides the "rice bowls." 
Wan (DAB): ......That's not protecting the "rice bowls," that's breaking them. 
Lau (DP): 丨 was afraid that they may even lose their life, they should concern 
for safety. 
Fung (ADPL):丨 also want to ask Lau, in previous LegCo, regarding 
unemployment aids and security ordinance, the DP opposed. 
That's actually breaking the "rice bowls" of the labors. Especially 
relevant is the security ordinance. Why didn't you protest at that 
time and request DP to support our stands? 
• Lau (DP): In the security ordinance issue, there is a matter of protecting the 
aged and the safety issues in this sector. All people know how I 
voted at that time,丨 also want to respond to Mr Wan...... 
Fung (ADPL): So how did DP vote? 
Lau (DP): you [Mr Wan] mentioned whether we offer help when several 
department stores closed, but there also is a related issue, that is 
collective bargaining. If you have supported collective bargaining, 
then we can help the labors to negotiate with the company on 
whether laying down employers is reasonable. But you opposed 
[collective bargaining]. As a result, employers do not have the 
chance to negotiate with employees…… 
Wan (DAB): On the issue of "hand-dug caisson," did you seek advice from 
workers within the sector ； 
From the example we can see that there were various issues raised by the 
parties and past records were the focus of discussion. However, it does not mean 
that they are discussed in a meaningful way. Actually, due to the hectic exchange 
between the candidates and the limited time available candidates did not explain 
clearly and deeply abqut the issues involved. As a result, unless'a viewef has the 
‘ . 
relevant background knowledge s/he could not understand what the issues "hand-
dug caisson," security ordinance, and collective bargaining involve. 
Besides, candidates did not have their only goal as engaging in enlightened 
» 
debate on issues. They had the interests in presenting themselves in good light and 
attacking others. Thus at various points they just avoided addressing questions 
directly. Thus Lau said everybody knows how he voted, which the public probably 
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has never known, and when Fung further questioned the vote of DP, Lau just turned 
away and started an attack on DAB above their opposition to collective bargaining. 
.DAB 'S candidate also decided to avoid the question and continued to stress the 
"hand-dug caisson" issue, which Lau in turn disregarded. As a result, the exchange 
ended in Lau and Wan's speaking simultaneously, but on different matters. 
Another limitation of the debates is that many facts, and sometimes 
contradictory facts, were claimed by the candidates but remained unverified, like 
Lau's and DP's voting record in the above example. On the whole, from the debates 
we see that part o f the problem of election communication began from the politicians' 
side. However, it does not mean that the media are not responsible. Candidates did 
raise more substantive issues and concerns. And they engaged in some, if not 
detailed, discussions. Nevertheless, from the newspaper coverage we saw not only 
the absence of extension of the discussions on issues but an overwhelming 
coverage of strategies and conflicts. Media's strategic coverage is only partially 
arising from the lack of substance of the election itself. 
Concluding remarks 
It has been shown that strategic coverage was largely present on newspapers 
during the 1998 LegCo election. The problem of strategic coverage was discussed 
with considerations about the importance of the narrative aspect of the coverage and 
its consequences on the coverage of substantive information. Three particular 
产 ‘ 
themes were discussed. It is contended that strategic coverage deriatures 
candidates' actions and campaign events, restricts the scope of substantive 
information included, and transforms the meanings of the information included. 
Possible linkages between effects found in previous chapters and strategic 
coverage are suggested. It may be argued that the media in the 1998 election, 
though contributed to voter turnout by providing knowledge to the public, can actually 
do better. In this sense, media have failed to utilize their potential to inform the public. 
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It should also be noted that informed participation is not only a matter ofquantity, 
that is, amount of information and amount of participation, but also a matter ofquality. 
Thus the media can further contribute to informed political participation by 
desseminating more substantive and useful information to the public. The effects are 
not necessarily in the form of increasing the turnout rate but of helping the voters to 
make an "intelligent choice." 
Some alternative arguments are briefly discussed in this chapter. It is pointed 
out that the alternative explanation of media's negative effects that media 
demobilized the public by portraying the election as undemocratic is not likely to be 
valid, since the coverage during the campaign did not provide an extensive 
discussion on the matter. For strategic coverage itself, it is pointed out that the 
public's judgment about media performance on providing information is not as 
negative as the content analysis shows. But it is also argued that the public's 
judgment should be taken with caution. Finally, a brief analysis of TV debates show 
that the performance of candidates is partly responsible for the lack of substance of 
the election coverage. But not all blame can be put on the candidates themselves. _ 
In sum, it is suggested that strategic coverage is a problem in media coverage 
of 1998 LegCo election. It is also a very probable cause behind some of the media 
effects found. Then, after all the empirical analysis, what can we conclude about 





X. Conclusion: Mass media and political participation in Hong 
Kong 
Democratization in Hong Kong has been a heated topic of debate and certainly 
will remain to be in the foreseeable future. As Hong Kong is not an independent polity, 
democratization has suffered from restraints imposed upon by the Chinese and 
British governments in the past. According to the Basic Law Hong Kong will not have 
a fully elected LegCo and a directly elected Chief Executive until after 2007. It even 
does not need an extremely skeptical person in Hong Kong to doubt whether direct 
elections of the LegCo and CE will be realized after that year. This is because any 
suggestions regarding amending the Basic Law, and after 2007, changing the 
political system of Hong Kong, have to go through a set of procedures that are filled 
with possibilities of rejection. 
On the one hand, the prominence of these structural constraints may have 
imposed upon the Hong Kong public a kind of inefficacious feeling that discussions 
on democratization are meaningless. Paradoxically, these structural constraints also 
make the public voice even more crucial in Hong Kong's quest for a more democratic 
system. Democratization, when started in the 1980s, was imposed upon by the 
British government supported only by a certain portion of elites and a minority in the 
public. But after more than 10 years of development, when the time came to the 
二 handover, democratization has already become a goal of the majority. Although the 
actual content of the"concept of democracy may be different in textbooks and in 
Hong Kong people's mind (see Kuan and Lau, 1995). a political system featured by 
more institutionalized ways for public opinions expression and a more accountable 
political leadership are certainly what the public wants. 
In a recent article, Kuan (1998) argues that a political society, defined as a 
space mediating between the state and the civil society, has already been formed in 
Hong Kong and the Chinese government's wish to de-politicize Hong Kong has 
% 
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become unrealistic. Democratization has set up its pace and it can at best be tamed 
but not reversed or destroyed. The development of elections, parties and interest 
groups are identified as important for further democratization. Kuan (1998) also 
stated, 
the development of the mass media will affect the future health of the 
political society in Hong Kong. The scope of the public sphere in which 
political discourse is conducted will shrink to the extent that the freedoms of 
expression and communication are abridged, (p.1442) 
In a broad sense, this study is developed based on the concern for the political 
development in Hong Kong, especially the role of media in it. It has taken the 1998 
LegCo election as a case to see whether media have contributed to electoral 
participation. The concern regarding media is not the freedom of the press as 
mentioned by Kuan (1998), though it is undoubtedly important. However, as critiques 
of media in the developed democracies have pointed out, a free media system does 
not necessarily contribute to democracy. These criticisms have come from critical 
scholars who argue that the media are only serving as an arm of the dominant group 
to rule. But the criticisms have also come from scholars upholding their beliefs in 
liberal democracies. They pointed out that the media have devalued and trivialized 
politics by their coverage of political issues and events. This research, following the 
second line of criticisms, tries to achieve an understanding of to what extent and in 
what ways the media have contributed to or been detrimental for political 
participation in Hong Kong. 
广 * 
Media effects in the 1998 election 
To evaluate media's role in activating informed participation in the 1998 election, 
media effects are analyzed to see in what ways media are related to political 
attitudes, knowledge and voterturnout. On the whole, media do contribute to political 
I 
knowledge. But the effect on knowledge is significantly larger for the sophisticated 
group than for the non-sophisticated group, producing a knowledge-gap between the 
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two groups of people. Media use and knowledge are shown to be related to political 
attitudes in a relatively limited way. Again, sophisticated and non-sophisticated 
people exhibit different patterns of relationship among the variables. The 
sophisticated people have more relationships between knowledge and attitudes than 
the non-sophisticated ones, suggesting that sophisticated people are not only better 
able to absorb knowledge from the media but also better able to relate the 
information to attitudes and evaluations. More specifically, there is a negative 
relationship between knowledge and evaluations towards the parties at the end of 
the election, and the finding is consistent with the analysis of media coverage, which 
suggests that the media have portrayed the candidates and parties in a negative light 
during the election. 
For voter turnout, the logistic regression analysis in Chapter 8 shows that 
knowledge is positively related to turnout while media use itself is negatively related 
to turnout. The negative relationship between media use and turnout is larger for the 
non-sophisticated group. 
Thus media in the election have scored both positive and negative points. 
Media function as an information provider and providing information has helped to 
increase the voter turnout in the election by making people feel more confident and 
interested in making a decision. However, media use is also related negatively to 
turnout, probably through introducing negative affects and feelings towards the 
election in some of the public's mind. Besides, the benefits of knowledge gained from 
产 ‘ 
the media are restricted primarily to the group of people who have the retevant 
background knowledge and a developed schema in their minds. 
Media coverage is then analyzed for giving cues and contexts for understanding 
the causes and implications of the above effects. The analysis has shown that media 
have largely focused on the strategic aspects of the election - who is leading, 
candidates' strategies, campaign events and campaign issues etc. Substantive 
issues, which may be policy issues, candidates' past performance and records, are 
149 
undermined. More important, the "substance" of the election was turned into strategic 
moves and elements by the coverage. 
Is this characterization of the election and the candidates by the media justified? 
The analysis showed that the newspapers failed to differentiate legitimate strategies 
from illegitimate ones, they failed to convey important information at certain points 
and their interpretations were sometimes lack of evidences and facts as grounds. 
The analysis on candidate debates on television further provides cues to evaluate 
the media. Candidates did focus more on the substance of election, and although the 
analysis showed that candidates did not perform perfectly and even showed that 
candidates may really have many strategic goals, the analysis also pointed out that 
the journalists do have many potentially "substantive works" to do, like bringing 
further discussions on the issues raised, verifying candidates' claims on their past 
performances and records etc. 
The need of a more sophisticated public 
There are two major concerns raised by the findings. The first is about the 
public's political sophistication. Unlike early studies about political sophisticaiton in 
the West (Converse, 1964; 1975), this study does not try to determine how 
sophisticated the Hong Kong public is. The sophistication index is only the result of 
an operationalization procedure and we cannot say that a person is sophisticated or 
not in the absolute sense if s/he gets a score of 6 or 7. But, like many studies on 
广 • 
political information processing, this study finds out important differences between 
the sophisticated and non-sophisticated people in terms of their ability to learn 
information, ability to relate information to attitudes, and immunity or susceptibility to 
some media effects. 
< 
On the whole, if the Hong Kong public becomes more sophisticated the 
development of democratic politics will be benefitted. But of course, people's political 
150 
sophistication is not something that can be easily enhanced. What can be said is that 
Hong Kong needs more and better political education for the youngsters. 
Political education is sensitive in Hong Kong recently because in the post-
handover context political education sometimes has the connotation of being related 
to government ideological propaganda. But to say political education is needed, I 
mean an education not aimed at telling people what is right and wrong in political 
matters, but to induce the people to think about such matters. Actually, one of the 
problems of Hong Kong's civic education in secondary schools is its emphasis on 
factual information but not ability to analyze and criticize (Tse, 1997). 
Media can also help in this regard by improving their coverage of political 
matters by inserting more context and background information in their coverage. Of 
course, increasing the public's sophistication may not be media's most important 
responsibility, but this study also has called for concern about media's role in political 
development in Hong Kong. 
Media and political development in Hong Kong 
The results of this study point out that we need a media system that is not only 
free but responsible for its political role and effects so that it would help the political 
development of Hong Kong. This is especially important as Hong Kong's 
democratization is developing within a context that the public has not been socialized 
into democratic politics before. Political parties and interest group politics are not well 
, ‘ 
developed, and there is a modern media system that function as the main 
communication channel and the public arena in the society. With the educational 
system and basic social institutions like the family do not perform the role of political 
socializing agents, the media do not only transmit information but actually help to 
create the basic views of politics and produce the "diffuse support" of the political 
system of the public. 
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In activating informed participation the media are not required to refrain 
themselves from criticizing the election if they have sufficient ground for criticisms. 
But they should help the public to differentiate the desirable from the undesirable, the 
legitimate from the illegitimate etc. If the distinction cannot be easily drawn then the 
media should at least provide the space for discussions about the issue at hand. In 
the case of the 1998 election, the existence of criticisms towards the election itself is 
» ‘ 
not a problem, and any undemocratic character or illegitimacy in the election does 
not free the media fronvits responsibility to activate informed participation in the 
broad sense. Actually, the media could have differentiated the different election 
procedures of the LegCo election clearly and point out the fact that some procedures 
are undemocratic while others are. The media can also provide a forum for the public 
to discuss whether the undesirable parts of the election made the whole election 
illegitimate and thus even the direct election should be condemned. But as argued 
earlier, these discussions are also largely absent on the media during the period. 
Actually, this kind of performance evaluation is not only relevant to electoral politics 
but also other political issues. For instance, it is the same in dealing with the problem 
of the actual functions of LegCo. It can be argued that the LegCo in reality has very 
limited functions due to their limited power in the political system. Here, what 
responsible media should do is to differentiate the real cause behind the 
"uselessness" of LegCo, that is, the executive-led political system, rather than 
blasting the LegCo as a place for "useless talks." 
In the 1998 election it can be said that the media as a whole did not particularly 
help or harm the participation in the election. They provide knowledge, but on the 
other hand provide a distorted picture of the election. But certainly media could have 
done better. If the media continue their way of covering politics and elections as this 
study have shown, a final outcome may be that the public receives a view of 
democratic politics as "useless quarrels." Its negative impacts, including lower levels 
of trust, declining "diffuse support" for the political system, and increasing cynicism, 
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are now being felt by some Western democracies (CappeIla and Jamieson, 1997). 
And the potential effects on a developing democracy like Hong Kong would be the 
failure of the society to develop enough support for democratic politics and basic 
trust towards the political processes and the people involved. 
The performance of the media is also related to the credibility of not only the 
politicians but also of the media themselves. It has been shown that media strategic 
coverage is related to cynicism towards the media (CappeIla and Jamieson, 1997), 
and lead to lower levels of media use (Pinkleton et al., 1998). In Hong Kong it is well 
known that media credibility is on the decline in recent years]，. Though this decline 
may not be directly related to media's political coverage, it cannot be ignored that 
media's political coverage could potentially have impacts on it. Chapter 2 has shown 
that the media still remain the most highly rated "political actor." Media should try to 
retain the public's trust towards them by acting more responsibly. Besides, the lack of 
credibility of the media is dangerous not only because of the level of trust among the 
public itself but also because of the fact that lowered credibility may provide the 
government a rationale for controlling the media. 
All these effects are, of course, speculative, but they are not imaginary fantasies. 
Democracy, meaningful participation, and responsible and free media are what the 
political development of Hong Kong need. They are interrelated and if one does not 
exist, the development of the other two would be inevitably hindered. If we believe 
that the development of a civic culture and a conception of democratic politics that 
«- ‘ 
would be supportive to democratization are crucial, then media are important, 
because from them, the public gets "the pictures in their head." 
Possibilities for improvements? 
« 
35 A research in 1997 and 1998 showed that the credibility ratings of 19 out of 25 media outlets have 
significantly declined from 97 to 98. See Ming Pao, Jan 4 
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It is always easier to criticize what media have done than to suggest what media 
can do. Of course, we can simply say thatjournalists and media organizations should 
acknowledge their roles and responsibilities. They have to re-consider their roles and 
acknowledge their inevitable effects and intervention into the political processes. 
They may not be the primary actors responsible for promoting democracy but they 
are certainly responsible for it, at least in the sense that they have to be responsible 
for the effects of their actions. 
However, in reality we also see that self-discipline seems to be insufficient. On 
the other hand, government regulations are often regarded as opening the door for 
political censorship. Scholarly works on news making have forcefully demonstrated 
how, as long as media are organizations which have the basic pressure of producing 
a product called news everyday, certain habits and ways of news making are virtually 
inevitable (e.g., Tuchman, 1978). Also, as long as media are commercial 
organizations which, if not maximizing profits, at least have to survive, they have to 
produce something that suit the mass' taste and it contributes to basic news values 
like personification, dramatization and simplification. The more convincing these 
arguments and analysis are, the more difficult for us to suggest how it is possible to 
change the existing situation. For some, it is just unrealistic to place hopes on the 
media. Political scientist Thomas Patterson, in his two major books on media in 
election (1980; 1994), argues that the media should not play the central role in an 
electioA. He argues, 
、 ： 
i 
The press is in the news business, not the business of politics, and 
because of this, its norms and imperatives are not those required for the 
effective organization of electoral coalitions and debate. Journalistic values 
and political values are at odds with each other (1994, p.36). 
As a result, it is not surprising in seeing this conclusion of his 1980's book 
The Mass Media Election, 
A workable system must take into account what the people, the parties, and 
the press can and cannot do. However appealing the image of the omni-
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potent public and however attractive the idea of the press as the corrective 
for defective political institutions, these beliefs are not the basis for a sound 
electoral system, (p.181) 
Patterson's arguments represent a very pessimistic view towards the media. 
This pessimistic view may not be totally wrong, but some points about Patterson's 
view should be noted. As a political scientist Patterson is more interested in 
salvaging the election. Thus he argues that reform should be undertaken that the 
campaign is organized for the press instead of by the press (his major suggestion for 
the US case is to shorten the campaign period, but the campaign period in Hong 
Kong is already short enough). However, it is a fact that media are central to social 
and political communication in our society and it is doubtful whether it is possible to 
design an electoral system in a way that make media less central to the campaign 
process but at the same time do not affect the public's participation. Actually, in 
Patterson's point of view the party system would be a better political institution than 
the media, but the development of the American society is just that the media 
replaced the party system as central to electoral campaign. 
I cannot prove the pessimistic view wrong, but we also cannot prove it Vight. 
There are scholars who are more optimistic, or at least not so pessimistic as to 
dismiss all possibilities of change of media performance. McManus (1994), 
concluding his study on market-driven journalism, also states that relying on media 
themselves to recognize their social responsibility is nearly hopeless, but he also 
pointed out that we should move .in the way to change and re-structure the 
- consumers' demand by consumer education and stimulating civic participation. In the 
US in recent years there is also the movement of publicjournalism, which argues for 
a different conception ofjournalism that are presumed to be helpful in bringing about 
more meaningful social and political communications (Merritt, 1998; but see 
Schudson, 1998, for a critique). 
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Regarding the situation in Hong Kong, the author intends to put forward two 
suggestions. The suggestions are only possible routes that can be followed in order 
to search for improvements. They are not well-articulated solutions and they certainly 
are not free from problems, either theoretical or practical. But it is hoped that they 
may stimulate further discussions and suggestions. 
The first suggestion is about what should be the journalistic values. Journalists 
in Hong Kong are not very different from their counterparts in the US in terms of the 
kind ofjournalistic values they uphold. According the Chan et al. (1996), journalists in 
Hong Kong believe that they should be neutral reporters of social issues and events. 
However, as the same time they also think that they have a participant-interpretive 
role to play. Besides, they believe that they should play a watchdog role to check the 
government, and they have an elitist view as they think it is important to educate the 
public and raise the cultural level of masses. The apparent contradiction between the 
neutral-informative role and the participatant-interpretive role lead Chan et al. to 
argue that Hong Kong journalists have a "mixed orientation." However, it can be 
argued that the contradiction pointed out, together with the watchdog and educator 
role, can be understood as belonging to the same paradigm of journalistic norms 
described as the "trustee model" by sociologist Michael Schudson (1998). According 
to Schudson, the most important characteristics of journalistic professional values 
and norms is the assumption that journalists are people entrusted by the public to 
decide what issues and events to cover and how to cover them. They are entrusted 
- : 
- so that'they need to be responsible in the sense that they should not serve as 
propaganda machines for groups and parties (neutral objective reporter), but they 
also have to interpret issues for the public and check government's wrong-doings 
(participant and watchdog), and they think themselves as professional 
communicators that have to inform the public and even educate them (interpreter 
and educator). Schudson argues that the trustee model has the problem of producing 
a group of professional journalists who are accountable to no one. 
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Here the author does not intend to articulate another model of journalism to 
replace the trustee model, but the author believes that journalists should re-think 
about the values they have. For instance, is objectivity necessarily good? Should it 
be replaced by a notion of mature subjectivity, as Schudson argues in his famous 
work Discovering the News? In what sense the public is in need of education and in 
what sense the public's view should be respected? More important, the 
reconsideration ofjournalistic values should take into account the development and 
maintainence of a democratic society as a need. Journalists should acknowledge 
that they are political actors and thus in thinking about their professional norms to 
uphold they must include political values into consideration. 
The second route to improve the situation is related to the development of 
. different program types and genres that allow a more direct and vibrant 
communication between citizens and their leaders. The analysis in Chapter 9 has 
touched on the argument that some candidate-controlled communication (TV 
debates in Chapter 9) can provide a channel for the candidates to communicate with 
the public in a more direct way. There are other such channels of communication 
through the mass media, like phone-in talk shows on radio etc. Some scholars in the 
US have argued that such channels, especially those for the public to express their 
opinions like phone-in talk show, can provide a way for more widespread and 
"unstructured" public deliberation (Herbst, 1995; Carey, 1993). 
In Hong Kong radio phone-in talk shows have increased in prominence in recent 
- -
» 
years. However, whether these talk shows can really bring about more widespread 
and meaningful public communication would depend on the exact way that the 
program is organized and also the actual practices of the media and the public. 
Nevertheless, we can at least argue that a possible way to improve communication 
through the media in an election, and in the political process in general, is to act more 
as platform providers. In other words, the media can serve better by providing an 
uncontrolled and unstructured space for advocacy and deliberation. 
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Let me stress again that these are no panacea for the problem of the kind of 
media effects and performance discussed in the thesis. But it can be noted that 
improvements of the situation require the public and the media to recognize and 
understand media's roles in the political process and the development of democracy 
in Hong Kong. With fierce discussions media coverage of social issues, it should also 
be reminded that media coverage of politics in Hong Kong should also be 
problematized, as media's handling of the political process is at least as important 
and at the same time problematic as how they handle crime news or other social . 
events. 
As a research this study has followed the advice given by some scholars to 
analysis both effects and content, and to link up normative and empirical concerns. 
As Chapter 1 discussed, media performance and effects are closely related. What 
can also be added, but absent from this study, is the question how journalists in 
Hong Kong do their job. What are the constraints they faced? What are the routines 
of Hong Kong political journalists? How they negotiate and build up relationships with 
their sources? These questions are largely remained unanswered. It is not necessary 
to list possible future research topics, for it can be a very long list. But the author 
hopes that this study have pointed out the importance of thinking about what our 
media have done on the political development of our society. 
- Z- * 
• 
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Appendix A: Variable constructions and statistical procedures 
This appendix would inform the readers about the construction and 
transformation of the major variables used throughout the analysis. Information given 
in the main text will not be repeated. The order of the variables discussed here is 
according to their order of appearance in the analysis in the main text. 
Media attention and exposure 
The idea that attention and exposure are two distinct dimensions of media use 
is supported by a factor analysis. Due to a relatively large number of missing cases in 
the factor analysis, the factor scores derived in the analysis are not used. Instead, 
attention is calculated by taking the mean of the three questions related to news 
media attention. To eliminate missing cases. Several steps are taken. First, as the 
three variables are highly correlated, it can be argued that attention to news is a 
stable individual attribute regardless of the particular medium one is exposing to. 
Thus, when a respondent has a missing value in one attention variable, the mean of 
the other two is taken as the media attention score for the person. If two medium-
attention variables are missing, the remaining one is used. If all three medium 
attention variables are missing, then there are two possibilities. The first possibility is 
that the respondent was not exposed to any news, in this case his/her attention score 
will be 0, since s/he cannot be said as having paid any attention to news. If at least 
one of the medium exposure variables is not missing, then his/her attention score will 
be recoded as the mean of all other respondents attention score. 
Exposure to news media is computed by adding the three exposure variables 
together. All missing values in the medium-exposure variables are recoded as the 
mean of their respective variables before the addition process. 
Level ofdifferentiation (sophistication) '' 
Six questions ask the respondents to place political parties on two dimensions. 
Respondents have to place the Frontier, Association of Democracy and People's 
Livelihood (ADPL), and the Hong Kong Progressive Union (HKPU), on whether they 
favor faster pace of democracy in Hong Kong or not, by means of a Likert scale with 
5 representing strongly supportive and 1 strongly opposing. Frontier is strongly 
supporting faster democracy and openly asking for amending the Basic Law to speed 
up democratization. The ADPL supports democracy to a certain extent, but unlike 
other democratic groups in Hong Kong they participated in various organizations 
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endorsed by the Chinese government like the Provisional Legislature. And though 
they support amending the Basic Law, they do not adopt a high profile approach on 
this issue. The HKPU, one of the largest parties in the Provisional Legislature, 
consists of mostly pro-China businesspersons. They are the least supportive for 
democracy among the three. 
Besides, the respondents have to place the Democratic Party (DP), the ADPL 
and the Liberal Party (LP) on a dimension of whether they are closer to the 
grassroots or closer to business interests in economic issues. The LP, consists of 
many businesspersons, is closest to the business side. In fact, in the 1998 LegCo 
elections the LP did not win any seats through direct elections in the geographical 
constituencies. But they did have a couple of legislators won in functional 
consistuencies, showing their support from the business and commercial sectors. 
The DP and the ADPL are both pro-grassroots. The ADPL, however, was a social 
organization having a longer history than most of the other current political parties in 
Hong Kong. Before the development of party politics in Hong Kong it was actually a 
residents organization focusing its works on livelihood issues on certain low income 
districts, especially Sham Shui Po in Kowloon. In the 1998 LegCo election they also 
used the slogan "grassroots cannot lose." On the other hand, the DP did not have 
this root in grassroot social movements and in the 1998 LegCo election one of their 
campaign messages is to rebuild the middle class. Thus the ADPL is thought as 
closer to the grassroots than the DP. 
A correct comparison scores 2 and a wrong one scores 0. In deciding whether a 
comparison is correct, only the relative placement is taken into account. This method 
has several advantages (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997) over determining a fixed 
"correct" placement for each party. Missing cases or no difference in relative 
placement score 1. People may have a lot of missing values if they do not answer 
just two or three out of the six original questions. And conceptually speaking, whether 
- people have formulated ideas about where the parties stand is an important aspect 
of the knowledge structure. Adjusting for this, \he number of "don't ‘knows" was 
subtracted by the total comparison score derived above. The final score ranges from 
0 to 12 and constitutes the measure of level of differentiation, that is, whether a 
person can differentiate the relative positions of parties on the two issue dimensions. 
It represents one's level of political sophistication in this research. 
« 
Interaction between sophistication and communication behavior 
The interactions between communication variables and level of differentiation 
are computed by following the argument of Smith and Sasaki (1979) in reducing the 
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multi-collinearity of the resulting interaction variable and the original variables. The 
method is not exactly what Smith and Sasaki (1979) proposed, however. For a 
conceptually close but practically much more simpler method, the calculation used 
follows Aiken and West (1991) and Pan et al. (1994): 
Interaction between a and b = (a - mean of a) X (b - mean of b) 
The multi-collinearity of the interaction variable and the original ones will be 
reduced to a large extent by this method, though by no means eliminated. 
Civic awareness and attitudes towards political participation 
Following the factor analysis as shown in the text, variables of civic awareness 
and attitudes towards political participation are constructed by averaging the relevant 
statements. To avoid a large number of missing values, the averaging process used 
the MEAN.1 method again. The resulting variables still have 41 (sense of duty and 
rights) to 73 (attitudes towards political parties) missing cases. When used in 
regression analysis or used as control variable in partial correlation analysis, the 
remaining missing cases are replaced by the mean of the respective variable to 
avoid a large number of missing cases. 
Separation of high and low sophistication groups 
In separating high and low sophistication groups, the knowledge levels of the 
two groups are kept roughly equal. The procedure is to divide people into 10 groups 
first according to the percentile of their total knowledge levels. Then within each 
group people are further divided into sophisticated and non-sophisticated by splitting 
at the median of the group's sophistication score. The resulting 10 sophistication 
groups and 10 non-sophistication groups are added respectively. The two resulting 
groups do not differ significantly on their total knowledge levels. By this method, the 
high sophistication group has 609 respondents while the low sophistication group 
has 617 respondents. 
- 二 ‘ 
Performance evaluations 
In June survey respondents were asked to give marks from 0 to 10 to rate the 
performance of the government, DP, DAB, LP, ADPL, the parties and candidates in 
general, and the election as a whole. The two questions about performance 
evaluations of the government and the election are used directly as the two 
respective performance evaluation variables. Performance evaluation of political 
parties and candidates, on the other hand, involve calculating the mean of the 5 
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questions asking respondents to rate particular political parties and in general. The 
MEAN.1 method is used to reduce the number of missing cases. Like in the case of 
civic awareness and attitudes towards political institutions, the performance 
variables' missing cases are recoded as mean of the respective variable. The 
"recoded" variables, which have no missing cases, are used when they are the 
independent variables and the "unrecoded" ones, which have some missing cases, 
are used when they are the dependent variables. 
Since the scale ranges from 0 to 10, some people may give marks centre 
around a high value or centre around a low value. Also, some may give greatly 
varying answers to different questions while some may give more or less the same 
evaluations for different questions. The amount of variance of each individual in 
giving the answers for these 7 questions is calculated by using the standard 
deviation formula. That is, a person's answers to the 7 questions are taken as 7 
values to be inserted into the standard deviation formula. As a result, every individual 
who has given two or more answers in the 7 questions is given a score by the 
procedure. Those remaining few who did not have a score (due to 6 or 7 don't know's 
in those questions) are given a score equal to the mean of all the other individuals' 
score. This is the amount of variation in evaluations. 
Weighting of cases 
The weighting procedure is designed to tackle the problem that in the survey 
82% of respondents reported voting, which is far higher than the government record 
of 53%. It is argued that the discrepancy can be due to flaws in government record, 
sample bias, and response bias. It is impossible to know the exact extent of the three 
problems and it is not possible to fully correct them. But the goal of weighting is to 
make the weighted sample one that would be as close to the actual population as 
possible. Two assumptions are involved in the weighting procedure. First, overall 
speaking,^sample bias is the largest problem in the sense that it is likely to account 
~ for the bulk of the discrepancy between the government record andthe survey result. ‘ 
Second, for the response bias problem, self-reported non-voters did not tell lies, only 
the self-reported voters may have told lies. These two arguments point to the same 
direction: to make the sample more "realistic," the general way is to increase the 
weight of the self-reported non-voters while reduce that of self-reported voters. 
I 
Since there is no uncontroversial procedure to identify individual by individual 
the probability of having biased one's response. All self-reported voters are given the 
same weight, and anotherweight for all self-reported non-voters. 
Then, to what extent should we increase the weight of the self-reported non-
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voters? The only available standard seems to be government's record of a 53% 
turnout. Thus, the goal of the weighting procedure is to make the turnout rate of the 
weighted sample to be 53%. The calculations are as follow: 
In original sample: 
non-voters * value on "turnout" + voters * values on ‘‘turnout” 
=107*0 + 452*1 
=82% 
The desired weighted sample: 
non-voters * weight(NV) * value on "turnout" + voters * weight (V) * value on turnout 
二 53% 
That is: 
107 • weight (NV) * 0 + 452 * weight (V) * 1 = 53% 
452 * weight (V) = 53% 
Therefore, weight (V) = 0.6555 
Since in weighting a sample, the sample size of the original sample and the weighted 
sample should remain constant, so 
452 * weight (V) + 107 * weight (NV) = 559 
Therefore, weight (NV) = 2.4553 
The weighting procedure itself is simply like the procedure a research would use 
to weight a sample derived by disproportionate stratified sampling. In this case it is a 
procedure mainly used to correct for the sample bias. Of course, if we see the 
procedure as one correcting for sample bias, than it can be argued that the sample 
bias is over-corrected. It is because, as pointed out, the official record may also be 
wrong and lower than the actual turnout rate. Thus making non-voters amount to 
47% of the weighted sample may over-represent them. However, it would be too 
arbitrary to choose another standard otherthan 53%. 
Although the procedure is mainly a method to treat sample bias, response bias 
is also partially corrected if we accept the assumption that the self-reported non-
I 
voters are not likely to have told lies. In other words, sample bias is corrected, 
response bias is partially corrected, and government records' flaw is not corrected 
and the existence of the flaw would cause over-correction problem to the above 
procedure. 
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standardization ofindependent variables 
One trouble in using logistic regression in SPSS is that the output only gives 
unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. The unstandardized coefficients are 
heavily dependent on the measurement scale of the variables. For instance, the 
unstandardized regression coefficient of news exposure in the model in Chapter 8 
never exceed 0.01, but it is significantly related to voter turnout. It is because 
exposure is measured in minutes and an increase in one minute, of course, would 
not bring about a large increase in the probability of turnout even if exposure is a 
significant factor. Thus, the unstandardized coefficients are problematic because 
they are not clear enough and they do not allow comparisons among coefficients. 
To facilitate comparisons one can turn the unstandardized logistic regression 
coefficients into standardized coefficients by using certain formulas (Menard, 1995). 
A more convenient method is to standardize the independent variables first before 
adding them into the regression model. The standardization procedure is: 
SD var. = (unSD var. - mean of unSD var.)/standard deviation of unSD var. 
, • 
、 . - 二 
• 
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Appendix B Questionnaires and basic information about the data 
The following will give the questionnaires used in the research with the 
appropriate information, either frequency distribution or descriptive statistics, of the 
data. 




Mean: 42.36 minutes S.D.: 30.84 Valid cases: 1200 
係蹄電視新聞的時候，你對香港的政治新聞有幾留意呢，你係不留意，頗不留 
意，普通，頗留意，定係留意呢？ 
1 你係不留意 0^=46，valid percentage: 4.0%) 
2 頗不留意 0^=129，validpercentage: 11.2%) 
3 普通 0^1=574，valid percentage: 49.7%) 
4 頗留意 0^=302，valid percentage: 26.1%) 
5 定係留意 GM=104, valid percentage: 9.0%) 
9 沒答 /不知道 0^=71) 
請問你每曰平均大約會花幾多時間聽電台的新聞報道呢？ 
Mean: 24.70 minutes S.D.: 36.72 Valid cases: 1168 
係收聽電台新聞的時候，你對香港的政治新聞有幾留意呢？你係不留意，頗不 
留意，普通，頗留意，定係留意呢？ 
1 你係不留意 0Sf=27, valid percentage: 4.2%) 
2 頗不留意 0^=98，validpercentage: 15.4%) 
3 普通 0^=279，valid percentage: 43.9%) 
4 頗留意 0^=168, valid percentage: 26.4%) 
5 定係留意 0^=64，validpercentage: 10.1%) 
9 沒答 /不知道 ¢[=590) - . 
請問你每日平均大約會花幾多時間蹄報紙的新聞報道呢？ 
Mean: 34.71 minutes S.D.: 30.79 Valid cases: 1196 
通常你每日會蹄幾多份報紙呢？ • 
Mean: 1.26 S.D.: 0.585 Valid cases: 1016 
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請問你最常蹄的報紙係邊一份呢？ 
明報0^=80) 成報0^=43) 信報(>1=4) 文匯報0^=1) 
東方日報 ( N = 3 9 3 )經濟日報0^=24)大公報0^=0) SCMP0^=11) 
頻果日報0^=360) HONGKONGSTANDARJXN=0) 新報 (^=13) 
天天日報0^=35)商報 (N=2 ) 其他0^=2力 沒答0^=221) 
係蹄報紙的時候，你對香港的政治新聞有幾留意呢？你係不留意，頗不留意， 
普通，頗留意，定係留意呢？ 
1 你係不留意 0^=62，valid percentage: 6.1%) 
2 頗不留意 0^=168，validpercentage: 16.6%) 
3 普通 0^=488, valid percentage: 48.2%) 
4 頗留意 Gsf=209, valid percentage: 20.7%) 
5 定係留意 CN=85, valid percentage: 8.4%) 
9 沒答 /不知道 0^=214) • 
係蹄報紙的時候，你對一0評論文章’包括社論，專欄同埋論壇文章，又有幾 
留意呢？你係不留意，頗不留意，普通，頗留意，定係留意呢？ 
1 你係不留意 0sf=150, validpercentage: 14.9%) 
2 頗不留意 0^=260, vaiid percentage: 25.7%) 
3 普通 G^=338, valid percentage: 33.5%) 
4 頗留意 ¢"^=214, valid percentage:21.2%) 
5 定係留意 0^=48，valid percentage: 4.8%) 
9 沒答 /不知道 0^=216) 
而家各電台都有一0接聽聽眾電話的時事討論節目，例如九十年代，風波裏的 
茶杯等，請問你有無收聽呢？你係經常收聽，有時會收聽，好少聽，定係完全 
不聽[1_^  ？ 
1 經常 0^=201, valid percentage: 16.6%) 
2 有時 0^=351, valid percentage: 29.0%) 
3 好少 0^=262, valid percentage:21.7%) 
4 不聽 OJ=393, valid percentage: 32.5%) 




1 經常 0^=261，valid percentage:21.4%) 
2 有時 （N=650,validpercentage:53.3%) 
3 好少 ^^=222，validpercentage: 18.2%) 
4 不聽 0^=87, valid percentage: 7.1%) 




1 經常 0^=66，valid percentage: 5.5%) 
2 有時 （N=429, valid percentage: 35.0%) 
3 好少 0^=436，valid percentage: 35.6%) 
4 不聽 OJ=293, valid percentage: 23.9%) 
9 沒答 /不知道 （N=2) 
特區政府現正爲立法會選舉宣傳’包括有海報，單張，廣告_，你最近有無留 
意到口!0宣傳呢？你係經常留意到’間中見到，好少留意到，定係未見過呢？ 
1 經常 0^=348，valid percentage: 28.6%) 
2 .有時 0^=366，valid percentage: 30.1%) 
3 好少 （N=426, valid percentage: 35.0%) 
4 不聽 0^=77，valid percentage: 6.3%) 
9 沒答 /不知道 0^^=1(¾ 
請問你係今次選舉入面係唔係已經登記左成爲選民呢？ 
1 係 0^=365，valid percentage: 30.0%) 
2 否 0sf=851, valid percentage: 70.0%) 
9 沒作答 （N=10) 
係五月你會不會去投票呢？係一定會，好可能會，一半一半，大槪不會’定係 
―定不會呢？ 
1 —定會 0^=370, valid percentage: 43.9%) 
2 好可能 0^=164, validpercentage: 19.5%) 
3 可能 0^=236, valid percentage: 28.0%) 
4 大槪不 （N=42，valid percentage: 5.0%) 
5 ―定不會 （N=30，valid percentage: 3.6%) 
9 沒作答 0^=384) 
係九五年立法局選舉的時候，你係唔係合資格選民呢？ 
1 係 0^二969，valid percentage: 80.7%) 
2 否 （N=232,validpercentage:19.3o/o) 
9 沒作答 -0^=25) 
一 • 
你當年有無投票呢？ 、 
1 有 0^=533, valid percentage: 56.2%) 
2 無 0^=416’ valid percentage: 43.8%) 











公民有權利透過不同方式表達自己的意見�（m e a n = 3 . 9 5 , S.D.=0.59,N=1126) 
參與公共事務係公民應負的責任 ° (mean=3.89, S.D=0.60, N=1127) 
香港政府並唔能夠對民意作出回應。 （mean=3.20, S.D=0.90, N=1067) 
如果我無得投票，我會覺得我的權利被剝削。（mean=3.52, S.D=0.99,N=1110) 
普通市民唔能夠掌握香港政治。 （mean=3.53, S.D=0.89,N=1106) 
一位公民有責任遵守法律。 (mean=4.15, S.D=0.64, N=1170) 
投票係一種向政府表達意見的有效方法。 （mean=3.55, S.D.=0.87, N=1115) 
你對一般的公共事務非常熟悉0 (mean=2.75, S.D=0.81,N=1151) 
香港市民無能力影響政府的政策0 (mean=3.16, S.D=1.02, N=1106) 
除非會影響我的利益，否則我無需要去投票�（mean=2.55, S.D.=0.94,N=1113) 
香港的選舉太複雜，令我感到難以理解。 (mean=3.19, S .D=1.00,N=1109) 
―位公民應有權參與政治� （mean=3.85, S.D.=0.69, N=1117) 
你對五月的選舉感興趣。 (mean=3.05, S .D=0.96,N=1128) 








1 民建聯 0^=424，percentage: 34.6%) 
2 其他 t . 
“9 不答 ‘ -
周梁淑儀係邊一個政黨的成員？ 
1 自由黨 0^1=544，percentage: 44.4%) 
2 其他 
9 不答 . 
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民主民生協進會的主席係邊個？ 



























1 港進聯 (N=120, percentage: 9.8%) - : 

















1 民協 0^=479, percentage: 39.1%) 
2 其他 ‘ 
9 不答 
民主黨係由邊兩個組織合倂而成呢？ 
1 港同盟’匯點 0^=67，percentage: 5.5%) 




1 全對（民主黨，民建聯，自由黨）0^=255，percentage: 20.8%) 
2 對兩個 0^=324, percentage: 26.4%) 




































1 NTWest 新界西 G^=207,validpercentage:16.9%) 
2 NTEast 新界東 0^=114，valid percentage: 9.3%) 
3 Kowloon East 九龍東 （>J=203,validpercentoge:16.6o/o) 
4 Kowloon West 九龍西 P^=108,validpercenmge:8.8%) 
5 Hong Kong Island 港島區 0^=179，validpercentage: 14.6%) 





請問你所屬選區係五月直選中有幾多議席呢？ _ : 




36 Due to a mistake in setting up the questionnaire in the computer system, there was a failure in this 
filtering question (POLlTA, POLITB, and POLITC). Thus the question was not used in the analysis and 













1 非 常 不 支 持 
2 不 支 持 
3 普 通 
4 支 持 
5 非 常 支 持 
Mean: 3.36 S.D.: 0.72 Valid cases: 929 
帽 線 呢 ？ 
Mean: 3.75 S.D.: 0.83 Valid cases: 867 
港進聯又點呢？ 
Mean: 3.01 S.D.: 0.76 Valid cases: 676 
口甘你自己的立場又係點呢？ 






： 4 接近工商界 、 
5 非常接近工商界 _ “ ‘ 
9 沒作答 T 
Mean: 2.66 S.D.: 0.83 Valid cases: 925 
口甘自由黨呢？ 
Mean: 3.56 S.D.: 0.90 Valid cases: 939 
口甘民主黨呢？ 
Mean: 2.27 S.D.: 0.81 Valid cases: 950 
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!^你自己的立場又係點呢？ 
Mean: 2.39 S.D.: 0.79 Valid cases: 1043 
係香港有無一個政黨或政治團體你係特別支持的呢？ 
1 有 0^=402, valid percentage: 33.9%) 
2 無 0Sf=784, valid percentage: 66.1%) 










1 非常高 0^=151’ valid percentage: 37.6%) 
2 高 0^=163，valid percentage: 40.5%) 
3 一般 （N=88， valid percentage:37.6%)" 









整體來講’五月的競選將會係公平的� （mean=3.35, S .D=0.89,N=1031) 
女£果五月立法會選舉成功，將會增加港人 
信心 ° (mean=3.18, S.D.=0.86, N=1044) 
今次選舉對香港整體發展好重要。 （mean=3.54, S.D.=0.78, N=1085) 
- 特區政府未能有效卩甘解決香港的社會問題0 (mean=3.49, S .D=0.85,N=1100) ： 
政府的高層都係爲公眾利益而工作。 - ( m e a n = 3 . 2 0 , S .D=0.91,N=1100) 
選舉同埋市民的生活有密切的關係° (mean=3.43, S.D.=0.87,N=1121) 
五月選舉出來的立法會合法性無容置疑。 （mean=3.42, S.D.=0.86, N=999) 
香港的政黨有鮮明的政治立場� （mean=3.12, S .D=0.89,N=1046) 
五月的立法會選舉對香港民主進程有正面的 
幫助。 ‘(mean=3.41, S.D=0.84, N=1048) 
香港的政黨會爲左爭取選票而改變立場� （mean=3.44, S.D=0.87, N=1015) 
選舉只係政客爭取名利的方法’對小市民意 
義不大 ° (mean=3.14, S.D.=0.98, N=1080) 
特區政府係一個真正由港人治港的政府� （mean=3.11, S.D.=0.96, N=1090) 
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香港的政黨只有係選舉的時候先至會著重 
民意 o (mean=3.37, S.D=0.92, N=1079) 
特區政府並唔算係一個民主的政府 ° (mean=3.09, S.D.=0.92, N=1067) 
今次選舉對香港的政治發展好重要 ° (mean=3.51, S.D=0.80,N=1063) 
中國政府並無干預特區政府的運作� （mean=3.11, S.D.=0.99,N=1041) 
特區政府而家給予市民的民主自由程度令你 
感到滿意 ° (mean=3.25, S.D=0.83,N=1109) 
特區政府係處理民生問題上係有效率的。 (mean=2.88, S.D=0.87,N=1091) 
一般來講，香港市民應該信任特區政府� （mean=3.53, S.D=0.79,N=1118) 





1 10000 以下 0^=185，validpercentage: 16.5%) 
2 10000-20000 0^=346, valid percentage: 30.8%) 
3 20000-30000 0^=263, valid percentage: 23.4%) 
4 30000-40000 0^1=168，validpercentage: 14.9%) 
5 40000-50000 Q^=6^, valid percentage: 6.0%) 
6 50000-60000 (N=32, valid percentage: 2.8%) 
7 60000-70000 0^=16，validpercentage: 1.4%) 
8 70000-80000 (N=9, valid percentage: 0.8%) 
9 80000 以上 0^=37，valid percentage: 3.3%) 




1 無正式收入 0sN426, valid percentage: 35.9%) 
2 10000以下 0^^=235，valid percentage:19.8%) 
3 10000-20000 0^=337, valid percentage: 28.4%) 
4 20000-30000 0^=105, valid percentage: 8.9%) 
5 , 30000-.40000 (N=43, valid percentage: 3.6%) 
6 “ 40000-50000 0^=16, validpercentage: 1.3%)^ ： 
7 50000-60000 (N=8, valid percentage: 0.7%) 
8 60000-70000 0^=3, valid percentage: 0.3%) 
9 70000-80000 0^=13, validpercentage: 1.1%) 








1 無正式讀書 （N=81, valid percentage: 6.7%) 
2 小學畢業或以下 G^=198, validpercentage: 16.4%) 
3 中一至中三 CN=218, validpercentage: 18.0%) 
4 中四至中五 CN=344, valid percentage: 28.5%) 
5 中六至中七 （N=130, validpercentage: 10.8%) 
6 大專 0^=221,validpercentage:18.3%) 
7 研究院或以上 （N=17, validpercentage: 1.4%) 
9 不作答 0^=17) 
請問你係持邊一種護照的呢？ . 
1 中國護照 0^^=49, valid percentage: 4.3%) 
2 特區護照 0^=153，validpercentage: 13.5%) 
3 C I 0^=152, valid percentage: 13.4%) 
4 B N O 0^=720, valid percentage: 63.3%) 
5 外國護照 0^=38，valid percentage: 3.3%) 
6 其他 0^=25，valid percentage: 2.2%) 
9 沒作答 0^=8¾ 
請問你現時的婚姻狀況係點呢？係未婚，已婚，抑或係其他呢？ 
1 未婚 0^=421, valid percentage: 34.7%) 
2 已婚 0^=766，valid percentage: 63.1%) 
3 其他 0^=26，valid percentage:2.1%) 
9 不作答 （N=13) 
你係香港居住了幾多年呢？ 
Mean: 32.75, S .D. : 12.02, Valid ca se s : 1210 
性別（無須發問） 
1 男 G^=638,validpercemage:52.3%) 
2 女 ¢^=582, valid percentage: 47.7%) 
3 沒記錄 ¢^=6) 
- 二 》 
泰 
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3 a 被 訪 者 不 在 _ 咐請問佢大槪幾時會係度呢？（寫下時間） 








有 /唔係記得好淸楚 /唔記得： 
根據我地有的統計資料，你係 _年出生，已婚 /未婚，教育程度係 ’ 
個人收則介乎 同 之間，請問有無出錯呢？ 
^ I ' F ' • 
TTtr • 
i \ \\ 
咐唔知會唔會係另外一位同我地做過訪問呢？可唔可以麻煩你問一問呢？ 
有 一 資 料 無 錯 一 繼 續 訪 問 （ 4 ) 
有 — 資 料 有 錯 - 更 改 資 料 一 繼 續 訪 問 （ 4 ) zzzz 
唔 記 得 - 資 料 無 錯 - 繼 續 訪 問 （ 4 ) 
唔 記 得 一 資 料 有 錯 （ 3 b ) Z Z Z Z 





請^口，你係五月二十四日有無去投票呢？ - 二 
1 有 0^=452, valid percentage: 80.9%) 
2 無 0^=107, validpercentage:19.1%) 
3 不作答 （N=0) 
請問係競選期間’有無候選人或助選團曾經上門或者打電話向你拉票呢？ 
1 有 0^=147，valid percentage: 26.4%) 
2 無 （N=409, valid percentage: 73.6%) 




1 有 G^=132, valid percentage: 23.7%) 
2 無 0^:426，valid percentage: 76.3%) 
3 不作答 （N=1) 
請問你有無蹄過電視播出的候選人論壇節目呢？你係經常蹄，間中蹄，好少蹄， 
定係完全唔蹄呢？ 
1 經常 （N=61, validpercentage: 10.9%) 
2 間中 GSK326,validpercenmge:58.3%) 
3 好少 CN=97, validpercentage: 17.4%) 
4 唔蹄 （N=75, validpercentage: 13.4%) 
9 不作答 （N=0) 
咐係你蹄的時候’你係非常不留意，不留意’普通’留意’定係完全非常留意 
呢？ 
1 非常不留意 0^=8， validpercentage: 1.7%) 
2 不留意 0^=50，validpercentage: 10.4%) 
3 普通 0^=273，valid percentage: 56.5%) 
4 留意 0^=122，valid percentage: 25.3%) 
5 享一常留意 ¢^=30, valid percentage: 6.2%) 
9 不作答 0^=76) 
你認爲過去兩個月入面’媒介係提供有關候選人政策意見的資訊方面做得足唔 
足夠呢？係非常唔足夠’唔足夠，咐卩甘好，定係太多呢？ 
1 非常不足夠 0^=6， validpercentage: 1.2%) 
2 唔足夠 （N=88，validpercentage: 17.7%) 
3 咐咐好 0^=364, valid percentage: 73.1%) 
4 太多 0^=40, valid percentage: 8.0%) 
9 不作答 0^=61) 
你認爲媒介係提供有關候選人競選策略的資訊方面做得足唔足夠呢？係非常唔 
足夠，唔足夠，咐 _好，定係太多呢？ 
1 非常不足夠 CN=3, valid percentage: 0.6%) 
： . 2 唔足夠 ¢^=151, valid percentage: 30.1%) 
3 咐柑好 G�I-=335，valid percentage: 66.9%) ‘ 
4 太多 0^=12，val id percentage: 2.4%) ： 





1 非常不足夠 （N=3， valid percentage: 0.6%) 
2 唔足夠 0^=143, valid percentage: 30.3%) 
3 柑咐好 0^=313，valid percentage: 66.3%) 
4 太多 （N=13, valid percentage: 2.8%) 
9 不作答 0^=87) 
你認爲媒介係提供有關預測候選人勝負的民意調查方面做得足唔足夠呢？係非 
常唔夠，唔足夠，咐柑好，定係太多呢？ 
1 非常不足夠 （N=4， valid percentage: 0.9%) 
2 唔足夠 0^=90，valid percentage: 21.0%) 
3 卩甘_好 0^=312，valid percentage: 72.7%) 
4 太多 CN=23，valid percentage: 5.4%) 
9 不作答 0^J=130) 
口甘你認爲媒介係提供有關選舉制度資訊方面又足唔足夠呢？係非常唔足夠，唔 
足夠， _咐好，定係太多呢？ 
1 非常不足夠 0^=16，valid percentage: 3.2%) 
2 唔足夠 0^=158，valid percentage: 31.8%) 
3 ffl^tf 0^=307，valid percentage: 61.8%) 
4 太多 0^=16, valid percentage: 3.2%) 
9 不作答 0^=62) 
咐你認爲媒介提供資訊對選民投票幫助有幾大呢？係非常有用，有用，一般’ 
無用，定係非常無用呢？ 
1 非常有用 0^=6， valid percentage: 6.0%) 
2 有用 0^=88, valid percentage: 44.1%) 
3 普通 0^=364，valid percentage: 33.8%) 
4 無用 ^^=77，validpercentage: 14.1%) 
5 非常無用 （^=11， valid percentage: 2.0%) 
9 不作答 （N = i p 
、在選舉期間’你有無特別花多d時間蹄電視，報紙或者聽電台新聞報道呢？係 
花多左好多時間’多左少少’同平時一樣，_定係少左呢？ -
1 花多好多時間 0^=17，val id percentage: 3.0%) 
2 花多少少 0^=209，valid percentage: 37.5%) 
3 同平時一樣 ¢^=329, valid percentage: 59.0%) 
4 少左 （N=3， valid percentage: 0.5%) 




1 留意多好多 0^=22, valid percentage: 3.9%) 
2 留意多少少 （N=303, valid percentage: 54.2%) 
3 同平時一樣 0^=228，valid percentage: 40.8%) 
4 少左 G^=5, valid percentage: 0.9%) 
9 不作答 （N=1) 
如果要你以零分至十分評分的話，你覺得今次選舉中政府表現値幾多分呢？ 
Mean: 5.94, S.D.: 1.54, Valid cases: 538 
咐民主黨表現又値幾多分呢？ 
Mean: 6.41， S.D.: 1.83， Valid cases: 501 
民建聯呢？ 
Mean: 5.56, S.D.: 1.81, Valid cases: 471 
民協呢？ 
Mean: 4.68, S.D.: 1.85, Valid cases: 469 
自由黨呢？ “ 
Mean: 4.71， S.D.: 1.73, Valid cases: 455 
口甘所有政黨同埋候選人的整體表現又値幾多分呢？ 
Mean: 6.21, S.D.: 1.44， Valid cases: 505 
口甘整個選舉的過程你又覺得値幾多分呢？ 
Mean: 6.63, S.D.: 1.55, Valid cases: 522 
一 • 
‘ , - 二 » 
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Appendix C Electoral system, vote calculating method, and candidates lists. 
The proportional representation system, and the list voting system 
The 1998 Legislative Council Election had three parts - election committee, 
functional constituencies, and geographical constituencies. They were responsible 
for returning 10, 30, and 20 legislators, respectively, into the Council. This study has 
focused on the geographical constituency election, which was the only one having a 
direct, one-person-one-vote election. It is chosen as the focus since it was the only 
truly democratic system, and it is expected to expand as democratization continues. 
According to the Basic Law, Hong Kong's constitutional document, in 2007 there will 
be 30 legislators among the 60 to be elected directly by the public. And after 2007 the 
whole electoral systems as well as Hong Kong's democratization process could be 
reviewed. 
The 1998 election has adopted the proportional representation system, which 
was different from 1991 election, which used double-seat-double-vote system, and 
also different from the 1995 election, which used single-seat-single-vote system. In 
1998, the whole territory was divided into 5 geographical constituencies - Hong Kong 
Island, Kowloon West, Kowloon East, New Territories East, and New Territories 
West. The 20 seats were divided into the 5 constituencies according to the 
population sizes within them. Kowloon East and West only had three seats each, 
while NT East and West had five each. 
Within the system, candidates do not enter the competition as single-individual 
candidates. Rather, candidates belong to the same political organization or party are 
put on one list. Independent candidates have a one-candidate list for him/herself. 
Thus the number of candidates on each list varies. Voters do not have the chance to 
choose one particular candidate but only a list. Therefore, the Hong Kong SAR 
government, starting from March, used the name "list voting system" in their 
promotionoftheetection. 一 
The political organizations and parties are responsible for deciding the ranking 
among the candidates on the list. The vote calculating method is designed so that the 
candidate ranked first has the highest chance to get a seat while the second has a 
greatly diminished chance. If a candidate is ranked third, the chance is slim (actually, 
no candidate ranked third on a list won). Commentators have pointed out that this 
particular aspect of the system had directly led to the intra-party conflicts that were 
mentioned in Chapter 9. 
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Vote calculating method 
The vote calculating method uses the largest remainder formula with the "Hare 
quota." We can use the New Territories East election as an example. The 
constituency had 7 candidate lists - Liberal Party (LP), Independent Andrew Wong 
(AW), Citizens Party (CP), Frontier (FR), Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of 
Hong Kong (DAB), Democratic Party (DP), and Independent Ken Ping-chi (KPC). 
The results of the election are summarized in the following table. 
List Candidates % of votes % of votes won Candidate won in 
ranking won by first by second the election 
candidate candidate 
LP Allen Li Peng- fe i ^10 .25% ^ ^ 
Wong Yiu-chee 
Cheng Chee-kwok 
Wong (lnd.) Andrew Wong 13.43% (4) —— Andrew Wong 
^ Liu Yat-ming 0.72% ^ ^ 
F R ~ ~ Emily Lau 30.81%(1)~~10.81%(5) Emily Lau 
Ho Sau-Ian Ho Sau-Ian 










^ e n (lnd.) |Kan Ping-chee |2.Q1% ----- -----
(Total votes: 330434) 
Since the constituency had 5 seats, a seat was won if a list got 20% of vote. 
Therefore, DP and FR got at;jeast one seat since their lists had more than 20% of 
votes. As "three seats were left, they would be obtained by the list with the "largest 
remainder." There are several methods in calculating the remainder but the Hare 
quota was used this time. The percentage of votes that the second candidate on a 
list got was calculated by the percentage the list got minus 20% (which can be 
thought as being "consumed" by the first candidate of the list). Thus in the above 
table we can calculate the percentage of vote the second candidates of DP and FR 
got, since the two lists had more than 20% of votes. If there was a list obtained more 
than 40% of votes, a percentage will also be given to the third candidate on that list 
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by the total percentage the list got minus 40%. 
After that we can determine who get the seats by just picking out the candidates 
with the highest percentages, so in the NT East Frontier's Emily Lau and Ho Sau-Ian, 
DP's Cheng Ka-foo, DAB's Lau Kong-wah, and Independent Andrew Wong entered 
the LegCo. 
Controversies about the electoral system 
There were heated debates and controversies surrounding the electoral system 
and the vote calculating method during the election period. Political scientists have 
pointed out that different electoral systems may give rise not only to the specific 
results of particular elections but also may affect various aspects of political 
development, like the development of party system, in a country. For these more 
theoretical discussions on electoral system, readers may refer to Choi (1998)'s 
Perspective on Hong Kong Electoral Systems, which gave a detailed discussions on 
these issues with regard to the Hong Kong situation. 
Here, it may be suitable to give a brief review on the more specific controversies 
raised by political parties and the public during the election period. When the 
government announced the plan to adopt the proportional representation system, the 
democrats' reaction was to condemn the change of electoral rules as a means to 
curtail the democrats' power in the legislature. Since under proportional 
representation system it is much more difficult for any party and faction to have a 
landslide victory and control the legislature (the DP did so in 1991, and then in 1995 
to a less extent). However, this accusation was refuted by the leftist parties and the 
government as they argued that Hong Kong never had an electoral system used for 
successive LegCo elections. Also, the proportional representation system is used by 
various Western democratic countries that have a multi-party system, like the one 
that is seemingly emerging in Hong Kong. The proportional representation system 
can lead to a better correspondence .between the percentage of votes and the 
_ number of seats a party gets. ： — , 
Enter into the election period the center of debate became whether the new 
system is too difficult to understand for the citizens and thus affecting their intention 
to participate. In the campaign period, various polling organizations including 
academic and media institutions conducted polls to test the public's understanding 
about the system. The results consistently showed that about 80% to 90% of 
respondents "did not understand the new system." 
The government's major response to the evidences of the polls was that voters 
do not need to know every aspect of the new system. They even do not need to know 
‘ 182 
how the votes will be calculated. All they need to know is that they have to choose a 
Iist that they like best. The government's response was then criticized by some 
commentators and politicians as "insulting the Hong Kong public's intelligence." 
While commentators criticized the government as having failed to promote the new 
system, Head of the Electoral Committee Justice Wu Kwok-hing commented that the 
greatest obstacle actually came from the academia and the media, who continually 
propagate the message that the system is difficult". 
It is certain that proportional representation is more complicated than single-
seat-single-vote. However, it seems that the media might indeed have over-
emphasized the complexity and the failure of the public to understand the new 
system. For instance, Ming Pao gave headline coverage on the main news page on 
April 19 about a poll result that 90% of respondents did not understand the system. 
What the poll did show, however, was that 87% of respondents failed to name the 
new voting system in an open-ended question. The problem is: Is failure to name the 
system equal to failure to understand the system? On May 3 and 17, Ming Pao 
reported poll results showing that about 60% of respondents answered "don't know" 
when they were asked to comment on whether the new system is suitable to Hong 
Kong. The results were then interpreted as the public's failure to understand the 
voting system. When a poll reported that 60% of respondents expected a lower voter 
turnout rate in 1998 than 1995, Ming Pao reported a researcher's explanation that 
the public's seeming apathy to the election is probably due to the fact that they did 
not understand the new system and they do not know whether the system is good for 
Hong Kong38. 
The same set of poll results is certainly open to alternative interpretations. The 
questions asked may not be fair test of understanding. More important is what we 
should expect the public to know. Actually, a poll reported on April 29 on Ming Pao 
showed that more than 70% of respondents said that they did not worry that the new 
system would hinder their voting. This particular result car> be said as supporting the 
government's argument that what the public needs to do is only to "draw a tick." ‘ 
It is difficult to determine to what extent the public should understand the voting 
system. Here the author is not trying to evaluate media performance and support the 
government regarding the issue. Suffice it to point out that whether the system is too 
complicated or not cannot be determined unless we have criteria on how far public 
« 
understanding should go. As Graber (1994a; 1994b) argued, the fact that the voters 
seemed to be ignorant in polls is sometimes attributable to the unreasonable 
37 Ming Pao, May, 13, 1998 
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standards set by pollsters and researchers. In the 1998 LegCo election, for the 
researchers the public should be able to name the system, to comment on the 
system's suitability to Hong Kong etc. But for the government the public really has to 
know virtually no specific things about the system. Probably both government and 
the pollsters are not absolutely right. In general, pollsters need to be aware of the 
standards they set, and the media should be aware of the possible interpretations of 
poll results. A method to improve the situation is to include in survey and media 
report more questions about the same issue (i.e., multiple indicators), thus providing 
a better and more comprehensive picture of the issue at hand. 
After the election, the question facing the pollsters and the media became the 
unexpectedly high voter turnout. Some commentators returned to the voting system, 
not to stress its possible detrimental effect to turnout this time, but to suggest its 
possible positive effects, like allowing a wider range of choices for every individual 
voter. Some commentators even suggested new systems with more complexities 
(like introducing the opportunities for voters to choose candidates as well as lists). 
This turn of the tide only shows how naive the "difficulty debate" about the voting 
system was. Whether a system is too difficult is not something the government orthe 
media tell the public, what the government and the media should do are to inform the 
public about the system. The public is allowed to judge and debate among 
themselves. 
For reference the following tables give the candidate lists of the five 
constituencies and the percentage of votes they got. The lists are listed according to 
their position on the votes prepared by the government used on the election day. The 
ranking of the lists is determined by a random process. As the lists in New Territories 
East was already given above, the following wHI only include the four remaining 
constitu6nci6s. 
Kowloon East (total vote: 261612，base rate percentage for one seat: 33.33%) 
List Candidate |% of votes won by lists |Winning candidate 
DP "Szeto Wah 55.80% Szeto Wah 
Li Wah-ming Li Wah-ming 
Mak Hoi-wah 
D ^ Chan Yuen-han 41.78% Chan Yuen-han 
Kwok Pit-chang 
Tam Man-fai 
Fok (lnd.) |Fok Pui-yee ]2A2% . ----- “ 
38 MingPao, April, 17 
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Hong Kong Island (total votes: 307611，base rate percentage for one seat: 25%) 
Ust |Candidate |% of votes won by lists |Winning candidate 
^ Christine Loh 12.76% Christine Loh 
Chong (lnd.) Chong Chan-yau 4.02% -----




LP Wong Kei-ying 2.43% 3HII 
Cho Sing-yu 
Lam Tsui-Iin 
^ Martin Lee 46.76% Martin Lee 
Yeung Sum Yeung Sum 
. Yuen Pun-keung 
Chan Kwok-leung 
Leung (lnd.) Leung Wing-on 0.84% — — — 
Chow(lnd.) Chow Kit-bing 3.56% ----- — 
LiTTnd.) |Li Hung |0.30% … -
Kowloon West (total votes: 205401, base rate percentage for one seat: 33.33%) 
List Candidate |% of votes won by lists |Winning candidate 
DP Lau Chin-shek 55.05% Lau Chin-shek 
Tao Kun-sun Tao Ken-shun 
Wong Chung-ki 
ADPL Frederick Fung 19.25% Z Z 
Liu Sing-lee 
Tam Kwok-kiu 
^ ~ C h u n g Yee-fong 1.12% ----- — 
LP Chiang Sai-cheong 2.85% IHI I 
Chan Noi-yue 
Li King-wah 
DAB Tsang Yok-sing 21.73% Tsang Yok-sing 
lp Kwok-chung 
|Wen Choy-bon 
* Atlas Alliance 
- 产 • 
« 
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New Territories West (total votes: 375173，base rate percentage for one seat: 
20%) 
List Candidate % of votes won by lists Winning candidate 
DP Lee Wing-tat 39.21 % Li Wing-tat 
Ho Ghun-y3n Ho Chun-yan 
Wong Wai-yin 
Chan Shu-ying 





^ S C * * Leung Yiu-chung 10.30% Leung Yiu-chung 
FR Lee Cheuk-yan 12.45% " Li Cheuk-yan 
lp Kwok-fun 
Ting (lnd.) Ting Yin-wah 2.98% — … -
LP Chan Sing-kong 0.84% ^ 
Liu Kwong-sang 
Wong Kwok-keung 





ADPL "Y im Tin-shan 5.20% -----
The Pioneer — L a m Chi-Ieung 0.26% -----




Yeung (lnd.) |YeungFuk-kwong | l .71% —— 
* New Territories Alliance 
** Neighborhood and Workers Service Center 
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